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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
The two major Bantu political groupings in West Central Africa 
centre on the Kongo kingdom and on the Luba-Lunda states* To the south 
of Kongo and east of Lunda live the Mbundu people who, from the end of 
the fifteenth century, developed contacts with the Portuguese and event­
ually became the main link between Western Bantu Africa and Europe* Dur­
ing most of the sixteenth century this relationship was based on trade 
in slaves. The benefits of this trade enabled the Mbundu to consolidate 
the small state of Ndongo, on the north side of the Kwanza River, into 
a moderately powerful kingdom. In the mid-sixteenth century Ndongo pros­
perity caused a migrant Lunda group called the Imbangala, who had camped 
on the eastern border of Mbundu country, to attack the Mbundu and make 
direct contact with the Portuguese.
From 1575 the Portuguese embarked on a programme of territorial con­
quest. This continued through most of the seventeenth century, the great 
period of the Angolan Wars. The Portuguese suffered many set-backs, the 
lowest ebb being from 1641 to 1648 when the Dutch temporarily captured 
and held Luanda* By 1671, however, the independent Mbundu monarch in 
Ndongo had been eradicated. Thereafter the main African trading states 
of the area were Matamba and Kasanje on the Kwango River. After the wars 
the Luanda slave trade declined, North European competition from Loango 
and Portuguese competition from Benguela caused a serious depression in 
Mbundu trade during most of the eighteenth century. Only after 1790 were 
there signs of a revival.
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PREFACE
This thesis is an attempt to look at the history of Angola as 
a chapter of African history rather than as an episode in the history 
of Portuguese imperial expansion. The records of European activity in 
Angola form an important part of the material used, hut this material 
has been employed chiefly to cast light on tie older established inhabi­
tants. Much that could have been said about Portuguese policies and 
achievements has been left out on the grounds that although interesting 
and relevant to the European settlers, it did not particularly concern 
the Mbundu.
The second kind of material used in this study is the oral tradi­
tions of the Mbundu and other Bantu whose history is linked with theirs. 
By drawing together oral history, which only has a relative chronology, 
and the history of European activities, in which each event bears a date, 
a much fuller picture can be gained than by using either separately.
On this basis a short history of the Mbundu from 1482 to 1790 has been 
written, and an attempt has been made to link this with the wider history 
of the Bantu in West Central Africa.
The Mbundu have been chosen as the focus of attention partly be­
cause of their relationship to several larger Bantu groups, and partly 
because of the continuity of their contact with the world outside Africa. 
A more detailed history of Kongo in the sixteenth century or of the 
Ovimbundu in the eighteenth would have been possible, but the Mbundu
played an important if fluctuating role throughout the first three 
centuries of European contact with West Central Africa. The neighbours 
of the Bundu who hae been included are the Ndembu of southern Kongo, 
the Jinga of Matamba, the Imbangala of Kasanje, and the heterogeneous 
peoples of the south bank of the Kwanza River. All these peoples con­
tain a strong element of Mbundu, many of them having been driven out of 
the central Mbundu areas by the Portuguese.
The Mbundu historical traditions used are those collected by 
Cavazsi in the 1660's and by Haveaux in the 1940's.^ Although the for­
mer are traditions collected before the complete subjection of the 
Mbundu by the Portuguese, they may have been obtained from informants 
who had left the Mbundu kingdom of Ndongo to settle in Matamba, further 
removed from the depredations of slave traders. The Mbundu traditions 
published by Haveaux were collected among the Pende, a people who were 
subjects of the IJgola, or king of the Mbundu,until the mid-seventeenth 
century. They then left Ndongo and migrated right out of the area of 
the slave trade to settle on the middle Kasai, near its junction with 
the Tshikapa. By escaping from Portuguese domination the Pende have 
preserved their traditions of origin and these can be compared both with 
the traditions collected by Cavazzi three hundred years earlier, and 
with the written records of Portuguese activity.
‘G. A. Cavazzi de Montecuccolo: Istorica Descrizione de tre regni Congo
Matamba et Angola. Bologna 1687.
G. L. Haveaux: .La tradition historique des Bapende Orientaux. Bruxelles, 
1954.
The history of the Mbundu was deeply affected by an invading 
people from the east called the Imbangala. Two versions of the tradi­
tions of the Imbangala have been used. The first was collected by 
Neves in 1850 while on a military expedition to the Imbangala state
of Kasanje on the upper Kwango.1 The second versinn was published by
2Henrique Dias de Carvalho about 1898. He probably collected the
material during his expedition to Lunda in the 18801 s.
In the process of linking the history of the Mbundu with that
of Kongo, Lunda and Luba, a number of traditions of these latter peoples
have been used. For Kongo the most important sources are two documents
of the 1620’s written by Portuguese clerics who worked in Kongo and re-
corded the oral traditions. These can be supplemented by the accounts
of Montesarchio and Gallo, two Capuchins who were in Kongo in the late
4
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The traditions of the
5 6Lunda were recorded by Pogge in 1875, by Carvalho in 1884-1888 and
7
lastly and most fully by Duysters in 1925-1927. Finally some of the
A^. R. Neves: Memoria da Expedi^o de Cassange em 1850. Lisbon 1854.
p
H. D. de Carvalho: 0 Jagado de Cassange, Lisbon ?1898 (or 1890).
•z ^
Anonymous: Historia do Reino de Congo c. 1620. In Felner: Angola, 
Lisbon 1953 and.Letter from a priest to Manuel Rodrigues dated Kongo 
1624. In Paiva Manso: Historia do Congo, Lisbon 1877.
4Jerome de Montesarchio cited in Cuvelier: L'Ancien Royaume de Congo,
Bruxelles 1946 and Bernardo de Gallo cited in Jadin; Le Congo et la 
secte des Antoniens, Rome 1961.
5
Pogge: I'm Reich des Muata Jamvo, Berlin 1880.
E^. D. de Carvalho: Expedi^So ao Huatianvua. Vol. entitled Ethnographia 
et Historia tradicional da Lunda, Lisbon 1390.
'L. Duysters: Histoire des Aluunda, Bruxelles, 1958.
numerous and complex traditions of the Luba peoples were collected 
by Verhulpen.^* In addition to these historical traditions minor 
references have been made to recent archaeological and linguistic re­
search.
For the written records, Angola is extremely well endowed with
collections of published documents. Among the earliest are the works
2of Lopes de Lima in 1846 and Paiva Manso in 1877. These are followed
3
by the Angolan archival review Arquivos de Angola, by the first volume
4
of Albuquerque Felner^ documents, by the first, and so far the only,
5
volume of Jadin's Vatican documents concerning Kongo, and finally 
there is the collection compiled by Antonio Brasio which has reached 
its ninth volume.^ This last work contains virtually all the Portu­
guese documents so far known which relate to Angola before 1600, and 
most of the important ones for the period 1600 to 1646. It also gives 
some coverage of the Spanish and Vatican documents over the whole period.
^Verhulpen: Baluba et Balubalses. Antwerp 1936.
2
'Lopes de Lima: Ensaios sobre o statistics das Possessftes Portuguezas 
no Ultramar, Vol. Ill Angola e Benguella. Lisbon 1846.
Paiva Manso: Historio do Congo (Documentor) Lisbon 1877.
3
Arcmivos de Angola, Luanda. First Series1933-1939> about 20 parts in­
cluding index volume. Second Series 1943 to date continuing.
4
Albuquerque Felner: Angola. Auontamentos sobre... Congo. Angola e 
Berguela, Lisbon 1933.
c
Jadin and Cuvelier: L'Ancien Congo d1apres lea Archives Romainea 
15X8-1640, Bruxelles 1954.
6 ^
Antonio Brasio: Monuments Missionaria Africans. Africa Occidental. 
Lisbon 1952, IX Vols to date.
This extensive range of published documents is especially useful 
in view of the wide dispersal of the sixteenth century material relating 
to Angola. This is chiefly in the badly organised and inadequately 
catalogued collections of the Torre do Tombo, the National Library and 
the Kings’ Library of Ajuda, all in Lisbon. Jesuit reports from Angola 
are scattered as far afield as Porto, Evora, Paris and the Vatican.
Most of this material appears to have been published with the exception 
of the Jesuit lettersin the Vatican, and these were briefly consulted 
in the photostat collection of Canon Jadin, at Louvain.
During the seventeenth century the pattern of distribution of the 
Angolan sources becomes clearer, and the main archive in which they are 
housed is the Arquivo Historico Dltramarino in Lisbon. The documents 
concerning Angola are of two kinds, the bound volumes of letters and 
orders to Angola, and the boxes of loose documents which include the 
correspondence from Angola. It is the latter series, containing 12 boxes 
for the seventeenth century and 28 for the eighteenth century to 1790, 
which has been used for this work. For the eighteenth century, es­
pecially the latter part, there is also a series of "disorganised papers". 
These were only sampled; they are mainly formal documents concerning 
such matters as petitions for arrears of pay, applications for jobs, 
and petty litigation. The "organised" boxes also contain many such docu­
ments of minor importance.
The Angolan archives in Luanda contain three volumes of letters
sent to Portugal before 1790. They cover the periods 1726 to 1732, 
1746-1757, and more extensively the activities of Souza Coutinho from 
1764-1771. The material is probably the same as that found in the 
Lisbon boxes, but a detailed comparison was not possible owing to the 
promised microfilms not proving available. Hore interesting than this 
external correspondence are five volumes of letters from the governors 
to officials in the interior. Each volume covers about two years within 
the overall period 1767 to 1790. Although most of the letters concern 
tythe-collection and other administrative matters, several refer to 
population movements and wars. Finally, but outside the scope of this 
thesis, Vol. 98 of the Luanda Archives is devoted to correspondence 
from the Portuguese governors to the indigenous rulers between 1798 
and 1854.1
In addition to the series in the AHU and the Luanda Archives, 
material on Angola after 1600 can presumably be found in four other 
sources. Two of these, Holland and Brazil, it has not been possible to 
investigate as yet. Some of the material which accrued in Spain during 
the Spanish domination of Portugal from 1580 to 1640 is published in 
Brasio*s documents. Finally the library of the Propaganda Fide, in 
Rome, contains the records of the Capuchin mission which was active in 
Kongo, and to a lesser extent in Angola, from the 1640*s. According to
Tor the history of Angola after 1790 the Luanda Archives are of funda­
mental importance. For the next hundred year period there are 70 vol­
umes of external correspondence, and over 200 volumes of internal mater­
ial. In Lisbon also the quantity of material on Angola increases drama­
tically after the year 1790.
Jadin this voluminous material contains little information about the
interior of Angola, but refers chiefly to the administration of the
mission headquarters in Luanda, and to activities in Kongo and further
up the coast. The Capuchins did, however, evangelise to some extent
in Ndongo, Matamba and Kasanje especially during the 1650's and 1660*s.
Cavazzi published an extensive account of this activity. Owing to the
kindness of M. Jadin it was possible to look fleetingly through some
of the Capuchin records for this period, which he has prepared for
future publication.
Oral traditions, published documents, and archival collections
have been supplemented by a few contemporary works. In addition to
Cavazzi's "Historical Description" of Angola published in 1687, the
major works of this kind are the "Adventures" of Andrew Battell,^
2
the "History of the Angolan Wars" by Cadoraega, the "Description of
3 4Kongo" by Lopes and Pigafetta, and Silva Correia's "History of Angola".
Other contemporary and post contemporary works referred to in the text
will be found in the Bibliography.
When this work had reached an advanced stage, it became apparent
that the importance of the Mbundu lay particularly in their activities
E. G. Ravenstein (ed): The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell.
Hakluyt Society,Ed.London 1901.
^Antonio de Oliveira de Cadomega: Historia/ifas Guerras Angolaras.
Luanda 1681. Ed. Lisbon 1940. 3 Vols.
■7
Duarte Lopez and Pilipo Pigafetta, (ed) Y/illy Bal: Description du 
Royaume de Congo et des Contrees environantes 1951. Ed. Louvain 1963*
4 ^Elias Alexandre da Silva Correia: Historia de Angola. C. 1792. Ed. Lisbon
1937. 2 Vols.
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In many ways, perhaps, 
this history would best have been concluded in 1684 when the kingdom 
of Ndongo had finally been crushed by Portuguese military action. The 
last chapter has however been included as originally planned, but should 
be considered in the nature of an epilogue. It discusses the activities 
of the Mbundu during a century of depression when they had ceased to be 
the main opponents of Portuguese conquest and the main purveyors of 
slaves, but before they became the Portuguese tool in establishing a 
modern colony with broad ramifications of government activity.
One of the reasons why this thesis has ranged rather widely beyond 
the immediate limits of the subject tackled, is the extreme paucity of 
historical writing for the whole western Bantu region. This branching- 
out has been valuable in opening up ideas for future research. Three 
major topics would appear to demand attention in the next instance. A 
history of Benguela and the Ovimbundu states of the plateau might be 
composed on the pattern of the present thesis, using similar materials 
and methods. The history of Loango has two outstanding aspects, the 
traditional history of the kingdoms which evolved in the region before 
the fifteenth century, and the history of the eighteenth century slave 
trade. The trade of this little known region, for which French, English, 
Dutch and Portuguese materials must exist, probably developed ramifi­
cations into the Teke country, and even as far afield as the Lunda empire. 
Finally, and perhaps most exciting of the three lines of approach sug­
gested, the way is open for a history of the Lunda empire in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.
ABBREVIATIONS AND ORTHOGRAPHY
Ik*11.11. Arquivo Histdrico Ultramarino. Lisbon.
Cx. Caixa or Box.
A.P.I*. Archivo da Propaganda Fide.
SRCG. Scritturi Rifferite dei Congress! Generali.
A.U.S.I. Jesuit Archives. Rome.
Lus. Lusitanian Series. (Portugal)
A.T.T. Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo. Lisbon.
CC. Corpo Chronologico.
3.11. British Museum.
Add. Additional Manuscripts.
3.11. L. Biblioteca National de Lisboa.
CA. Colecj&o de Alcoba^a.
CP. Colecj£o Pombalina.
FG. Funda Geral.
B.N.M. Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid.
B.n .R.J. Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro.
B.A.L. Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon.
B.V. Bibliotheca Vaticana.
J.A.H. Journal of African History.
An attempt has been made to spell Bantu names in a phonetic manner. 
Nhere this method involved a greater change from the Portuguese spelling 
than, for instance, substituting k for _q or jc, the original spelling 
had normally been included in a foot-note.
16.
f
[|
f
\
f
i
i
1
i
it
r
t
I
i
i
;
i
I
f
Chapter One
TEE BANTU OF WEST CENTRAL AFRICA
West Central Africa consists of a broad belt of light woodland 
and patches of grassland which stretch over the African plateau from 
the Atlantic to the great lakes. In the north the region slopes down 
to the inhospitable equatorial rain forest of the northern half of the 
Congo basin. In the south it reaches the semi-desert fringes of the 
Kalahari. Most of the country1 s waterways run north into the Congo 
or south into the Zambezi. The Kwanza is the only river of any importance 
which reaches the coast between the Congo and the Cunene. It was along 
the northern bank of the Kwanza that the Mbundu lived and it was up the 
Kwanza that European missionaries, colonisers and traders sailed.
In pre-historic times this open country with perennial streams 
attracted a considerable stone-age population.^* Some centuries before 
the arrival of Europeans on the coast, however, the whole region was 
infiltrated by iron-age Bantu immigrants, among whom were the Mbundu.
These Bantu formed themselves into states and groups of states with dis­
tinctive types of political organisation. The two state-complexes which 
most affected the Mbundu were those of the Bakongo and of the Luba. The 
kingdom of Kongo, which was the first Bantu state to attract the attention 
of Europeans, was centred on the city of Kbanza Kongo, about a hundred
S/. B. Leakey: Tentative Study of the Pleistocene climatic changes 
and Culture sequence in North-East Angola. Lisbon 1949 *
miles east of the Congo River estuary. The older Luba civilization, 
of which Europeans have only become aware in the last century, was 
based on the agricultural wealth and mineral deposits of the area now 
known as Katanga.
The rulers of Kongo were close northern neighbours of the Mbundu, 
and frequently interfered directly in their affairs. A description of 
this monarchy which played so large a role in Mbundu history, is found 
in a Vatican document of the late sixteenth century. At the head of the 
kingdom was a powerful sovereign who was described as a supreme king and 
absolute master of his realm. No one could oppose him or limit the scope 
of his jurisdiction. In his house he had a great many unpaid servants.
His compound was larger than any other and before entering it one had to 
pass by many paths and hedges like a labyrinth. The outside gate into 
a large open square was attended by guards and musicians with drums and 
ivory trumpets. The throne consisted of a platform covered with a mat 
of palm fibres. When the king wished to eat he had a large cauldron of 
boiled or roast meat placed in front of him. He ate with his fingers and 
distributed tasty morsels to his attendants who expressed their gratitude 
by clapping loudly. The queen had her own establishment in the same royal 
enclosure. She ate among her own entourage of ladies. When she travelled 
abroad she was always accompanied by her attendants who continuously 
clicked their fingers like castanets.’*'
^Description of Kongo in the late sixteenth century in the Confalonieri 
Collection. Vatican Archives: Vat. Lat. 12516. Published in Cuvelier-
Jadin: L !Ancien Congo dfapres les archives Romaines. Bruxelles 1954,
132-155.
Under the monarch, the kingdom of Kongo was divided into six 
provinces, five of which had their own subordinate rulers. The central 
province of Mpemba was governed by the king personally and contained 
the royal city of Mbanza Kongo. This city lay on a well cultivated 
plateau surrounded by many small villages. Its population was some­
times estimated to be as high as 100,000 people. The surrounding pro­
vinces were Nsundi to the north, Mpangu to the north-east, Mbata to the 
south-east, Mbamba in the south-west, and Sonyo on the coast west of 
the capital.**"
Duarte Lopez, who went to Kongo in 1578 and spent five years there 
as a trader, returned to Europe and gave a description of the country 
to the Italian humanist Pigafetta. He said that the most powerful of 
the provinces was Mbata. This may have been, as Lopez said, because 
Mbata had been an important kingdom in the days before the Kongo clans 
spread their authority over the whole area from the Congo to the Dande 
Rivers. Although the governor of the province was chosen by the king of 
Kongo, he was always a prince of the old Mbata royal family. Unlike 
any other nobleman in the kingdom, the Mani Mbata had a right to eat at 
the same table as the king. Although the historical importance of Mbata 
may have been one reason for its power, another was obviously its strate­
gic position on the eastern frontier of Kongo. Shortly before Lopez*
Willy Bal (ed.): Description du Royaume de Congo et des contrees 
environantes par Filippo Pigafetta et Duarte Lopez, 1591, ed. Louvain 
1963.
visit to Kongo the Jaga had invaded the kingdom from the east and 
only been expelled at great cost* The king obviously found it ex­
pedient to strengthen Mbata to prevent such an event from occurring
. 1 
again.
The other important buffer-state of Kongo was Nsundi which lay
closely round the north side of the capital and spread over both banks
of the Congo River. Its chief military function was to keep out the 
2
Teke or Anzika people who lived across the river. Nsundi was also an 
important trading province. In return for salt and small spiralled 
currency shells called nzimbus, the northern peoples came to the front­
iers of Nsundi to sell palm cloth, ivory, pelts and iron. It is pro­
bable that Kongo also received copper from the deposits in the Teke 
country. Lopez had the impression that Nsundi was normally ruled by
the heir to the Kongo throne, whom he thought to be the king’s eldest 
3
son. Since the Kongo monarchy seems to have had an elective system 
based on the principle of matrilineal succession, there is not likely 
to have been a pre-destined heir. Since, however, Nsundi was a power­
ful province situated close to the capital, it is possible that its 
’duke1 not infrequently succeeded in being elected king.
^Lopez-Pigafetta, 69-71.
^For a more detailed mention of the Teke-Anzika see the beginning of 
Chapter II.
3
Lopez-Pigafetta, 66-67 and foot-note 87.
Mpangu was one of the remoter provinces of Kongo. The tradi­
tions of its people give an interesting insight into the way in which 
the Kongo clans spread out to dominate the whole area which they later 
consolidated into a centralised kingdom. These clans first settled in 
Mpemba where their numbers gradual^ - grew until there was a shortage of 
arable land. The old mother of the tribe, Mpemba Nzinga, decided that 
one chief from each clan should emigrate with his entire family. The 
people of Mpangu were instructed to march in an east-north-easterly 
direction. Each morning during the march, when they broke camp, one of 
their number remained on the site while the others went on. For their 
long journey the people took with them millet, bananas, palm-nuts, 
kola, pepper, chickens, goats and pigs. Their clothes consisted of 
the loin-cloth (Mbari) and the cloak (Lubongo) made of raffia cloth.
They carried cutlasses, knives, bows and arrows. The chief had a staff 
and a large mat upon which he spread a leopard skin for state occasions. 
He also carried the symbols of authority which were the "basket of the 
ancestors" and some bracelets of fine grass. The Mpangu eventually 
reached the Nkisi River valley beyond which lived a small people. They 
settled down and the women began farming while the men set out to hunt 
and fish. Specialised guilds of workers practiced crafts such as weav­
ing, basket-making, iron-working and pottery and in time Mpangu developed 
into a prosperous community.^
■^Traditions collected by Van Wing, Etudes-gakongo. Sociologie, Religion
et Magie, 2nd Edition, Leopoldville, 1959.
The coastal provinces of Kongo were Sonyo and Ebamba. Sonyo
in the north seems to have been of minor importance before the arrival
of sea-borne trade. It may, however, have controlled some of the
coastal salt deposits. Ebamba, . on the other hand, was described by
Lopez as one of the largest and especially one of the wealthiest of
the Kongo provinces. The prince of Mbamba claimed suzerainty over the
*
whole coast from the Mbije River to the Kwanza River, and inland along 
the Mbundu frontier, another of the Kongo boundaries where war was en­
demic. The importance and richness of Mbamba probably lay partly in 
its control of the Luanda trade route. The main fishing ground for 
nzimbu currency shells was the island of Luanda where several villages 
of Kongo settlers were engaged in collecting them. Women waded into 
the sea and brought up baskets of sand from which they picked out the 
shells and graded them carefully according to their size and brightness. 
The governor of Luanda, who was appointed by the king, then dispatched 
the shells to the royal treasury.'*'
The chief function of the complex administrative hierarchy of the 
Kongo kingdom, as indeed of the other Bantu kingdoms, was the raising 
of tribute. At the lowest level on the administrative scale was the 
village chief who collected the taxes which had to be paid by each indi-
Lopez-Pigafetta, 25-26.
*Ambriz in Lopez1 spelling. This is probably the river which reaches the 
sea at Ambrizette.
vidual or family. The system was described in the Vatican collebtion
of Confalonieri mentioned above:
’’The village chiefs have above all to take care to collect 
from their subjects the taxes which are due to the king, 
and which they each carry to the governor of their province.
The governor presents himself twice in each year at the royal 
capital in order to pay in the tribute, and if the king is 
satisfied, he replies with the one word wote, which means 
!you have done well*. In this case the governor esteems him­
self highly favoured and makes many clappings of his two hands.
As a sign of joy he throws himself on the ground, covering his 
body with the dust. His servants do the same, and then take 
him on their shoulders, and go through all the city crying his 
praises... But if the king does not say this word wote. he re­
treats greatly discomfited, and another time he takes care to 
bring a larger tribute. The tribute is not fixed as to quan­
tity: each brings as much as he can. But if the governor does
not do better, the king addresses to him a strong reprimand, 
and takes away his post. Such a man then becomes as poor as 
the most miserable of all the blacks. The king does this because 
he is the absolute lord of all the kingdom: and whenever the de­
sire so takes him, he takes away the offices and the inheritances 
and the goods of whomever he wills, and there is no one who can 
say him nay.
The same document goes on to describe the ordinary people of 
Kongo as they struck a sixteenth century European observer. The people 
were poor but seemed satisfied with a meagre level of subsistence. Ho 
free man would till the earth or allow himself to be employed by another. 
Such tasks were left to slaves. The most powerful men were those with 
the greatest number cf slaves whom they had bought or captured in war. 
These slaves were often trusted to conduct commercial transactions and 
attend markets on behalf of their masters. The normal currency of Kongo
■^Confalonieri collection, Vat. Lat. 12516, Cuvelier-Jadin, 133-134.
was small coloured shells about the size of a pea, but some districts 
did not have these shells and cloth was commonly used instead as a 
means of exchange. Commodities such as salt and hens were sometimes 
exchanged by direct barter. One of the most important resources of 
the country was the palm tree from which oils were obtained both for 
cooking and for lighting. In times of famine palm kernels were eaten. 
Palms were tapped for their sap which made a highly esteemed alcoholic 
drink. The leaves and the bark of the palm tree provided fibres for 
weaving cloth. The best and longest fibres made a fine velvet-like 
material. Other produce grown in Kongo included very hot peppers, a 
variety of bananas, cola nuts which were widely held to make water taste 
sweeter, and yams which were the commonest food and could be eaten boiled 
or roasted. The most important grain was one which resembled radish 
seed and could be ground into a very white flour and baked into excellent 
bread. Kongo men commonly wore animal skins as clothing. Women dressed 
up by winding a piece of cloth round their shaven heads. Houses were 
made of stakes interwoven with grass and sometimes beautifully decorated 
with painted mats. Furniture consisted of sleeping-mats, wine calabashes 
and decorated pots for cooking* The villages, in which a few small live­
stock usually ran, were mostly tucked away from the main thoroughfares 
to avoid having their food supplies requisitioned by passing armies or 
noblemen."*-
^"Confalonieri collection, op.cit.
One of the controversial problems of the history of Kongo has 
been the origin of its rulers. Various theories have been put forward 
to suggest the source of the political ideas which went into the con­
struction of the kingdom. The most widely accepted hypothesis, and the 
one which seems most logical in terms of the westward spread of the 
Bantu, was that the founders of Kongo came from the east, across the 
Kwango. It would appear, however, from the traditions discussed below, 
that this theory was based on a faulty interpretation and that, although 
the most likely true origin of the Kongo kings must still lie in the 
east, the place from which the ruling Kongo clans came immediately be­
fore entering the Kongo area must be sought to the north of the lower 
Congo River.
The earliest and most important tradition relating to the northern 
origin of the kings of Kongo is found in an anonymous manuscript called 
the Historia do Reino do Congo in the Biblioteca Hacional de Lisboa 
which was written about 1620. This document says that before the terri­
tory of Kongo was invaded by the clans which established the monarchy 
and were ruling in the fifteenth century, the country was divided up in­
to a number of communities each ruled by its own independent and absol­
ute chief. Among these rulers there was a religious chief called Mani 
Kabunga. After the conquest by the ruling Bakongo, the successors of 
Mani Kabunga became important in the new kingdom as rain-makers and 
authorities on the correct times of year to sow and reap crops. To the
north of the territory of Mani Kabunga and the other chiefs, on the
far side of the Congo River, there was a small kingdom called Bungu
or Vungu. The king of Bungu. had so many sons that the youngest* Mutinu 
*
Mbene, realised that he was unlikely ever to become king of Bungu.
He decided therefore to cross the Congo River and conquer the chiefs 
who ruled to the south of it. In a few years KutinuMbene had dominated 
a large part of Kongo and had divided it among his captains, instructing 
them to marry the daughters of local chiefs. He himself married the 
daughter of Mani Kabunga and founded the dynasty of the Kongo kings.
Only Mbata was not conquered but an alliance was made with its rulers 
which stipulated that all future kings of Kongo should marry a daughter 
of the Mani Mbata.^
Confirmation of this tradition that the origin of the Kongo kings 
lay in Bungu, north-north-west of Mbanza Kongo, is given in three other 
sources. The first is a letter by a missionary priest written from Kongo 
in 16241 which mentions that Bungu7^ had been destroyed by the 'Jaga* 
with the approval of the .Loango king and that the king of Kongo had
2
been upset about it because that was where his ancestors came from.
The second source is Jerdme de Montesarchio, who wrote that the first
jiking of Kongo came across the Congo River from Kwimba^ and conquered
Xthe province of Mpemba. On his way south he stopped at Mpemba Kazi.
BHL FG 8080 in Felner: Angola. 1953. 375 ff.
2
Conego do Congo to Manuel Rodrigues, 1624. Evora Cod cxvi, 2-15, no. 7. 
In Paiva Mansoi Historia do Congo (Documentos). Lisbon 1877, 177*
*Motinobene. ^Bango. ^Coimba. ^pembacasi.
When he moved, his capital further south to Mbanza Kongo he left a
woman to rule at Mpemba Kasi who took the title Mother of the King
of K o n g o L i n g u i s t i c  evidence shows that the region of Mpemba
Kasi, and not that of Mbanza Kongo, is the central area of the Kikongo 
2
language. A third tradition confirming the above account was recorded
by Bernardo de Gallo. Mutinu was the son of a woman called Lukeni who 
*
lived in Kwimba on the north side of the Congo River. It was he who
led the Kongo ruling clans in their conquest of the country south of 
3the river.
The first king of Kongo is variously referred to in the traditions 
as Mutinu Mbene, Nimi Mutinu or Nimi a Lukeni. According to the letter 
of 1624 quoted above, Nimi Mutinu was succeeded by two nephews whose 
names had been forgotten, and then by his son, Nkuwu Mutinu.^ Nkuwu
g
Mutinu* s own son was the famous Nzinga a Nkuwu whom the Portuguese
4
baptised as Jo&o I of Kongo on 3 May 1491* The fact that this king 
list is interrupted by two unremembered names is suspicious, and it is 
not unlikely that there was in fact a wider gap than the tradition sug­
gests. The anonymous Historia do Reino do Congo said that there were
*^ Jer6me de Montesarchio cited in Cuvelier: L*Ancien Royaume de Congo.
Bruges, 1946. Note 1, 251.
2
This information, together with that about the Vili and Bembe languages 
below, was given by Professor Guthrie to the London University African 
History Seminar in 1961.
3
Bernardo de Gallo to the Prefect of the Propaganda Fide, Rome 12.12.1710, 
Arch. Prop., Scritture Rif. 1711 t. 576, fol. 516-340. In Jadin: Le
Congo et la secte des Antoniens, Rome 1961, 467-468.
4,
Letter to Manuel Rodriques S.J. from Kongo. 1624. In Paiva Manso,
ginga ancu.
^op.cit.. 174-:175.
Coimba. H3ncu a Motinu. ^N
six unremembered kings between Mutinu Mbene and Nzinga Nkuwu. It
also said that the kingdom of Kongo had been founded about 550 years
before the Historia was written circa 1620.^ This evidence suggests
that the Kongo clans probably invaded the region south of the Congo
2
River, and set up the Kongo monarchy, in the fourteenth century.
The first tradition which says that the kings of Kongo came from
*
the east across the Kwango and stopped at Kongo dia Mulaza before going
on to conquer Kongo, was taken by Van Wing from an incomplete edition
of Cadornega1 s chronicle. The full edition contains a foot-note by
Cadornega himself saying that some opinions held that the conqueror of
Kongo had come from another direction. Van Wing found some confirmation
for this eastern tradition among the Mpangu. Most informants could only
remember their migration from Mbanza Kongo but a few chiefs confirmed,
or may even have volunteered, that they came from the Kwango before that.
Rather more interesting, perhaps, is the fact that the Bankanu of Kongo
dia Mulaza claim that their town was founded by the great Kongo chief.
Moreover the Suku people, much further south on the Kwango, call their
$3chief Mwene Kongo. The second source for the Eastern hypothesis1
^BNL FCr 8080 in Felner, op.cit.. 375 ff.
2
This conclusion agrees with that recently arrived at by Vansina in a 
short article called "Notes Sur 1*Origins du Royaume de Kongo", Joumal 
of African History IV, 1963, 1*
3Van Wing, 27-28. Plancquaert: Les Jaga et Bayaka du Kwango, 48. Bruxelles
1932. Cadornega: Historia Geral das Guerras Angolanas. Luanda, 1681.
ed. 1940, Lisbon, III, 188.
*
Congo de Amulaca. $FMini Kongo.
was Cavazzi, a Capuchin Missionary, who, like Cadornega, never visited 
Kongo* His second hand account of the Kongo traditions of origin has 
been interpreted to place the events on the Kwango, which was known as 
the Upper Congo, instead of on the Congo River proper.^-
The ultimate origins of Kongo kingship are even more difficult 
to ascertain than the immediate source* Accepting that the latter was 
in the small group of kingdoms on the north side of the lower Congo, 
including Loango, Kakongo, Ngoyo and Bungu, does not necessarily in-
n
volve concluding, as Vansina does in the article quoted above, that 
the founders of Kongo could therefore not have come from the Katanga- 
Kasai area. There is, after all, a waterway from the Lulua or the 
Sankuru to the Kasai and thence to Stanley Pool, while the country be­
tween the Pool and the Loango coast is not impenetrable.
The fact that the invasion of Kongo by its rulers came from the 
north, justifies a brief sketch of Loango, the best known of the northern 
kingdoms. Loango was probably founded earlier than Kongo and might yield 
some clue as to the remoter origins of the peoples who formed the Kongo 
state-complex on the fringe of which the Mbundu lived. At the same time 
the possibility should be kept in mind of influence from the almost un­
known Teke states north-east of Kongo and Loango* It is not altogether 
impossible that the Teke, who lived in a stretch of savanna stretching
^Van Wing, 27-28, citing Cavazzi. (See footnote page 29)* Vansina; 
,f0rigines du Royaume de Kongo” JAH, IV, 1963> 1*
several hundred miles north from Stanley Pool, might even have controlled 
a means of access to the Kongo area from West Africa*
The king of Loango as described by Andrew Battell in about 1610 
was another absolute ruler like the king of Kongo* He had a large com­
pound in which his noblemen gathered round him* In an inner court he 
kept his wives. When the king wanted to drink he rang a bell and every­
one fell on their faces. Anyone who saw the king drink was killed re­
gardless of his rank or status. The king ate alone in a small hut, be­
lieving that he would die if anyone should see him eat. One of the king's 
major functions was that of rain-maker. When the rains were due, his 
people brought gifts to him and a great feast was held with drums and 
trumpets and a display of archery. Two leagues from Loango, in the dir­
ection of Bungu, was a place called Loangiri where lay the royal graves 
of the Loango kings. The place was surrounded by tusks of ivory stuck 
in the ground, possibly with one tusk for each grave.^
The kingdom of Loango, like the kingdom of Kongo, was divided into 
provinces. The four provinces were ruled by the sons of the king's sister.
They bore the title Mani Kaya, Mani Mbuku, Mani Selanganga, and Mani 
*
Kibanga. When the king died the Mani Kaya succeeded him and the other 
three princes moved up in rank. A new Mani Kibanga was then appointed.
The king's sons, who were usually extremely numerous, could never succeed. 
The king's sister, the mother of the princes of the realm, was an extremely
*^E. G. Ravenstein (ed); The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell in Angola 
and the adjoining regions. Hakluyt Society, London 1901. 42-52. Battell
was an English trader who was captured by the Portuguese in South America 
and sent to Angola where he was a prisoner from about 1590 to about 1610.
*
Manis Cay, Bock, Salag and Cabango in Battell's terminology.
important person and, according to Battell, bore the title Mani Lumbo.’*’
Perhaps the most curious fact about Loango is that its people,
the Vili, speak a language unrelated to the other languages of LTest-
Central Africa. The only language akin to it is Bembe, a language spoken
by a small group who live in the region formerly occupied by the kingdom
of Bungu. According to Professor Guthrie these languages are more akin
2
to eastern Bantu languages than to any western Bantu ones.
The hypothesis which, at the moment, w>uld seem best to fit this 
situation, is one of a migration from the east to Bungu. The king of 
Loangofs eating and drinking habits have an East African appearance. The 
high importance of the queen-mother is a political trait which will be 
met again in the Lunda state of Luba origin. The matrilineal form of 
succession which would appear to preclude a Luba origin for the migrants, 
need only mean that they left the Luba home-land, if that is indeed where 
they came from, before the Songye invaded it and built a new patrilineal 
state in the series of Luba empires which had previously been matri­
lineal. It might even have been the Songye advance which made the mi­
grants leave* If this were the case, the Vili and Bembe languages, with 
their eastern Bantu characteristics, could have come from the Luba area 
which is the westernmost of the districts speaking eastern Bantu languages.
■“■Battell, 42-52.
2
Information supplied by Professor Guthrie as mentioned above.
The preservation of the distinct characteristics of the Bembe and Vili 
languages may have been due to the fact that the immigrants settled 
in comparatively uninhabited country. This hypothesis might appear to 
be strengthened by the fact that the Mani Loango was his own rain-maker, 
whereas the invaders who went into Kongo chose one of the autocthonous 
chiefs as their rain-maker. These latter invaders also lost their lan­
guage and apparently adopted that of the conquered people.
Although this study of Kongo has ranged rather far from the Mbundu, 
it provides a useful background against which to study Mbundu history.
A similar survey of the other main western Bantu state system, that of 
the Lunda people and their Luba conquerors, will provide the eastern 
facet of the background against which, in the sixteenth century, the Mbundu 
developed a typical Bantu kingdom which the Portuguese destroyed in the 
seventeenth.
The Lunda were not a numerous people before they embarked on their 
imperial designs in the sixteenth century. They lived in families and 
small sparsely dispersed villages along the Kalagne River, a right bank 
tributary of the Bushimaie in western Katanga. Each community had an 
independent chief called the Kabungu. Their life was probably similar 
to that of the people of Kongo before the establishment of the monarchy. 
The men wove mats and made nets for catching game and more especially 
fish. They also knew how to fashion iron tools and weapons. The women 
made pots of baked clay and tended the crops. The Lunda had little 
contact with their neighbours, of whom the most important were the Kanioka
in the north-east and the war-like Akawanda or Bakete in the north­
west. Before the Luba arrived in the sixteenth century to revolutionise 
their way of life, the only figure whom all Lunda respected was the sen­
ior Kabungu, who bore the name or title of Tala Mwaku. His insignia was
a copper bracelet entwined with human nerves and elephant sinews which
1
was called the Lukano or Kazekele.
The Luba who invaded Lunda in the sixteenth century came from the 
region of the upper Lualaba basin in Katanga where the concepts of Bantu 
monarchy had apparently been evolving for several centuries. Recent ar­
chaeological excavations at Sanga on the north shore of lake Kisale have 
revealed a huge grave-yard containing a wide assortment of pottery, tools 
and rich copper and iron ornaments. Although no royal tombs have so far 
been found, the size of the site suggests that it belonged to a large 
political unit of a people using advanced metallurgical techniques. Carbon- 
dating places this 'Kisalian* culture in the eighth or ninth century, six
or seven centuries before the earliest traditional history so far re-
2
corded in the district.
L. Duysters; "Histoire des Aluunda" in Problemes de VAfrique Centrale. 
Bruxelles, 1958. Duysters was a colonial district officer among the 
Lunda from 1925 to 1927. During that time he collected a traditional 
history of the Lunda. The manuscript was used by E. Verhulpen: Baluba
et Balubatses. Antwerp, 1936. Duysters1 original was not published until 
1958. The other main source is Henriques Dias de Carvalho: Etnografia
e Historia tradicional dos povos da Lunda. Lisbon 1890. The most import­
ant section is translated in Turner: MA Lunda love story and its conse­
quences11, Rhodes-Livingston Journal, 1955, No* 19, pp* 1-26. Carvalho 
led a Portuguese expedition to Lunda in 1884-1888. The Etnografia is 
one of eight volumes describing the expedition.
‘Jacques Nenquin: "Notes on some early pottery cultures in northern Katanga"
J.A.H.. IV, 1963, 1.
Another reason for supposing that Katanga was of great import­
ance for the early history of the Bantu, ds furnished hy linguistic re­
search* When the Bantu began to disperse over the southern half of 
Africa, they spoke a common language. By collecting as many as possible 
of the words which are common to all Bantu languages today, a hypotheti­
cal * proto-Bantu* vocabulary can be re-constructed. This exercise shows 
that the languages with the highest degree of correlation with ’proto- 
Bantu* are those of the Katanga grassland and the country stretching east 
and west from it.'*’ Prom this evidence it is tempting to suppose that 
the Bantu may originally have dispersed mainly from this area, and that 
the Luba lived in a country which was throwing out migrations long be­
fore those of the sixteenth century which are the first for which firm 
oral records exist. The reason for these migrations would seem to be 
economic growth leading to overpopulation and the need for new lands 
and new resources. New game, including elephants to provide ivory, and 
new salt deposits may have been among the needs which emigrants from the 
upper Lualaba sought to satisfy.
The first state in the Luba region remembered in the oral tradi­
tions collected by Verhulpen, seems to have been a kingdom of the Bena 
Kalundwe on the Lubilssh River. One account says that the Kalundwe were 
ruled by a chief called Tshifinga and others say that they were ruled by 
a woman called Tshimbale Bande or Bande Lumbale. This country was in­
filtrated by a people called the Songye who came from the north. The
■Malcolm Guthrie: "Some developments in the prehistory of Bantu languages"
J.A.H.. Ill, 1962, 2.
Songye leader was called Kongolo. He was remembered for his great 
cruelty in amputating the noses and ears of offenders. He punished 
his brother for treason by loaring him up a tree to die. After Kongolo 
and his followers had infiltrated the Kalundwe country, the chief of 
the Kalundwe recognised them as rulers because of the superiority of 
their arms. One tradition says that Kongolo married Tshimbale Bande, 
thus legitimising his children both by the matrilineal line of the autoch­
thonous peoples and by the patrilineal line of the invaders. The suc­
cessors of Kongolo formed a Songye dynasty of whom notable rulers were 
Kongolo Mukulu, Kongolo Miketo and Kongolo Mwana. The empire expanded, 
particularly to the east, and formed new villages and subject states. 
Expeditions crossed the Lom&mi River in search of salt and palm oil. 
Eventually the capital of the empire was moved east to Muibele beyond 
the Lomami. At the height of its power the Luba-Songye empire probably 
spread from the Lubilash to the Lualaba and perhaps even further.^*
The date of the founding of the Songye dynasty and the length of 
time during which it ruled are unknown. If, as was very tentatively 
suggested, earlier, the founders of the Loango coast states were refugees 
from the Songye advance, then this advance could not have been later than 
the end of the thirteenth century. This would fit in with internal Luba 
evidence which tends to point to an even earlier date. The Kongolo dynasty
This reconstruction of the history of the Luba is drawn entirely from 
the complex and often contradictory traditions collected by Verhulpen. 
See especially pages 82-108 in Baluba et BalubaTses.
of the Songye was probably overthrown in the fifteenth century,^ and
i
two centuries would seem to be the minimum reasonable time to allow 
for the rise and fall of an empire as powerful and influential as that 
of the Songye. During the Kongolo dynasty the pattern of government 
emerged for a whole generation of widely spread Bantu kingdoms, start­
ing with the Luba successor state which replaced the Songye domination.
Between the Lualaba River and the north end of lake Tanganyika, 
in the area east of the Songye home-land, there were a number of related 
peoples called the Kunda, Kalanga, Lumbu and Bwi whom it will be conven­
ient to refer to by the general name Kunda. These peoples seem to have 
been Bantu peasants with a less sophisticated culture than their Songye 
neighbours. Probably at a date some time after groups of Songye had be­
gun to migrate southward along the Lomami, similar groups of Kunda began 
to move south on the eastern side of the Lualaba River. Their leader or 
leading clan, Bombwe Mbili, eventually founded a small Kunda state in the 
area east of Lake Kisale. Prom there small groups of hunters went out 
into the west. Some of them reached as far as the Lomami and Lubilash 
Rivers and settled down among the Kalundwe. By this process the Kunda 
gradually infiltrated the empire of the Kongolos..
The traditional story of the final overthrow of the Kongolo empire 
is as follows. One of the Kunda hunting expeditions across the Lualaba 
was led by Hbili Kiluhe, son or brother of Bombwe Mbili, the great leader
^Evidence for this is adduced in Chapter Pour.
of the Kunda. Mbili Kiluhe and his followers entered the Kongolo do­
mains peacefully. Kongolo Mwana accepted their friendship and gave 
Mbili Kiluhe two of his sisters as wives. One of these, Bulanda, bore 
him a son called Kalala Ilunga. After this Mbili Kiluhe returned to 
his home-land in the east leaving his numerous followers without any 
political organisation. Kongolo attempted to incorporate them into his 
empire. A dispute arose, however, as to whether Kalala Ilunga, the 
nephew of Kongolo, was the heir to the kingdom according to Kunda matri 
lineal succession, or was not the heir in accordance with Songye custom. 
Kongolo became very jealous of Kalala Ilunga and determined to kill him. 
Kalala Ilunga was warned of a trap consisting of a pit full of poisoned 
arrows hidden by a mat, and fled across the Lualaba to the territory of 
his father Mbili Kiluhe. He hid the canoes to prevent pursuit. Kongolo 
tried to recall Kalala Ilunga on the drums and attempted to follow him 
on a raft, but failed. Soon afterwards Kalala Ilunga re-crossed the 
Lualaba with many of his father* s men and conquered the empire. Before 
fleeing, Kongolo killed his own mother together with enough slaves to 
care for her in the after-life. He was caught by the invaders, however, 
and decapitated. During the subsequent wars between the followers of 
Kongolo and those of Kalala Ilunga, many Luba including the Bena Lulua 
and the Binji, fled from their homes. They founded a Luba colony on the 
Kasai which was never incorporated into the new Luba-Kunda empire.
Kalala Ilunga became the first ’Mulohwe' or ruler of the new Luba 
empire, which was to survive until the artival of the Arabs and the Euro 
peans in the nineteenth century. The laws and customs of the new state
combined those of the old Songye rulers with those of the Kunda in­
vaders. The Kulohwe always ate and drank alone. As a mark of distinct­
ion he filed his front teeth into a point, unlike the Songye aristocrats 
who removed their incisors altogether. Among the royal insignia were a 
pair of sacred fire-sticks which had to be used to light all fires on 
which the Mulohwe1s food was cooked. The ruler also possessed a double 
bell made of iron which was probably similar to the one lateradopted by 
Lunda emperors. There is a suggestion that the Mulohwe made a practice 
of marrying his sister or niece. Such a practice would have ensured that 
succession could be carried down both through the male and the female 
line. When the Mulohwe died he was buried in a dry river bed together 
with wives and slaves. His spirit passed to a woman who received many 
lands and honours and was appointed to rule over his capital. She was 
never allowed to see the new Mulohwe who had to go and build another capi­
tal elsewhere. The empire was divided among provincial rulers who were 
responsible for levying tribute from the chiefs and forwarding it to the 
Mulohwe. Taxes might be imposed in the form of labour or of produce.
The overthrow of the Luba-Songye empire had direct repercussions 
on its neighbours, and in particular.. on the Lunda who lived only a short 
distance to the west of the L6mami. These repercussions were of two kinds. 
The first were caused by the supporters of the old order escaping from 
the invader. The Bena Lulua have already been mentioned in this context.
It seems possible that the Jaga, a fierce, disoriented, cannibal people
who in the mid sixteenth century rampaged through west central Africa 
with great violence and temporarily overthrew the kingdom of Kongo, 
may have originated from the disintegration of the old Luba empire. The 
same may have been true of the peoples who carried out long-distance 
raids on the settlements of the east African coast. The second effect 
of the change in Lubaland, was the sending out of probing expeditions 
by the new government. It seems that one of these, led by Kibinda Ilunga, 
was responsible for establishing the concept of monarchy among the Lunda.
In about the first half of the sixteenth century,^ while these
turbulent events were taking place in Luba country, the Lunda were being
peaceably ruled by the Tala Mwaku. The first sign of trouble is related
2
in the oral traditions. One day Yala Mwaku was weaving a mat and soak­
ing the fibres in a bowl of clouded water to make them more manageable.
His sons Kinguri and Kinyama came in Aril, thinking that the bowl con­
tained palm wine, asked for a drink. The old man told them that it was 
only water but they refused to believe him and began to beat him. Their 
sister, Lueji, called for help and the old man was rescued. He survived 
long enough to curse and disown his sons and to make Lueji his heiress.
The old ruler then died and was buried in the bed of the Kazanga stream 
at the spot where in later times a woman chief called Mwadianruteba ruled 
over the tombs of the Lunda emperors. Lueji was then recognised as paramount
■^ The dating of these events will be demonstrated in Chapter Four.
2
Some sources say that this episode concerned Yala Mwaku*s successor, 
Konde.
40.
by the chiefs and received the Lukano insignia. This tradition would 
appear to serve the main purpose of showing that the right to transmit 
paramountcy among the Lunda was in the gift of a woman when Kibinda 
Ilunga, the Luba prince, arrived on the frontier of the Lunda country.
Such an explanation might have been necessary later, once the rulers of 
Lunda had adopted a patrilineal form of succession. The fact that the 
narrators of the tradition were accustomed to a patrilineal form of suc­
cession might explain the otherwise strange and almost certainly false 
assumption that Yala Mwaku* s natural heirs would have been his sons.
According to the most recent version of Lunda tradition, collected 
by Duysters, Kibinda Ilunga arrived in Lunda and said that he was a grand­
son of Mbili Kiluhe. When his father Kalala Ilunga had died, his brother 
Ilunga Liu or Ilunga Waelefu, had succeeded to the Luba throne. Vaelefu 
was jealous of the hunting ability of Kibinda whose name meant the hunter. 
The king insulted him for not helping in the wars of conquest, so Kibinda 
gathered together his friends Tshibandama, Mwadi Hwichi and Mwadi Kalumbu 
and their families and set out, hunting as they went, through the unin­
habited country west of the Lomami.^
The older version of the Lunda tradition collected by Carvalho is
substantially different. Mutombo Mukulu was the last ruler of the Luba.
*
He had four sons, Kasongo, Kanyuca,^' Ilunga and Mai. When he was old,
■^Duysters, 83.
* $ /Cassongo. ^Canhiuca.
he told his sons that he had nothing to leave them and that they must 
go out and find new lands and form states of their own* They should al­
ways co-operate to help each other in times of military danger. Kasongo
*
and Kanyuca departed entrusting the Kimbwia , the axe symbolic of royal
authority, to Ilunga who took the title of Swana Mulopo or heir apparent.
Ilunga and Mai stayed with the old Mutombo Mukulu until he died, and when
they had buried him with the necessary ritual, Ilunga gathered his friends
and set out for the west.^ Pogge, the first European to record Lunda
traditions, heard a version similar to that of Carvalho. He adds that
Kibinda Ilunga, the old king's fourth son, had neither title nor .rank
2
and lived the free unfettered life of a huntsman.
The significance of the Carvalho tradition is that it could be 
interpreted to mean that Kibinda Ilunga was the last of a dying line of 
kings. When all was lost he departed to the west carrying the chief sym­
bol of royal authority, the axe Kimbwia. The Lunda would in that case 
take on the appearance of the direct successor state to the Songye empire 
of the Luba. This seems, however, to be a slightly less likely hypo­
thesis than the one which emerges from the Duysters tradition, of Kibinda 
Ilunga, the son of Kalala Ilunga, being the representative of a young and 
virile state which was expanding from the old political centre on the 
Lualaba.
^Henriques Dias de Carvalho, op.cit., 59-68.
^Pogge: Im Reich des Muata Jamvo, Berlin 1880. Appendix.
*
Quimbuia.
When Kibinda Ilunga arrived on the Kasidishi stream he sent a 
present of meat to Lueji and said that he and his people were in need 
of salt. Lueji invited him to visit her mussumba or compound and of­
fered him -pumbe, a beer made from sorgum. In order that he should not 
be seen to eat or drink in public, Lueji had a hut built for him to 
retire into. Kibinda Ilunga settled in Lunda and taught Lueji's broth­
ers how to hunt. In due course he obtained permission from the elders 
to marry Lueji, and the recognition that their children would be the 
rulers of the country. Kibinda sent the royal axe to his brother Kasongo 
saying that the lands of the Lunda queen were so rich that he never wanted 
to return east. Lueji exchanged presents with her brother-in-law Kasongo. 
At some later date Kibinda received the lukano. the Lunda bracelet, from 
Lueji and began to develop Lunda into a unified, monarchic state and to 
expand its frontiers.^
Although most of the elders in Lunda accepted the transfer of power 
to a Luba chief, there were groups in the community which did not. Prom­
inent among these were Lueji's brothers Kinguri and Kinyama. They in­
dulged in attempts at subversion but eventually had to flee from Lunda 
finding that Kibinda had become too strong for them. They intended to 
build a new Lunda state further to the west from which they would return 
to conquer their old home-land. They travelled west founding several 
states until they came into contact with the Mbundu and with the Atlantic
The traditional story of the 'marriage' of Luba and Lunda is central 
to the historical traditions of all the many peoples who trace their 
decent back to Mussumba, the capital of the Lunda empire. See Duysters, 
Pogge, Carvalho.
sea-trade which had opened some years earlier. The refugees from 
Lunda apparently forgot all about returning to conquer the dynasty 
of Luba usurpers, and settled down to a commercial way of life in 
which riches unheard of in Lunda were to be gained.
Within this setting of the Bantu world, the Mbundu lived in the
region bound to the north by the Dande River and to the south by the 
Kwanza River. They were the furthest south-west of the Western Bantu. 
Beyond the Kwanza River was a broad belt of sparsely inhabited country 
south of which lay the Benguela highlands inhabited by Southern Bantu 
pastoralists. In the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries Ovimbundu 
invaders drove out or cbmininated the old pastoralists and established 
a dozen or more small kingdoms of the now familiar Western Bantu type.
More important than the Mbundufs southern neighbours, were their 
immediate eastern and northern neighbours. The eastern neighbours 
were, however, the peoples about whom least is known. The first and 
most obvious reason for this lack of information is that this was the 
area furthest removed from the European activities which developed on 
the coast, and so least known to the early travellers who described the
country. Another reason for the paucity of knowledge is that after 1570,
the forests of the Kwango River were defended by the war-like Jaga peoples 
who had retired: there after their defeat in Kongo. They formed an effect­
ive barrier to penetration east of Kongo which may have been the reason 
why, with the growth of the slave trade, the main trade routes from Kongo
and even from Luanda, were diverted northward to the country inhabited 
by the Mpumbu.^ By the seventeenth century when the Portuguese tried 
to circumvent the Jaga to the south, they were already too late. The 
Lunda had reached the upper Kwango and founded the state of Kasanje which 
effectively prevented all European access to the inland trade-routes.
This barrier prevented knowledge of the interior from being gained until 
the nineteenth century. What is known of the peoples beyond the east­
ern borders of the Mbundu and Kongo countries in the early sixteenth cen­
turies, has to be gained mainly from oral tradition.
The most important people or state in this eastern region in the 
late fifteenth century was probably Matamba. Most of what is known about 
Matamba dates from the seventeenth century when it was conquered by Mbundu 
peoples escaping from Portuguese activities further west. The earlier 
Matamba was referred to by Afonso I of Kongo when he wrote to Jo&o III
of Portugal in 1530 sending him two silver bracelets lfwhich were sent
2
to me by a nobleman of my country called Matamba1*. Matamba may have
been the home of the Batsamba people who later moved northward along the
Kwango and were recognised by the Jaga escaping from Kongo, as the prior
3
owners of the landsof the middle Kwango in which the Jaga settled. Matamba
^The Mpumbu lived near the lower Kwango south-east of Stanley-Pool. The 
derived name pumbo came, in slave trading days, to mean a slave fair.
The slave market of the Mpumbu specifically was referred to as Pombo de 
Okango, that is the pumbo of the Kwango. The people who went to trade in 
the pumbos were called pomfreiros.
2Afonso I to Jo&o III, 28.1.1530, ATT CC-I-44-70. In Antonio Brasio (ed): 
Monuments Missionaria Africans - Africa Occidental, Vol. I, 540.
M. Plancquaert, S.J. : Les Jaga et les Bayaka du Kwango. Bruxelles, 1932. 
Traditions published on pages 42-50.
ciay have "been the furthest point south-east which paid tribute to 
the king of Kongo* Evidence that Kongo authority stretched so far 
is also to be found among the Suku, another old-established people 
of that region, since in 1535 the Kongo king signed himself with the
In the north the Mbundu frontier met the Kongo province of Mbamba. 
It is not clear what the nature of the Kongo-Mbundu border was. Accord­
ing to one theory, the Mbundu, or at least the underlying strata of that 
people, were the same as the people of Kongo before the ruling clans con­
quered them. The Mbundu would therefore be, basically, those members of 
a comparatively homogeneous group existing between the Congo and Kwanza 
rivers, who had not been subjected by the Kongo invaders. This theory 
is, however, based partly on rather doubtful evidence that the word 'Mbun- 
du1 meant 'slave' in Kikongo. An alternative but similar theory sug­
gests that the Kongo rulers might, indeed, have been trying to subject 
the Mbundu, but that the Mbundu were different from the peoples whom they 
had already subjected. Even this, however, is far from proved and it 
is possible that the offensive was going the other way. The Mbundu may
1Afonso I to Pope Paul III, 21.2.1535. ATT CC-I-3-6 & CC-I-48-45, 
Brasio II, 38.
title of 'master of Musucu'
1 The ruler of the Suku was called 'mini
Kongo' 2
See, for instance, Willy Bal (ed): Lopez-Pigafetta, op.cit. footnote 149
have been invaders who were attacking the southern frontier of a king­
dom which was already passed its prime.
The historical traditions of the Mbundu suggest that their original
elements may have been influenced both by Kongo and by Luba, just as
their later history was subjected to forces from both areas. The fullest
traditions of early Mbundu history are those remembered by the Pende, a
people who left Angola in the seventeenth century to settle on the Kasai
and thus avoided the domination of the Portuguese. Kasanje,^ the brother
of the Pende chief of Tshikapa, and Mukunzu, a Pende historian, remember
2
the origins of the Mbundu in the following manner. The earliest an­
cestor of the Mbundu, Ngola Kilaji, lived at Tandji ni Milumbu, which 
was probably in the region of the upper Zambesi. Ngola1s people were 
hunters and warriors who did not know how to smelt iron for their arrow­
heads, but used only wooden arrows and spears. One day Ngola Kilaji de­
cided to leave Tandji. He destroyed his camp and set out for the west, 
towards the sea. All along the route he left groups of men who settled 
and founded villages. When he reached the Kwanza he followed the course 
of the river down to the sea at Luanda. Ngola settled on the plains of 
Luanda and lived there happily for a long time. There he met the people 
of Bembo Kalamba, a blacksmith, who came to Luanda with all his followers 
and their cattle. He taught Ngola how to smelt and forge iron, and how 
to make pots and weave. The chief who held authority over the people of 
Bembo Kalamba was his wife, Ngombe dia Ngaada. She taught agriculture
^The Pende informant Kasanje has nothing to do with the Imbangala Kasanje. 
2
G. L. Haveaux: La tradition historique des Bapende Orientaux, Bruxelles,
1954, 35-37, 46-47.
and cattle rearing. The people of Ngola married the daughters of Ngombe 
who became mothers of the Mbundu clans. Together they lived comfortably 
and prosperously in the Luanda plains with their cattle, their crops, 
their banana trees and above all their salt marshes, until one day the 
Europeans arrived and drove Ngola away from his salt marshes with guns.'*' 
This Pende tradition is similar to the traditions collected among 
the Mbundu in the seventeenth century by Cavazzi. Cavazzi said that in 
earlier times the Mbundu had been divided up among a large number of auto­
nomous chiefdoms. Their way of life was probably similar to that of the 
early inhabitants of Kongo and Lunda, but the Mbundu did not know the use 
of iron and only used stone and wood for their tools and weapons. A 
blacksmith called Mussuri, who had learnt to smelt iron, rose to promin­
ence among them by bartering his iron wares for food. When a famine hit
the Mbundu he shared out his wealth and in gratitude the people made him
*
their king. Mussuri married a woman called Ngana Inene who had no sons 
but bore him three daughters, Zunda ria Ngola, Tumba ria Ngola and a third 
whose name had been forgotten. When Mussuri was old he was killed by a 
slave who wanted to gain control of the kingdom. In time, however, the 
rights of Mussuri*s daughter Zunda were asserted and she ruled over the 
Mbundu. She had no children, however, and the paramountcy passed eventu­
ally to her sister TumbaTs husband. He was a great hunter and warrior
L. Heaveux: La tradition historique des Banende Orientaux. Bruxelles, 
1954, 35-37 > 46-47.
#
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called Ngola Kiluanji kia Samba. The son of this hunter, also called
Ngola Kiluanji, started the dynasty of the Ngolas who founded and ruled
over the kingdom of Ndongo which flourished in the sixteenth and early
1
seventeenth centuries.
These traditions suggest at least three component elements among 
the Mbundu people. The first were a people with no skill in iron working 
who may have been the same as the pastoral peoples ruled by the woman 
chief, Ngombe dia Nganda or Ngana Inene. The second group were the 
people with a refined iron-working technology led by the chief Bembo 
Kalamba or Mussuri. Finally the people who came from the hunting grounds 
of the east, and were probably the last to arrive, were led by Ngola 
Kilaji or Ngola Kiluanji. It was these latest arrivals who, despite 
their inferior techhical knowledge, brought the concept of centralised 
kingship and founded a monarchy which ruled over the Mbundu. The king­
dom of Ndongo which they established may have been founded before the 
first Europeans arrived on the west coast of Central Africa. Its growth, 
however, is closely linked with the beginning of European activities and 
the opening of the Atlantic slave trade.
G. A. Cavazzi de Montecucc&o: Istorica Descrizione de tre regni Congo.
Matamba et Angola. Bologna, 1687. 290-294.
*
Angola Chiluangi Chiasamba.
Chapter Two>
THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRAPS 1482-1565.
The first contact between the Bantu, and European;- worlds occurred
/
about 1483 when three Portuguese caravels arrived at the mouth of the 
Congo river. In the previous year Jo&o II had succeeded to the Portu­
guese throne and had personally taken up the supervision of African 
coastal exploration* Since the death of Henry the Navigator in 1460, pro­
gress in this field had been only spasmodic, the greatest achievements 
being those of FemSo Gomes, discoverer of the Gold Coast. One of the 
first tasks undertaken by Jo£o II was to build Elmina castle on the Gold 
Coast. His ultimate aim was to claim all the "lands of the Negroes" as 
his dominions. To further this ambition he organised an expedition under 
the leadership of Diogo CSo charged with exploring the African coast be­
yond Cape St. Catherine which lay to the south of the Cameroons and was 
the furthest point discovered in the previous reign.^
Diogo CSo and his men landed on the south side of the Congo estu- 
ary and were immediately struck by the number of people whom they met 
in contrast to the sparsely inhabited Gaboon coast which they had been 
following. The people who welcomed them belonged to the Kongo province 
of Sonyo. Although these people could not understand the African inter-
JoSo de Barros: Asia. Primeira Pecada. Coimbra 1932. Bk III Ch. III.
For details of Portuguese advance north of the equator see J. W. Blake: 
European Beginnings in West Africa 1454-1578.
preters whom the Portuguese had brought from Guinea they succeeded in 
conveying that they owed allegiance to a powerful king whose capital 
lay several days journey inland. This was the ruler of the Kongo king­
dom, ^ The exact date of this encounter is not certain. The widely 
accepted date of 1482 is based on the inscription on a pillar which
2
Diogo C&o erected on Cape St. Mary, 80 miles south-west of Benguela.
3
A chronicle of 1497* however* gives the date as 1483* and Pacheco Pereira
4
and Jo&o de Barros both give 1484* It is at least plausible that the 
expedition was prepared in 1482 (including the inscribing of the "PadMo” 
with which Portuguese claims were to be asserted) but did not actually 
reach its destination until 1483, returning in 1484.
Relations between the Sonyo people and the Portuguese opened on 
an extremely friendly footing. A delegation was sent by Diogo C&o to
Details of this encounter are found in the chronicles of Pacheco Pereira, 
Garcia de Resende, Rui de Pina, and Jo&o de Barros. Relevant extracts 
are in Brasio, I, 30-43.
2The inscription reads: "Era of the creation of the world six thousand
VICLXXI, year of the birth of our lord Jesus Christ one thousand 
CCCCLXXXII years, the most high and excellent and powerful prince King 
Dorn JoSo II of Portugal ordered the discovery of this land and the plac­
ing of these pillars by Diogo C&o, valet of his chamber.n Cited in 
Ralph Delgado: Historia de Angola. I, 55.
•z
Torre do Tombo Library, no. 852. Brasio, I, Doc. 6, 30-31.
4Barros, op.cit., 79. Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis,written 
c. 1504, Hakluyt Society 1936. The editor of the Esmeraldo. G. H. T. 
Kimble, says that Pereira is one year out and that the CSo expedition 
to Kongo was in fact in 1483. (Footnote on p. 142.)
the court of the Mani Kongo, sovereign of the Kongo empire, to hear 
him presents of European manufacture* In the meantime CSo pushed his 
investigations to beyond Benguela before turning back* When the messen­
gers who had been sent into the interior did not return within a reason­
able time, it was decided to take hostages from Sonyo as guarantors for 
their security* Four of the noblemen who frequented the &ips were seized 
and it was explained to their kinsmen that they would be brought back in 
fifteen moons,1 On arrival in Portugal the captives were royally fSted 
as envoys of their king and shown the material wonders of European civili­
zation. Jo&o II ordered C2.0 to take them back to Kongo as soon as poss­
ible and to offer presents to the king whose existence had been revealed 
to the European world* When they arrived in Kongo these erstwhile host­
ages were received with surprise and Joy. The king of Kongo was told 
about the life of the Portuguese court and immediately ordered that pre­
sents of coloured palm cloth and carved ivory be sent to the Portuguese 
king. ^
At the time the Kongo and Portuguese kings began this mutual in­
vestigation of each other*s resources, Kongo was already a large and 
stable kingdom whose development had probably begun at least a century 
before as outlined in the first chapter. The king of Kongo who first 
welcomed the Portuguese envoys to his court was Nzinga Nkuwu* He accepted
1Barros, op.cit.t 80.
2
Brasio I, 56-57 quoting Rui de Pina.
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baptism on 3 May 1491 with the name JoSo I, but before his death in 
1506 he had renounced Christianity. The successors of Nzinga Nkuwn 
according to the list of the clan names of the kings of Kongo who 
reigned after the arrival of the Portuguese is given by Van Wing and 
Jadin as follows:'*"
Nzinga a Nkuwu
Nzinga Mvemba 
Nkanga Mvemba 
Mpudi a Nzinga Mvemba.
Nkubi Mpudi a Nzinga 
Nzinga Mvemba 
Nzinga Mvemba
Mpudi a Nzinga Mvemba
Nimi ne Mpangu 
Lukeni lua Mvemba
Nimi ne Mpangu Lukeni 
lua Mvemba
(baptised JoSo I on 3.5.1491> 
died c. 1506.)
(Afonso I, son of J0S.0 I, died c. 1543.)
(Pedro I, son of Afonso I, fled c. 1545.)
(Francisco I, until c. 1546 ?.)
(Diogo I, grandson of Afonso I, died c. 1561.)
(Afonso II, son of Diogo I, died c. 1561.)
(Bernardo I, brother of Afonso II, died 
1566 or 1567.)
(Neriko,Henrico I, died c. 1568, last of 
Nzinga Mvemba line.)
(Alvaro I, died c. 1587.)
(Alvaro II, eldest (?) son of Alvari I, 
died c. 1614.)
an Wing, 35; Cuvelier and Jadin, 16-26 and sources quoted there.
55.
The death of Nzinga a Nkuwu in about 1506 was followed by a 
succession struggle between two clans which probably concerned the 
attitude which Kongo should take towards the Portuguese. The old king 
had rapidly become disenchanted with the Portuguese at his court. They 
probably behaved in an overbearing manner quite out of keeping with the 
tone of the Portuguese king’s brotherly letters. According to a history 
of Kongo written by a priest in 1624> Nzinga a Nkuwu, disillusioned by 
the Portuguese, disowned his eldest son, Nzinga Mvemba, prince of Nsundi, 
and the electors chose his ’bastard' son, Nzinga Mpangu, as king.*** A 
civil war . apparently followed in which the senior clan in the line 
of succession favoured an extension of the profitable welcome hitherto 
accorded to the Portuguese, while the junior or illegitimate clan op­
posed foreign intervention in the affairs of Kongo. The victory went 
to the disowned elder son, Nzinga Mvemba, who was a convert to Christian­
ity, under the name Afonso, and fully intended to co-operate with the 
Portuguese. This dynasty ruled Kongo from Afonso’s accession in about
1506 until about 1568, by which time hordes of cannibal Jaga were cross-
2ing the Kwango and plundering the kingdom.
The reign of Afonso I lasted over 30 years and saw the apogee of 
Afro-European co-operation. Then began the slow break-down of contact 
leading to the century-long Angolan wars. A brief survey of the effects
1
Paiva Manso, 174-175.
^Van Wing, 52-55*
of the establishment of commercial and political links between Kongo 
and Portugal during Afonso's reign will provide a useful background 
and source of comparison for the study of the sixteenth century rise 
of the Mbundu kingdom of Ndongo. The economic stimulus needed to form 
a nation-state among the Mbundu, came, to a large extent anyway, from 
the opening of the Atlantic slave trade. The economic basis for the 
founding of Kongo could obviously not have come from overseas trade, 
but probably came from the country's natural agricultural richness and 
from the wealth of its coastal salt supplies. The slave trade only de­
veloped after Kongo was well established, but it nonetheless became the 
leading factor governing the kingdom's relations with Portugal. It 
was also one cause of the Kongo intervention in the affairs of the Mbundu.
The benefits which Kongo hoped to gain ffrom its association with 
Europe were strangely similar to those sought by post-colonial Africa. 
Afonso did not want administrative advice and considered his own judi­
cial system more humane than that of 16th century Portugal. What he needed 
was teachers and craftsmen to pass on the technical knowledge of Europe.
He even tried to persuade the king of Portugal to let him lave a ship so 
that he could trade on his own account^but this was totally contrary to 
Portuguese policy and even his less ambitious requests met with decreas­
ing attention in Lisbon.^
The aims of the Portuguese in exploring the African coast were not
The letters between Manuel and Afonso are published in Brasio, Vol. I. 
An interesting general discussion of this partnership is found in Basil 
Davidson} Black Mother, London 1961, 118 ff.
only a desire for empire, a quest for gold and spices, and the search 
for the sea route to India. They also hoped to make Christian converts 
and to find existing Christian kingdoms. They were attempting to break 
the encirclement of Western Europe by Islam. For this reason the kings 
of Portugal were delighted to find a powerful African ruler willing to 
be accepted into the Christian community of nations. The early letters 
of Manuel of Portugal, who had succeeded J0S.0 in 1495, to 'our royal 
Brother* Afonso of Kongo are written in the friendliest terms. This 
effusiveness, however, did not last long and the concrete results were 
disappointingly few. As the horizons of the Portuguese empire widened 
to India and the Far East, the attractions of Kongo dwindled. A potential 
political ally might have been useful but was no substitute for gold and 
spices and the Kongo-Angola region was found to produce no such valuable 
commodities. The presents which the Mani Kdngo had sent to Portugal 
consisted only of palm cloth and ivory.
A valuable, if less spectacular, commercial asset was found in 
Kongo. That was men. From very early in the relationship between Kongo 
and Portugal a slave trade grew up based on the Congo estuary port of 
Mpinda. The demand for slave labour came principally from two sources.
In Portugal itself a very sparse population was being stretched to pro­
vide the administrative personnel for a widening empire;and the shortage 
of agricultural labour at home could only be met by importing outside 
help. From the beginning of Portuguese contact with Negro Africa slavea
were being sent to the home country, and Kongo came to be an especially 
important source of supply since the kings had a great thirst for Euro­
pean cloth and metal-wares but no commodity with which to pay for them 
other than slaves. Kongo also came to supply slaves to the settlers of 
S&o Tome. When first discovered this island was uninhabited, which made 
it easier for the Portuguese to colonise, but meant that all labour had to 
be imported. Prom 1485» and especially after 1495 * Jews and criminals 
in particular were sent to settle the island, and in order to encourage 
the natural growth of the population each one was given a slave girl from 
Kongo.^ Sugar became the chief industry of the island and large supplies 
of slave labour were needed from Kongo for planting and cutting, and for 
operating the crushing mills. The trade in slaves was advantageous to 
the Portuguese crown, not only because it established a rich sugar economy 
in S&o Tome, but also because it provided revenue from tares on the trade.
As the trade grew the benefits of Kongo-Portuguese 1 partnership1 
became increasingly one-sided. Not only did Afonso fail to get the ad­
vantages for which he hoped, but the flourishing empire which he had in­
herited was being undermined by the drain of man-power. One of the most 
debilitating aspects of the slave trade was that it took away the young­
est and most vital elements of the nation* s manhood. The *pe9a da India*
had to be of specified stature and youth. Although Afonso took part in
v
the slave trade in order to buy Europ^i goods, he did succeed in keeping 
some control over its volume. After his death however the factor of S&o
^Lopes de Lima: Ensaios sobre as statisticas das Possessors portugueses 
no Ultramar. Vol. II S. Tome. Part II, 4-5. Lisbon 1844.
Tome wrote to Lisboa to say that the Kongo slave trade had become far
brisker than it had ever been in the days of old Afonso.^*
Although the slave trade had a weakening effect on Kongo, the
majority of the 4,000 to 5,000 slaves who were shipped each year from
Mpinda by the 1530's, probably came from outside the boundaries of the
2
Kongo kingdom proper. They were obtained either by raids which the 
Kongo people conducted against their neighbours, or by trade with the 
kings of adjacent lands. The most important states with which Kongo 
had trading relations for the acquisition of slaves seem to have been 
those of the Teke and of the Mpumbu, Kongo's neighbours to the north-
3
east. Slave raids, on the other hand, which the kings of Kongo organised 
with a varying degree of Portuguese participation, concentrated especially 
on the country of the Mbundu.
Prom very early in "Hie sixteenth century the slave traders operating 
from Mpinda were on the look-out for new supplies. One reason for this 
must have been the lack of slaves in Kongo itself and the consequent need 
to travel even further overland at a high cost in time and mortality.
The reluctance of the still powerful king of Kongo to allow an all-out
^Jeronimo Coutinho to the King of Portugal. ATT CC III 17-16.
Brasio II, 268.
^Manuel Pacheco to Jo&o III, Kongo 28.3*1536, in Paiva Manso, document 
xxxviii, 67, gives this estimate for the volume of trade exclusive of 
the large numbers of slaves who died in raids, during transit and while 
awaiting shipment at Mpinda.
3
See Chapter Three for a description of the Mpumbu and Teke.
scramble for slaves must also have frustrated the foreign traders. 
Another draw-back to the Kongo trade was that export taxes imposed 
by the Portuguese kings reduced the profits. Finally the demand for 
slaves from Brazil, where, during the first half of the sixteenth cen­
tury, a dozen or more captaincies were established by the Portuguese, 
outstripped the potential supplies from Kongo. For all these reasons 
the traders needed more plentiful supplies of slaves. The area to which 
they turned to seek them was the Angola'*’ coast south of Kongo, because 
slaves were already coming from there by the difficult overland route. 
None of the other slave supplying areas, with the possible exception of 
Loango, was accessible by sea.
One of the earliest descriptions of the Angola coast was written 
by Pacheco Pereira about 1504* Two hundred miles south of the Congo 
river lay the rivers Dande and Bengo and beyond them,
"the coast forms a bay of a little more than a league, and 
at its mouth there are two small islands, low and level and 
sparsely wooded, called Hhas das Cabras.^ They are very 
near the mainland and the Negroes who inhabit them belong 
to the lordship of Maniconguo, the Conguo country extending 
even beyond them. The Negroes of these islands pick up small 
shells (of the size of pine-nuts in their shell) which they 
call 'zinbos'. These are used as money in the country of 
Maniconguo; fifty of them buy a hen and three hundred a goat 
and so forth; and when the Maniconguo wishes to confer a 
favour on one of his nobles or reward a service done to him, 
he orders him to be given a certain number of these 'zinbos1
The name 'Angola' will be used in its loose Portuguese sense of the 
country south of the Kongo kingdom. The name Ndongo applies to a more 
limited area over which the Ngolas gained control.
2
Literally the 'Goat Islands' later known as Luanda Island.
... The country from Rio do Padram (the Congo River) to 
the Rio do Mondego (Bengo River) and the Ihlas das Cabras 
along the coast is flat and well wooded. ... Off these 
islands at thirty fathoms there is extremely abundant 
fishing.
Pereira goes on to describe the promontories and bays which sailors 
would meet along the coast. South of Luanda the coast was less wooded 
and beyond Cape St. Mary completely barren. The inhabitants lived 
entirely off fish and there was no prospect of profitable trade for 
the Portuguese. Migrant fishermen living a very poor existence were 
found as far south as Tiger Bay, 16° below the equator.
An interesting record of the early contacts between these sailors, 
whose probings Pachero Pereira describes, and the inhabitants of the An­
gola coast is found in the traditions of the Pende, who, as seen in Chap­
ter One, once lived there but have since migrated inland to the Kasai 
river. This oral history recalls very clearly the arrival of the first 
ship on the Luanda coast. At the time the Ngola and his people had been 
living for a long period on the plains behind Luanda where they raised 
cattle and crops and bananas. One :&ly the 'Tukusunia Tungunga* (white 
men) arrived in ships with wings which shone in the sun like knives.
They fought hard battles with the Ngola and spat fire at him. They con­
quered his salt-pans and the Ngola fled inland to the Lukala river. Some 
of his bolder subjects remained by the sea and when the white men came 
they exchanged eggs and chickens for cloth and beads.
^Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis. Hakluyt Soc. 1937. 145.
"The white men came yet again. They brought us maize 
and cassava, knives and hoes, groundnuts and tobacco.
From that time until our day the Whites brought us noth­
ing more but wars and miseries."^-
When introducing the new crops the Europeans taught a prayer which had 
to be said for the crops to succeed. This prayer, which was clearly 
once a Christian prayer, is still remembered by the Pende.
These Pende, before their emigration, formed part of the Mbundu 
nation whose country lay between the rivers Dande and Kwanza and from 
the sea to an unknown frontier in the east. This Mbundu territory would 
appear in some ways to have been a power-vacuum which attracted the Portu­
guese in their search for a new population because it would provide a 
better field for slaving activities than the more closely administered 
Kongo kingdom. It seems that the political ideas necessary for the form­
ing of a powerful nation-state had taken root much more recently among 
the Mbundu, than in Kongo, and that at the time of the European arrival 
the kingdom of Ndongo was still taking shape. The subsequent history of 
the Mbundu became a race between the African forces of political organi­
zation and unity and the alien forces of subjection.
The earliest known documentary references to the Mbundu concern 
their relationship with the rulers of Kongo. In a letter of 1512 which 
the Manikongo wrote to Portugal about the Kongo succession dispute, he 
referred to himself as "... Dom Afonso, by His Grace king of Manicongo
Maveaux: La Tradition Historique des Bapende Orientaux. Brux. 1954,
47. Also 36-37 and 46 ff.
and Master of the Ambudos . ..'fl The next documentary reference to 
the Mbundu is in a letter of 1514 from Afonso I to the king of Portugal 
which illustrates the manner in which slaves were captured on the south­
ern border of Kongo. The king informed his royal brother that he had 
received news that a Mbundu nobleman called MCLza had declared war on 
one of the sons of Kongo. The king immediately led a military expedition 
against the Mbundu,leaving a courtier and a Portuguese captain called 
Alvaro Lopes in charge of his capital. Luring the campaign the king 
quarrelled with the few Portuguese who accompanied him, as a result of 
which Liogo Bello and Kanoel CSo abandoned the expedition and retired 
with 100 or more slaves. The captives were so badly guarded, however, 
that they succeeded in killing Manoel C&o and escaping. They roamed 
through Kongo burning villages and plundering markets until Alvaro Lopes 
ordered their re-capture and had them whipped. The Queen of Kongo ordered 
that those immediately responsible for the murder of Manoel C3.0 be exe­
cuted. When the main body of the expedition returned they brought further 
consignments of slaves. Jo&o d'Estremos, one of the Portuguese partici­
pants in the expedition, brought 190 slaves and the king*s official agents 
sent 410 'pieces* to the royal market. Of these Lopes chose the 520
finest specimens to be embarked at Mpinda, leaving 90 meagre and aged
2
captives in the market. Luring the next five years, until 1520, no
^Prom LamiSo de Peres, Brt'sio I, 260.
2
Afonso I of Kongo to Manuel I of Portugal, 5 October 1514. ATT - CC
I 16 28. In Brasio I, 512-314.
known documents give any additional information about the Mbundu*
In Lisbon the Portuguese did, however, receive reports of the exist­
ence of a Mbundu state called Mongo ruled by a Idng called the 
Ngola, Individual Portuguese had been trading along the Angola coast 
and possibly with Ndongo at least since 1504, in which year Manuel I 
decreed heavy penalties for traders sailing beyond the River Congo.^
In 1520 a Regimento of royal instructions was drawn up at Evora order­
ing Manuel Pacheco and Balthasar de Castro to visit wel Rey dAmgola”,
2
convert him to Christianity and prepare a full report on his country*
The occasion for this royal embassy to Ndongo was a request for 
Christian missionaries sent by the Ngola via Kongo* Although this 
request was probably made on commercial and political grounds, a be­
lief in Portuguese evangelical fervour may have made the Ngola think 
that it was on the religious plane that an appeal was most likely to 
be heeded. He presumably wanted to gain prestige for Ndongo by having 
European advisers resident at his court and may have hoped to open sea- 
trade links with Europe, if possible thus putting a stop to the slave 
raids from across his northern border* Just as the Ngola1 s appeal was 
presumably made on a false basis, the Portuguese alacrity to accept 
the invitation was more mercenary than idealistic. The third paragraph 
of the Regimento says: "Moreover we are informed that in the said
^ATT Llis 2-12. Brasio I, 205-204*
^egimento de D. Manuel a Manuel Pacheco e Balthasar de Castro 16.2.1520. 
ATT: Livro de leys e Regimen to de D. Manuel fl 1440 ff. Brasio I, 
431-440.
Kingdom of Amgola there is silver because we have seen it in some 
bracelets which came to us from the king of Kongo. **^ The ambassadors 
were instructed to find the source of this silver and give information 
on its value and accessibility. They were also asked to report on 
all other mines in Angola and on any other merchandise available. The 
lure of silver first noted in the Regimento of 1520 remained a power­
ful driving force of Portuguese enterprise in Angola. Even after the 
myth of the Cambambe silver mines was exposed a hundred years later, 
an enthusiastic belief in the existence of precious and other metals 
in Angola has periodically continued to affect Portuguese dreams and 
policies.
The Regimento* s stress on the importance of Christianity is in­
teresting. The chief ambition of the Ngola was to obtain European goods 
by opening direct trade links with the Portuguese. The Portuguese 
royal orders state clearly, however, that no hope of such trade was to 
be held out to the Ngola unless he accepted the Christian faith. Once 
the royal court had been converted the process of "redemptions11 could 
begin. Redemption was the current euphemism for enslavement. ‘Heathens* 
could thus be given the possibility of leading a Christian life in a 
country where they would not be subjected to the temptations of their 
old environment. Although they might be slaves they had gained the 
priceless privilege that their souls would not be condemned. The in-
^Regimento, op.cit. 432.
struct ions also said that if the Ngola refused to co-operate with 
these evangelical ambitions and if Pacheco and Castro were unable 
to 'redeem1 a full cargo, then the expedition was to continue south­
ward towards the Cape of Good Hope until a load of slaves, ivory and
1
copper had been obtained*
Detailed results of the 1520 mission to the Ngola are unfor­
tunately not known. There was silence about Angola until Castro wrote 
from Kongo in 1526 saying that he had been a captive at the Ngola's
court for the past six years and that in all that time he had seen no
2silver whatsoever. It seems likely that in Ndongo, as in Kongo, 
there was a shifting balance of power between those in favour of ad­
mitting Europeans and those against it. The balance of these factions 
and the outside interference of Kongo, Portugal and the Sao Tome 
traders, who were probably the main agents of the Brazil trade, were 
all important factors in the development of the Mbundu state.
Records of the growth of Mbundu kingship come mainly from oral 
traditions. By 1520 the Ngola was considered by the Portuguese to be 
the second most powerful ruler on the west coast of Central Africa, 
and important enough to receive a full religious and commercial mission. 
Although the Portuguese may have had a rather exaggerated idea of the
^A post-script to the document orders the ambassadors to sail first to 
the Cape and then work up the coast to Angola. Prom a navigational 
point of view this would be much easier, following the Benguela current.
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Balthasar de Castro to Jo&o III 16.10.1526. ATT Gav. 20 4 21 Brasio I, 
485-487. The assertion about the silver was either forgotten or dis­
believed in Lisbon before the next Angola expedition in 1560.
Ngola1 s power at that time, Ndongo was certainly a growing kingdom*
The first ruler in the Ndongo king-list remembered by Mukunzu, the 
Pende historian mentioned earlier, was a king or queen called Ngana 
Ngombe. He or she started the sale of slaves to the Portuguese and 
caused serious disorders in the country# The subsequent rulers of 
Ndongo in the king-list remembered by the Pende were as follows:^
Ngola Inene Kiluanji
Ngola Ndambi Inene ia Ndjenge
Ngola Kiluanji kia Samba (who is indistinctly remembered)
Ngola Nzinga ia Bandji
Queen Njinga Pande (Nzinga Mbande)
Another and more detailed history of the early growth of Mbundu
kingship was collected by Cavazzi# After describing the origins of
the Mbundu he goes on to tell of the great reign of Ngola Kiluanji,
the warrior before whom even the most powerful neighbouring chiefs
gave way. Kiluanji’s wife, Naria Ngola, had a son Naria Kiluanji,
*
from whom descended the dynasty of Ngola Ayre which governed Ndongo
tin the seventeenth century# Another wife, Kanika Kiluanji , was the 
mother of the line of Ngola Kanini, chief of Mbaka and later king of 
Matamba. Kiluanji’s successor as king of Ndongo was a cruel son called
^Haveaux, op.cit*, 48 and 10.
*  iz5Ngola Aarij. 'uannica Chiluagni.
Ndambi Ngola who killed all his brothers but for two who fled to 
Libolo and Matamba. Ndambi was succeeded by Ngola Kiluanji a great 
warrior who conquered wide territories and is said to have approached 
the coast to within eight leagues of Luanda. It is difficult to see 
how this ties in wiih the tradition that the Ngola lived on the coast 
until driven off by the Portuguese. Ngola Kiluanji died childless and 
was succeeded by Nzinga Ngola Kilombo kia Kasenda, son of Ngola Kiluanj 
kia Ndambi who was a 1 nephew1 of the original hunter Ngola Kiluanji kia 
Samba who came from the east. Nzinga Ngola1s successor was Mbandi 
Ngola Kiluanji, father of Ngola Mbandi and of his sister Nzinga Mbandi. 
In tabular form this tradition gives a king-list as followss^*
Ngola Kiluanji 
Ndambi Ngola 
Ngola Kiluanji
Nzinga Ngola Kilombo kia Kasenda (new dynasty)
Mbandi Ngola Kiluanji
Ngola Mbandi
Queen Nzinga Mbande
In comparing this tradition with that of the Pende, one inter­
pretation might be to say that Ngola Kiluanji kia Samba, whose reign 
is avowedly unclear in the memory of Pende historians, is in fact an
■^Cavazzi, op.cit.. 294-296.
amalgam of two reigns in between which a change of dynasty had taken 
place. Such an interpretation also implies that the Pende omitted 
the name of Ngola Mbandi, who ruled for a short while before, and 
under the influence of, his more famous sister. Another interpretation 
might be that the Pende list represents only the new dynasty to which 
Cavazzi refers.
Any attempt to provide even tentative dates for the reigns of 
the Ngolas is frustrating. The names in the lists are clan names or 
titles as much as proper names,and dated Portuguese references to the 
kings usually refer simply to the Ngola. If another name is used it 
is not necessarily significant. What is certain is that Queen Nzinga 
gained control of Ndongo about 1624* It is also fairly certain that 
a 'Ngola Inene' died in or shortly before 15571 and. was succeeded by a 
'Ndambi Ngola' which could equally be Mbandi.^ Cavazzi said that it was 
Mbandi Ngola Kiluanji who received the Portuguese embassy of 1560 and 
had trouble with the invading Jaga or Imbangala. If this is the case 
a reasonable chronology could be drawn up as follows:
Nzinga Ngola Kilombi kia Kasenda - Ngola Inene Kiluanji
(who began Cavazzi's (who asked for Portuguese
second dynasty.) support but died c. 1557
before it came.)
^Pero Rodrigues: (ed): Uma Historia da Residencia dos Padres da Companhia 
de Jesus em Angola, 1.5.1594. A.R.S.I. Lus. 106 fls 29-39* Brasio IV, 
546-581, p. 552.
Mbandi Ngola Kiluanji Ngola Ndambi Inene ia Ndjenge
1560 and began the wars) 
(existence uncertain)
Ngola Mbandi
(received Paulo Dias in
Ngola Eiluanji kia Samba
Ngola Kiluanji ia Bandji
(was Ngola by 1617) 
Queen Nzinga Mbandi Queen Njinga Pande
(1624-1663)
After the first official Portuguese visit to the Ngola in 1520, 
the Mbundu slave trade developed rapidly. Although legally slaves 
could only be embarked in the Kongo port of Mpinda, an increasing 
number were fetched direct from the mouth of the Kwanza in Angola. The 
basis for the future Portuguese economy in Angola was thus laid in these 
years. Until the end of the nineteenth century the chief reason for 
Portuguese interest in this unhealthy land was as a means of providing 
labour for the rich plantations and mines of Brazil.
A large part of the supply of slaves undoubtedly came from the 
expansionist wars of the Ngolas. In a country that was probably more 
densely populated than Kongo^ such wars may have provided a larger supply 
than could be obtained at Mpinda in Kongo* Moreover the Mpinda trade was 
controlled by royal agents of both Kongo and Portugal and traders there 
had to pay the requisite taxes and dues which could be avoided by trad­
ing further south. Attempts to prevent this extension of free-trading
69
activities were frequent but unsuccessful* The royal ban of 1504 
on trade south of the Congo river has already been referred to*
In 1532 the royal instructions drawn up for the new trade factor 
going out to S&o Tome stressed that the Mani Kongo had been greatly 
scandalised by the direct trade with Angola which was being carried 
out to the detriment of his own ample supplies of slaves, ivory and 
copper* It was the royal wish that all cargoes be loaded in Kongo 
and never in Angola. Moreover, the Regimento added lamely, trading 
at the mouth of the Kwanza was dangerous because of the sand bar and 
the lack of adequate shelter*"*”
Sixteen years later the Kongo king was still disturbed about 
Portuguese interloping on the Angola coast and J0S0 III of Portugal 
ordered an inquiry. S&o Tome claimed that the supply at Mpinda was 
utterly inadequate and that ships were having to sail with a mere forty 
or fifty slaves on board. The Kongo reply, which was substantiated with 
a series of sworn testimonies, claimed that on the contrary there were 
far too few ships coming to Mpinda to collect the slaves available. No 
ship, they said, left with less than four hundred captives on board and 
the larger ones carried seven hundred. The shortage of transport meant 
that slaves had to be held over from one sailing to the nextjresulting 
in very high costs to the suppliers both in food and in mortality. Cases 
were quoted of slaves who had had to wait five months for shipment and
^Regimento do Peitor do Trato de S. Tome, 2.8.1532. Brasio II, 14-15.
the implication was that the ships which should have been fetching 
them were engaged in illegal traffic on the Angola coast.^
Despite the determined opposition of the kings of Kongo, con­
tacts with Angola continued to grow. A letter from the trade factor 
at S3.0 Tome in 1551 said that the Angola trade was quite permissible 
when the Kongo ports were not functioning, but goes on to admit that
ships were visiting Angola although at the time trade with Kongo was 
2
flourishing. Individual requests were made to the Portuguese king 
to allow trading trips to Angola. Jacome Leite applied for such a 
permit in 1553 subject to the consent of the king of Kongo and to the
*5
payment of the royal dues. At the Angolan &nd the trade was apparently 
more organised than its illegality would lead one to suppose. In 1556 
the Portuguese king wrote to his counter-part in Kongo asking for per­
mission to send a ship to Angola himself to fetch two Portuguese sub-
4
jects who had been there as factor and clerk for the past six years.
In the same year the Franciscans were planning to investigate the 
missionary field in Angola.
The result of this activity was the growth of a rivalry between 
the rulers of Kongo and of Ndongo. Both wanted to control the main
^Enquiry ordered by Jo£o III, 12.11.1548. ATT CC I 80 105 Brasio II, 
197-206.
^From the secretary of the royal S. Tome factory to the King. ? 1551 
ATT CC III 17 16. Brasio II, 268.
*5
Jacome Leite to King of Portugal, 8.8.1553# ATT CC 1-90-126. Brasio II, 
287-294#
4
King of Portugal to King of Kongo. August 1556, ATT. CSJ, Vol. 9, p. 61. 
Brasio II, 387-388.
outlet for the central African slave trade. Although the Portuguese 
officially backed the Kongo claim, they were also economically in­
volved in Angola, possibly to an even greater extent. By about the 
1550's the Dande seems to have become the recognised boundary between 
the two states. At the end of a period of economic and territorial 
expansion, the Ngola had emerged as a ruler of similar stature to that 
of Kongo. In part at least the growth of trade must have been re­
sponsible for this. In a Bantu state the king frequently held a mon- 
poly of external trade, and if that trade was a slave trade he also 
controlled the supplies since he was responsible for all wars. By 
trading with the Mbundu, therefore, the Portuguese were themselves 
indirectly responsible for the emergence of a powerful unitary state 
in.Angola, although it had been no part of their policy to promote 
such a development. The next stage of relations between the Mbundu and 
the Portuguese was the latter's attempt to curb the power of the Ngola, 
first trying to discover more about Ndongo and its new monarch.
The second official attempt by the Portuguese crown to make con­
tact with the Ngola began in 1557. In that year some representatives 
of Ngola Inene arrived in Lisbon to ask for an embassy to be sent to 
the royal court of Ndongo. Antonio Mendes, one of the Jesuit mission 
which went out to Angola as a result of Inene*s appeal, later wrote 
that the Ngola's deputation to Lisbon had been held up for nine years 
in SSo Tome. He said also that it was only after that long delay that
the envoys had hit upon the idea of asking for Christian missionaries 
and saying that their king wished to be baptised.^* He does not state 
what their original mission had been, but several causes might be sug­
gested. It is possible that the Ngola was already being threatened
(
by migrant groups of Jaga coming fromthe east and that he wanted Portu­
guese military aid. Another possibility is that in the economic struggle 
with Kongo the Ngola wanted armed protection in case his lands were in­
vaded. The Ngola may have felt that he was now strong enough to try 
to have the official Portuguese slave trade transferred from the Kongo 
to Angola. This desire to try to increase his stake in the slave trade 
seems to be the most likely general cause for wishing to establish offi­
cial contacts, although lesser but more specific and urgent reasons may 
have prompted the timing of the appeal.
The delay of nine years before Inene*s embassy reached Portugal 
possibly reflected the hostility of S&o Tome to any attempt on the part 
of the Ngola to make contact with the royal authorities in Lisbon. They 
would have been loath to see an extension of Portuguese royal influence 
to the coast south of Kongo. If the ambassadors really were delayed 
nine years they must have been sent out by Ngola Inene about 1548* If 
his reason for doing so was an urgent, peril to the state, the probability 
is that the cause had passed by the time his appeal reached Lisbon. This 
may be one of the reasons why the reception afforded to the Portuguese
1
Antonio Mendes S.J. to the General, 9.5.1565. B.N.R.J. I 5. 2. 58. Brasio I] 
497.
when they finally arrived was so cool.
The response of Queen Catherine to the Ngola*s request was to 
organise a Jesuit religious mission with a lay leader who would act
as her ambassador. Plans for sending this mission were being drawn
1 2 up when, in November 1557 or at latest in mid-1558, the news of
Ngola Inene*s death arrived in Lisbon. There was some delay while 
enquiries were made as to what the attitude of the new Ngola would be 
to such an enterprise. No real satisfaction seems to have been ob­
tained but on 22 December 1559 the expedition nonetheless set sail in 
two ships. The leader was Paulo Dias de Novais, grandson of Bartholemeu 
Dias who was claimed to have been the first discoverer of Angola on his 
way to the Cape in 1488. The mission consisted of two Jesuit fathers 
and two lay brothers. The royal instructions given to Dias ordered him 
to make contact with the Ngola from the coast. If the Ngola consented 
to receive him he was to make his way up country and present his cre­
dentials to the court. The Jesuits would then open discussions on the
3
possibility of converting his people to Christianity. The Bishop of 
S2Lo Tome expressed great scepticism about the prospect of success in 
such an undertaking. He doubted whether any negotiation with the Ngola
■^Apontamentos sobre Paulo Dias. BNL CP Ms 647 Doc 6. Brasio II, 466.
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I'-.acio de Azevedo to Diogo Lainez, 19.8.1558. Brasio II, 415*
Royal Instructions to Paulo Dias. 20.12.1559. B.N.L. CA Ms 308. Brasio 
II, 446-448.
could be began until the ban on free trade with Angola had been lifted. 
He also complained of the importance which the Mbundu attached to their 
'idols'. The carved statuettes and figurines which the Portuguese met 
in Ndongo were considered a powerful sign of the devil's hold on that 
country. The bishop’s pessimism probably contained a true understanding 
of the commercial nature of the Ngola's desire for direct links with 
Europe. It was also however an opportunity to put in a word for the 
traders of his diocese who wanted the partially enforced ban on trade 
with Angola to be lifted, but did not want royal authority widened to 
include an agreement with the Ngola.^
When Paulo Dias arrived at the mouth of the Kwanza on 5 May 1560 
the new Ngola, Ndambi, was not sure what to do. It seems likely that 
he had European traders living at his court and since they represented 
the SSo Tome 'free-traders' they probably advised him not to allow Dias 
to enter the country. On the other hand Ndambi knew that any embassy 
would be bringing substantial presents of cloth and other goods which 
he craved. Dias also was uncertain how to proceed. A Portuguese trader 
whom he met on the Kwanza firmly advised him not to sail up the river. 
Dias finally decided to send his kinsman Luis Dias with a message to 
the royal capital. Dorn Antonio, the half-European sailor who had been 
one of old Inene's ambassadors to Portugal, acted as his guide. The
1Bishop of SS.0 Tome to King Sebastian 20.2.1560. A.T.T. CC I 104-3. 
Brasio II, 459-461.
Ngola1 s reply to the first overture was that he had no interest in 
anything other than the gift which 'his brother' the king of Portugal 
had sent him. To this the Jesuits replied firmly that their only pur­
pose in coming to Angola was to convert him and his subjects to Christ­
ianity and that the gifts which they brought were conditional upon his 
accepting baptism.^
Negotiations dragged on over six months while the expedition 
camped at the mouth of the Kwanza. During this time many Portuguese; 
including one of the priests^died of fevers. The ruler of country north 
of the estuary was a chief called Mani Corimba who claimed to owe alle­
giance both to the king of Kongo and to the king of Ndongo because his 
lands lay between them. This chief sold food to Dias and his men and 
on one occasion even supplied them with three bullocks and some goats. 
Eventually Dias grew impatient with the delay and set out to visit the 
interior himself. It was said that he was being accused of cowardice 
in remaining on the seaboard. He sailed thirty leagues (probably about 
120 miles if the estimate was accurate) up the river in a small boat 
with seven men. The bare country of elephants and palm-trees gave way 
to more populous regions with rich valleys and fresh-looking country.
At the limit of navigation, probably near Massangano, the party was wel­
comed by one of the Ngola's tributary chiefs. They then marched several
This information together with nearly all the following description of 
Ndongo is taken from a letter of Antonio Mendes written on 9 May 1563 
after he had returned to Lisbon. B.N.R.J. 1-5, 2, 38. Brasio II, 495-512.
days further on through some twenty villages to the royal city,
When they arrived they were received by an official called Mani Dongo 
and accommodated in three straw huts. The king sent them chickens, goats, 
flour, fruit and many calabashes of palm wine.
This city was a large and well built African town which the Jesuits 
considered to be not much smaller than their own city of Evora in Portu­
gal.’1’ After waiting a few days as was customary, the Ngola sent word 
that he would like to speak to the envoys. The compound in which he 
lived was large and complex with a stout outer defence of trees and
palms planted close together and interwoven with branches. The first
\
courtyard was used on occasions when the king met the masses of his sub­
jects or when he was passing judicial sentences on criminals. Beyond 
this were further inner courts and doorways until inihe heart of the 
complex was a pateo in which the king lived and received his closest 
advisers and nobles. When Dias and his Jesuit companions were ushered 
into this central sqisre the Ngola was seated among his courtiers drink­
ing palm wine out of a horn which he filled from a large calabash at 
his side. It was the greatest honour to be invited to drink wine with 
the king. As a mark of esteem the ambassadors were offered ”a fruit
which theymlue very highly and call cola but which we find bitter and
2
disagreeable as they know full well11. The Ngola showed great appreciation
^Letter from Francisco Gouvea SJ. 1 Hov. 1564* Boletim da Sociedqrfe 
de Geografia de Lisboa. 1883.
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Antonio Mendes, letter cited, Brasio II, 501.
of the blue materials, woollen cloth and other gifts which were pre­
sented to him and in return gave sheep, goats, flour, wine, fruit 
and two cows. When the Jesuits discussed the subject of proselytising, 
the king was less enthusiastic but eventually agreed that fifteen or 
twenty of his own and his courtiers1 children should be taught the prin­
ciples of Christianity.
Amicable relations did not progress from there but on the contrary 
deteriorated rapidly. The Portuguese blamed outside interference, 
notably from Kongo, but the inherent stresses of the situation were 
probably no less important. The commercial and perhaps also religious 
antagonisms were bound to be translated to a political plane in which 
rivalry turned to open hostility. The intervention of which Antonio 
Mendes accused the king of Kongo was not unexpected. The king was thought 
to have sent word to the Hgola that the Jesuits had come to see if Angola 
produced silver or gold which would make it worth while for the Portuguese 
king to conquer his lands. This was an earnest warning based on a sound 
understanding of Portuguese ambitions although its motives were the in­
terests of Kongo rather than those of Mongo. The king of Kongo through 
his official monopoly of the central African slave trade was the sole 
legal supplier of European goods to Mongo; a Portuguese conquest of 
Mongo or even regularised trade links would rob him of this rich com­
mercial field.
The Ngola took the warning seriously and the children who were 
being educated were removed from the 'seditious1 care of the Jesuits.
The belongings of the ambassador and of the missionaries were im­
pounded* Thirty of the Portuguese who iere at the court were sent 
down to the coast to get home as best they could and nine men, in­
cluding Paulo Dias, Father Gouveia and Antonio Mendes, were kept as 
hostages. When the news of the Ngola's hostile attitude reached SSo 
Tome a ship was sent to the Kwanza with an interpreter to try to res­
cue the prisoners. The Ngola determined to get hold of the goods which 
the ship carried without relinquishing the advantage of holding his 
Portuguese captives. He allowed Antonio Mendes to go and explain to 
the captain that the lives of Dias and Gouveia were in danger if he did 
not hand over all his merchandise to the Ngola* s representative. The 
captain handed over the goods but refused to allow Mendes to return to 
the court and took him to SSo Tome whence the bishop sent him to re­
port to Lisbon rather than allowing him to return to such an unpromis­
ing mission field.^
The action of the Ngola in 1561 marked the end of the period of 
'co-operation* in Afro-Portuguese relations. The Ngola hoped to be able 
to squeeze further advantages out of the situation, but the Portuguese 
were turning towards the idea of conquest. Father Gouveia wrote from
his captivity that the only way to convert the people of Angola was by
2forcible political subjection. The Ngola kept Dias and Gouveia in his 
capital partly by promises to receive baptism and partly by enforced
^Letter from Antonio Mendes, op.cit.. Brasio II, 495-512.
^Ruela Pombo: Angola Menina. Lisbon 1944 > p.9
captivity until 1565* In that year Dias was sent back to Portugal 
to accompany an envoy from the Ngola* He took forty copper rings, 
thirty-five ivory tusks, forty pieces of valuable Kikongo dye-wood, 
and a number of slaves. In return he was to request Hthousands of 
things” for the Ngola.'*' Gouveia remained in Ndongo as a prisoner 
and eventually died there in 1575 soon after Dias had returned to 
Angola as conquistador.
Although the mission failed in the attempt to open friendly 
contacts between Ndongo and Portugal, it was historically important 
for the information which it supplied to the outside world about the 
Ngola and his subjects and lands. Antonio Mendes said that he was a 
fearsome ruler and that his justice was harsh. On one occasion he wit­
nessed the execution of eleven rain-makers who had failed to attract 
rain when the crops needed it. The Ngola1s main concern apart from 
the administration of justice was the conduct of wars. He had a great 
number of vassal chiefs who had to take up arms and follow him with 
their subjects when he called&pon them. His captains might lead armies 
of four or five or eren ten thousand men. On one occasion the Ngola 
reviewed an army estimated at fifty thousand men who filed past on a 
great open plain before setting out to attack twelve important chiefs 
who had rebelled in their allegiance. All were captured together with 
their wives, sons, slaves and three thousand cattle and lesser stock.
Father Gouveia from Angoleme, Ndongo, 19.5.1565. Boletim da Sociedade 
de Geografia de Lisboa. 1885, 538-539.
The booty also included copper and ivory. On another occasion the 
Ngola personally led an attack on a ‘King of Banguella1 who was cap­
tured and killed. The conquered realm was then divided between two 
of the Ngola1 s ‘sons' or subjects who in return were bound to pay an 
annual tribute. This they soon failed to do and the Ngola had to raise 
a new army and attack the province once more.^ The Jesuits were not 
the only people to be struck by the cruelty and warlike abilities of 
Ngola Ndambi. The Pende remember Ndambi as a terrible chief who repressed 
revolts without mercy. Their tradition represents this cruelty by a well- 
known cliche. When Ndambi wanted to make a surprise raid on a village 
he raised himself up into the air on two spears which were planted on
the chests of two slaves. When the spears pierced the heart, Ngola
2
Ndambi disappeared on his raid.
The country around the Ndongo capital was described as fertile 
and populous. Numerous palm trees produced wine, oil, and fruits as 
well as building materials for houses and compounds. While the men were 
at war the women were occupied in cultivating the land and rearing cattle, 
goats, sheep and chickens. The main crops were millets, beans, cala­
bashes, yams, radishes and occasionally a few bananas. Eggs were greatly 
valued but milk was not used. Other food included honey, pigs and a 
small kind of dog which was eaten with much appreciation. Birds and 
hares, as well as smaller animals like rats and snakes were hunted and
^Antonio Mendes* letter d. 1563, cited above.
Haveaux, op.cit., 49* An almost identical tradition relates to the 
cruelty of the Imbangala leader KascCnje. See Vansina J.A.H., Vol. IV, 3.
hippos and crocodiles, which were eaten, were caught in the Kwanza
and Lukala Hivers. Very little fishing was done. Throughout the
country daily markets were held for the exchange of foodstuffs. The
universal currency of Ndongo was rock salt. This salt was brought
from the mines in Kisama in square blocks about 3 span wide. Three
of these blocks would buy a goat and fourteen or fifteen were the price
of an ox or cow. Chickens sold for six to the block or three if they 
1were capons.
The location of the capital city of Ndongo and the exact limits
of the kingdom as a whole are not easy to define. It would appear that
the Ngola no longer controlled Luanda which was considered to be part of
the Kongo domains. He did however have some claim to suzerainty over
the Nani Corimba at the mouth of the Kwanza and also as far north as
the Dande river. The importance of cattle suggests that the heartland
of Ndongo may have been on the edge of the plateau rather than in the
wooded foothills of the lower Lukala. There was probably more than one
royal city in the metropolitan area of Ndongo. Father Gouveia lived in
Ngoleme, which he refers to as a city of five or six thousand houses
with a strong outer wall. It was burnt down by a tremendous fire in 
2
1564* The Ngola then moved to another city called Kabasa.
The release of Paulo Dias from Ndongo in 1565 concludes the first 
stage of the history of European activity in West Central Africa. The
^Antonio Mendes.
Father Gouveia 1.11.1564* Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, 
Vol. for 1883, 303-504.
crucial new factor which, had been introduced into the area was sea- 
trade. Earlier the states of the region had their backs to the sea 
and faced inland. The sea was only important for the salt deposits 
which formed on the coast. In itself it was of no value and only 
hindered further progress westward in search of new lands and riches.
The coming of the Portuguese, the men from the sea, radically altered 
this outlook. A new source of riches, greater than any discovered be­
fore, was found to exist beyond the ocean. The effects of the new 
trade were twofold: the first was a weakening effect due to the drain
of manpower and the second was a strenghthening as those who controlled 
the slave trade gained wealth and power from the European goods which 
they obtained in return.
The first area in which the new trade operated was Kongo. Fairly 
rapidly however the emphasis shifted southward to the southern boundaries 
of the kingdom. The diverse reasons for this shift probably included 
the greater density of population in Angola, the easy access to the in­
terior by the Kwanza river, the rapid growth in the demand for slaves and 
possibly the fact that Kongo, unlike Ndongo, was strong enough to impose 
its own terms on the trade. The volume of the Mpinda slave trade was 
estimated in 1536 to be between 4000 and 5000 slaves a year as mentioned 
above. The Kongo slave dealers who complained of a shortage of ships in
1548, said that each ship carried four hundred slaves but gave no indi­
cation of how many ships a year called at Mpinda.^* The same account
^"Enquiry into S&o Tome trade, 12.11.1548, quoted above, Brasio II, 197.
gives the impression that even by 1548 trade with Angola was considerable. 
It is perhaps unlikely, however, to have reached, by then, the volume 
achieved during the early years of the Portuguese conquest, when an aver­
age of about 3>000 slaves per annum were being shipped officially from 
Luanda.^ This Portuguese conquest of Angola began to be considered as 
soon as Paulo Dias was released from the Ngola1 s capital and allowed to 
return to Portugal in 1565.
Abreu e Brito: Urn inquerito a vida administrativa e economica de
Angola e do Brazil. 1591* Published by Albuquerque Felner in Coimbra, 1931
p.30.
Chapter Three
TEE BEGINNING OF THE PORTUGUESE COTOJBST 
OF NDONGO 1565-1605
The first phase of Portuguese activity in Nest Central Africa 
had been predominantly peaceful in that Europeans had not been intent 
on conquering any African state. The wars that had taken place had 
been the attacks of stronger African states against their weaker 
neighbours with the aim of obtaining slaves to sell. In particular 
the centralized kingdom of Kongo had attacked the smaller and less 
organised state or states of the Mbundu. Any Portuguese participation 
in these wars was in a secondary role. The second phase of European 
activity in the Kongo-Angola region was in marked contrast to this.
The Portuguese made a conscious decision to attack with a view to 
territorial conquest. The decision to do this may have been precipi­
tated by a crisis which arose in Kongo. This crisis was the invasion 
of the Jaga and the expulsion of the Portuguese from Kongo.'*’
The Jaga invasion of Kongo took place during the late 1560's.
In about 1569 they captured the city of Mbanza Kongo and the king had
to flee to an island refuge in the Congo estuary. By February 1571 news
2of the disaster had reached Lisbon, and an army of 600 European soldiers
3
was rapidly raised under the command of Captain Francisco de Gouveia,
■*"The nature and origins of the Jaga will be discussed in Chapter IV.
2
A.T.T, Chancelaria de D. Sebastin&o, liv. 25» fl 123. Brasio III, 122.
3Captain Francisco de Gouveia, leader of the Kongo expeditionary force 
of 1571-1576, should not be confused with Father Francisco de Gouveia S.J., 
Missionary to Ndongo 1560-1575.
former captain of the island of J££o Tome, to go and help the king of
Kongo. The expeditionary force sailed in March 1571 and on reaching
1
Kongo combined with King Alvaro's refugee army. They left the Island 
of Hippopotami in the Congo River and attacked the enemy on the main­
land. Duarte Lopez, the chief source of information about the Jaga in­
vasion, said that the noises of the old “ arquebuses was sufficient to
put the Jaga to flight. Within eighteen months Alvaro had been restored
2
to his capital and could begin to repair the damage. In March 1574 
the king of Portugal wrote to Gouveia saying that his mission had now 
been successfully completed and that he could return to Europe. Before 
doing so, however, he was to build a fort, at the expense of the king 
of Kongo, in which the king and the Portuguese residents at his court
3
could take refuge in the event of a further attack by the Jaga. Gouveia 
finally arrived back in Lisbon in September 1577 and died shortly after-
4
wards at the age of seventy. Several of his companions remained in
5
Kongo where they became prosperous traders. Many of them established 
private armies to protect them from further attacks and also, undoubtedly, 
to assist in the acquisition of slaves.
^Epitaph on the tomb of Captain Gouveia. Brasio III, 121-122.
2
Lopez-Pigafetta, op.cit.» 109.
3
King of Portugal to Gouveia 19.3.1574. In Manuel de Santos; Historia 
Sebastica cited by Brasio, III, 120-121.
4Gouveia*s epitaph. Brasio, III, 121-122.
5Lopez-Pigafetta, 110.
The Jaga invasion had a profound influence nn the Portuguese.
The shock of seeing the powerful kingdom of Kongo overthrown by a 
few hordes of nomads was long remembered. The name Jaga became synony­
mous with plundering and cannibalism. Apart, however, from the awe 
inspired by these invaders, there were hard practical considerations 
of an economic and political nature. Paulo Dias and many other Portu­
guese had already for some years been contemplating the possibility of 
a southward shift in the main Portuguese trading base from Kongo to 
the populous Kbundu country. It was suggested that armed force should 
be used to secure a firmer hold there than was possible in a country 
where Kongo sovereignty was recognised. There was now also a fear that 
if the Jaga could invade once, they could invade again. In addition to 
this the Teke, who had been attacking Kongo from the north in the 1560's 
and thus diverting the army just at the time when the Jaga were threaten­
ing the eastern frontier, might .take advantage of the confusion to in­
vade the Kongo kingdom again and with greater success than before. For 
these reasons the Portuguese position in Kongo now appeared highly in­
secure. It is significant therefore that within eight months of the
i
news of the Jaga disaster reaching Lisbon, Paulo Dias received a charter 
allowing him to conquer territory in Angola. He had been lobbying for 
this charter for the past five years.^
An important plea for the conquest of Angola was made by Father
Dias probably arrived back in Lisbon and began planning the conquest of 
Angola in 1565 or 1566. The news of the Jaga invasion arrived before 
February 1571. The charter was granted on 19 September 1571.
87.
Gouveia the Jesuit missionary who was kept a captive at the court 
of Ngola Ndambi from 1560 until his death in 1575. In a long letter 
which he wrote to his superior in about 1565, he said that the only 
way seriously to convert a 1 heathen* people to Christianity was by 
subjecting them to colonial rule. The example of Kongo had shown how 
weak and superficial Christianity became in a country which was not 
politically dominated by a Christian power. The refusal of the king 
of Ndongo to allow preaching in his lands was ample justification for 
the Portuguese to declare war and take away his kingdom. The Ngola 
should be punished at once for accepting presents from the Jesuit 
mission and then refusing to listen to the word of God.'*'
To add economic incentive to his evangelistic plea for a holy war 
on Ndongo, Father Gouveia described the supposed riches of the country. 
These, he said, would soon repay the costs of the conquest. The first 
source of wealth was the Kisja'ama salt mines to the south of the Kwanza 
River ten or fifteen leagues from the sea. Apart from being the normal 
currency of Ndongo, salt was a valuable commodity and traders from many 
nations in the interior came to the Mbundu markets to buy it. The 
Mbundu also had plenty of copper which they made into bracelets, neck­
laces and anklets. Father Gouveia was convinced that there were rich 
veins of silver in the mountains of Ndongo, especially in one near to 
the road leading from the Kwanza river port to the royal city. This
"^Report on Angola drawn from the letters of Father Gouveia and Paulo Dias 
de Novais. B.N.L. FG MS 8123 in Ruela Pombo: Angola Meninat Lisbon 1944. 
Also see Brasio II, 518-521. Dated 1563 by reference to * three years 
captivity*.
mountain, owned by a chief called ’Ombe Amoguila', was probably the 
Cambambe Hill which the Portuguese eventually conquered at great 
cost. Gouveia maintained that the reason why the silver was never 
seen was that the king of Kongo had warned the Ngola that the Portu­
guese would conquer his country if they heard about it. If this hap­
pened, he said, the king of Kongo’s trade might move to Angola and 
because ’his land is sterile, he would remain a sad king without trade'.^
Another advantage put forward for conquering Ndongo was the alleged
closeness of Mozambique and Sofala. Gouveia said that the 'Dambia
Songe' who lived in a large kingdom seventeen days journey to the east
2
of Ndongo, came to buy salt and copper in the Kabasa market and talked 
of the eastern seaboard as though familiar with it. The prospect of 
quick access to the mines of Monomatapa without having to sail round the 
Cape must have had a strong appeal to the authorities in Lisbon, how­
ever unlikely it may appear in the light of later geographical revelations.
As a final shot to drive home his argument, Gouveia referred to 
the 'insolence’ of the Mbundu in their treatment of white men. They
lacked respect even for the ambassador of the great king of Portugal,
whom they robbed even of his personal clothing. They accused him of 
spying and inferred that the Jesuits were a mere cover for his activities. 
They taunted the Portuguese by saying that if it were not for the sea
■^Ruela Pombo, op.cit., 11 quoting B.N.L. FG 8123.
2
The reference clearly says that they came to fetch copper not to sell it.
they -would conquer Portugal and help themselves to the riches to be 
found there. Gouveia stressed that the Portuguese king must give ex­
emplary punishment to those who expressed such ideas and show once and 
for all that he was the real master of all 1Ethiopia
This strong plea for evangelisation by the sword also contains a 
short memorandum drawn from a letter written by Dias himself, probably 
while still a captive at the Ngola1 s court. He said that labour was 
very plentiful in Angola and that subjects would work for their king or 
overlord when their own crops had been sown. With such plentiful man­
power the Portuguese would be able to build a civilization in Angola 
surpassing that of the Romans. There should be little difficulty in 
persuading Portuguese noblemen to emigrate with their vassals in return 
for the grant of a title or of a pension which could be drawn from the 
land conquered. With the help of people from S&o Tome and a few noble
leaders, Dias considered it possible to establish a white colony on the
2
cool plateau behind the fever-ridden coast.
These ambitions of the advocates of a new, active policy in Angola, 
received great stimulus from the Portuguese military intervenion in Kongo. 
One result of Captain Gouveia's expulsion of the Jaga from Kongo was to 
demonstrate that European troops could operate effectively in tropical 
Africa. The success of a small army of 600 white soldiers must have given
^Ruela Pombo op.cit., 5-16, quoting B.N.L. FG 8123*
2
B.N.L. FG Ms 8123 drawn up from a letter of Paulo Dias. In Ruela Pombo, 
op.cit. 17-19*
great encouragement to Paulo Dias and his associates planning the con­
quest of xingola. Lopez had claimed that even the noise of fire-arms 
was enough to drive the Jaga out of Kongo. In later years the conquistadores 
were to discover that European troops were not as effective as they had 
supposed, and that the gun was not as superior to the bow as they had 
been led to believe. The conquerors came to rely on the sune massive 
armies of bowmen that were used by the kings of Kongo. In the years 1571 
to 1574, however, these developments were unknown,and the success of a 
few Europeans with guns against the Jaga greatly stimulated the grandiose 
and almost dream-like plans for conquest and white settlement in Angola 
which were being prepared with royal approval and Jesuit encouragement.
On 39 September 1571^ " a charter of donation was drawn up for Paulo
Dias de Novais. Two theologians certified that military subjection would
be beneficial in spreading the Christian faith. Dias was made hereditary
overlord of the donataria, which was the territory south of the Kwanza,
and governor for life of the colony between the Kwanza and the Dande River,
which formed the boundary of Kongo. The southern limit of the do>-uvfcyT-ipy
was thirty-five leagues south of the Kwanza and the eastern border could
2
be pushed as far as the conquerors were able to go.
The obligations which Dias took on were so heavy as to be almost 
absurd. The southern section, of which Dias became 'Lord-Proprietor1,
Pelner read the text as 'seix* (six) but Brasio read it as ' xjx'
(nineteen).
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Carta de DoajSo a Paulo Dias de Novais, 19.9.1571. A.T.T. Chancelaria
de D. Sebasti&o (Doa^es) Liv. 26, fl 295-299. Brasio, III, 36-51.
consisted of a stretch of barren coast with a sparse population and 
a rainfall of only about ten inches a year. On this coast he under­
took to settle one hundred white, non-Jewish families with wives and 
children within the space of six years. He was to provide the farmers 
with plants and seeds. The crown would provide neither capital, nor 
loans, nor would it furnish arms, ships, food or ammunition. All costs 
were to be born by the donatario. The military obligations were no 
lighter. Dias was to take eight sea-going vessels to Angola and three 
fishing boats for fluvial navigation. He undertook that within twenty 
months of leaving Lisbon he would have 400 trained soldiers, 18 masons 
and builders, a physician and a barber in the colony. He was to take 
enough food for all his men for one year. From the six i horses which 
he had to take he was to breed twenty within three years. In the first 
ten years he was to build three castles. One had to be at the chief 
port to ward off foreign attack. It was to be 40 fathoms wide and as 
many long, and the walls were to be nine feet thick and thirty high.
The other two forts were to be built at suitable sites inland. To pro­
tect them from sudden attack by the Mbundu^ when they arrived temporary 
fortifications of timber and earth were to be thrown up.
The attitude of the Church to the venture was interesting. It 
had progressed little since 1452, in which year the Pope wrote to the 
king of Portugal saying: "We grant you full rights to capture the Sara­
cens, pagans, and other infidels in your properties ... to subjugate them
and reduce them to perpetual slavery'1. The Charter stated that 
before slaves were certified as true captives and shipped to the 
mother country, the 'necessary justifications' must be made in accord­
ance with the orders of the Hesa de Conciencia. Although the import­
ance of proselytising in Africa had been so strongly stressed in the 
original pleas for conquest, the Charter itself only mentioned eccle­
siastical affairs in a post-script. This said that the expedition was 
to take three clergy to hear confessions and administer the sacraments 
to its members. The Ponatario was to be responsible for building a 
church dedicated to Saint Sebastian and would provide all the necessary 
furnishings, ornaments and vestments at his own expense.
In return for his large out-lay, Dias was to receive all taxation
in the donataria, and one third of the colony's taxes, especially those
on slaves. He gained a monopoly of the idzimbu shells which were fished 
up in Luanda and sent to Kongo to be used as currency. He was allowed 
to export 48 slaves per annum free of duty, but had to pay 1,600 re iS\ 
tax on all others. He would own all water-mills and receive a half-tythe 
on all fish caught. Finally he was to take possession of all the salt
mines, both inland and by the sea. It may have been from this last pro­
vision that Dias hoped to make a profit. The slabs of Kisama rock salt
came from mines within the donataria, but Dias never conquered them nor
2
any other part of his Kisama domains.
B^aitLo: Historia da ExpansSo Portuguesa no Mundo, Vol. II, 268. Lisbon 1939*
^Donation Charter, Brasio III, 56-51.
93.
The ambitious plans lad down in the charter were never in fact 
carried out. The first reason for rapid failure was the high mortality 
rate among Europeans on the Angola coast. Although Dias should have 
expected this from his knowledge of the country, he was still defeated 
by it. Secondly the hostile opposition of the Africans was stronger 
and more organised than the architects of colonization had supposed.
Thirdly the climate of the coast proved unsuitable for agriculture.
Even drinking water was often scarce in Luanda and the rainfall was
r; i» v
quite inadequate for most crops. Finally,Athis was probably the most
important factor of all, the slave trade dominated all other activities.
Its supremacy is a theme which constantly recurs in the history of
Angola. At least until the nineteenth century it undermined all attempts
to diversify the economy of the country.
The colonising expedition left Lisbon towards the end of 1574
three years after the granting of tie charter. On December 17 it passed
the Cape Verde Islands and a month later sighted the island of Annobon
2
in the Gulf of Guinea. On 20 February 1575 the main body of the ex­
pedition arrived at Luanda. On Luanda Island the colonisers found forty 
Portuguese already sebtled. They were rich traders who had escaped from 
Kongo 1 because of the Jacas, ferocious barbarians who nourish themselves
3
on human meat*. There were also in the bay seven slave ships which had
^Pero Rodrigues (ed), op.cit, gives 23.10.1574.
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Garcia SimCes to the Provincial, 20.10.1575* B.N.L. CA Ms 308 fl. 215-220v, 
Brasio, III, 129-142. The alternative date of 11.12.1575 given by Rod­
rigues suggests that the expedition did not arrive all at the same time.
3
Rodrigues, op.cit.
come from S&o Tome to trade. Luanda Island's African population, 
which was estimated at 3,000, was mainly engaged in fishing nzimbu 
shells for currency.
Most of the information about the early years of the Portuguese 
settlement and the beginning of the Angolan Wars is obtained from the 
letters of the Jesuit fathers who accompanied Dias or who were sent 
out to join him later.^ Father Simfles gained a first impression of 
the country very different from the glowing accounts of Dias and Gou­
veia a few years before. He said that the people were .cannibals and 
that shortly before his arrival in Luanda they had killed and eaten 
four white men in a nearby village. The kingdom of Ndongo was, he said, 
divided up among ten or twelve powerful chiefs who each had the right 
to sell or kill their subjects. SimSes was decidedly unimpressed by 
Luanda and its environs. Food was scarce, the main crops being beans 
and millet. Occasionally a goat or some bananas were brought from the 
interior to barter. He did not like the local luxuries of palm wine 
and cola nuts. Water was in short supply and on the island could only
be obtained by digging shallow pits in the sand and hoping that the
2
water which seeped into them would not be brackish.
When Dias arrived in Luanda^Ngola Ndambi may already have been 
dead. If he was dead than Ngola Kiluanji was a separate king as the Pende
^The letters written from Angola during the governorship of Paulo Dias 
by the Jesuits were first published from Paris manuscript versions in the 
Boletim of the Lisbon Geographical Society for the year 1883. They were 
republished with some commentary by GastSo de Souza Dias in Relacfles de 
Angola, Coimbra 1934. They were republished again from Lisbon and Oporto 
manuscripts by Antonio Brasio, Vol. III. The main reference is B.N.L.
CA Ms. 308. Subsequent foot-notes will normally refer to these letters 
by the name of the author and the date only.
^Garcia SimSes, 20.10.1575.
tradition tentatively suggests. Unfortunately there appears to be
no record of his death, nor is there a clear record to assist in the
matter of the name of the Ngpla who watched the establishment of the
Luanda colony from his capital beyond the Lukala River. It cannot
even be stated for certain where the Mbundu capital city was at this
time. The evidence is so contradictory that it must be assumed that
within the metropolitan province of Museke, between the Lukala and
the Kwanza, the Ngola had a number of capitals. One of these, which
is clearly remembered by the Pende, was the rocky fastness of Pungu a
Ndongo where the Ngola could withdraw in times of danger. Kabasa, a
royal totyn which several early European visitors saw, seems to have
*
been a short way south of the latter site of Kbaka. One reference 
placed the Ngola*s capital at 'Gloanga Loanba*, 15 days journey from 
the coast.^
As to the death of Ndambi there are two rather uncertain refer­
ences in the correspondence of the 1560 Jesuit mission. In May 1563
2
Mendes said that the king was called 1 Ngola Quiloange*. Kiluanji was 
the name generally given to Ndambi's successor, but it may also have 
been a title applicable to any Ngola. Rather more interesting than this 
is a remark of Father Francisco de Gouveia. He wrote that he rarely
^"Garcia SimSes 20.10.1575.
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Antonio Mendes 9•5.1563.
*
Ambaca or Enbaca.
saw the king but that his warder, 'Gongacinza*, told him that this 
king had only recently begun to reign and assured him that later he 
would call upon the father to come and instruct him,'*' If he referred 
to Ngola Ndambi, the ’short time* would mean at least six years and 
perhaps longer. It is possible that, unbeknown to the captive Jesuit, 
a new Ngola had replaced the cruel Ndambi by 1564*
Whoever the Ngola was in 1575, it is certain that from his capital 
on the plateau he carefully watched the new developments on Luanda Bay. 
His opening move was to welcome Dias by sending an embassy down to the 
coast to greet him. The ambassador took four months over the journey 
and on his way levied 100 slaves and a great many cattle to present on 
the king's behalf. A grand reception was prepared by the Portuguese.
The embassy arrived blowing ivory horns, ringing double bells and ratt­
ling calabash* ■: gourds. After the Ngola*s credentials had been pre­
sented, Dias explained that he had been sent by his king to facilitate 
the activities of European traders and to help solve legal disputes.
A bowl of cola nuts was then handed round as a gesture of good-will and 
friendship. The Ngola probably hoped to acquire a new load of presents 
from the Portuguese king by his friendly approach, while Dias was anxious
not to do anything which might endanger the safety of Father Gouveia^who
2
was still alive at the Ngola*s court.
■^Father Gouveia to Diogo Mir&o 1.11.1564*
2
Garcia Sim&es to the Provincial 20.10.1575.
The Portuguese attempt to dissimulate their military intentions
did not succeed. SimSes said that, as on the occasion of the previous
Portuguese embassy, it was envoys from the king of Kongo who warned
the Ngola that the white men had come to conquer his kingdom.^- Alvaro I,
2
however, strongly denied any complicity. European traders at the Ndongo 
court who were opposed to the granting of a charter for Angola may have 
advised the Ngola of the military ambitions of the Dias expedition.
This warning caused the Ngola to threaten the lives of all the Europeans 
at his court,including Gouveia. He took no action however, and soon 
after, Gouveia died of fever and from the deprivations of his fifteen 
years' captivity. Losing this hostage was a serious blow to the Ngola,
He accused the Kongo envoys of witchcraft and sent them to Luanda to 
face trial by the Portuguese whose designs they had been trying to sabot­
age. It was believed in Ndongo that the presence of the priest had 
helped attract trade.
Before preparing for war, Dias tried to recall to Luanda all the 
European traders spread over Angola. At the time the trade was flourish­
ing. Simftes says that in 1576 14,000 slaves were bought by traders in 
Angola, although 4,000 of them died. This figure is difficult to reconcile 
with a later analysis of the slave trade made in 1591, which said that 
between 1575 and 1591 52,000 slaves in total were exported from Luanda.
^Garcia SimCes, 20.10.1575*
2
Alvaro I to Garcia SimSes 27.8.1575.
Various reasons could account for the wide divergence. The figure 
given by Simftes may have been merely an optimistic estimate, and the 
later account would not have included the slaves smuggled to Brazil 
to avoid paying duty. The figure of 1591 refers to 'pieces of India'• 
Since all except young men slaves were counted as less than one 'piece',
52,000 'pieces' may have represented a much greater number of head of 
slaves. Another point is that in the pre-war days of friendly trading 
with the Ngola the quantity of slaves obtained may have been greater 
than it was after the outbreak of hostilities. Simses said, for in­
stance, that nearly all the inhabitants of Ndongo appeared to be slaves 
of the king and that the usual form of punishment for crimes such as 
robbery or adultery was to be sold to the Portuguese.^ This practice 
may have declined with the outbreak of war. Furthermore, in trying to 
relate these two figures it must be remembered that the first figure is 
for the number of slaves bought and the second for the number shipped 
overseas. In neither case do we know how many were kept as domestic 
slaves and as military auxiliaries.
In 1576 the settlers and their Jesuit companions moved from Luanda 
Island to the mainland, probably to a site near the present fort of S&o 
Miguel on a high promontory overlooking the bay. Until 1579 relations 
between the Mbundu and the Portuguese remained quiet and trade continued 
to flourish. There was a minor skirmish in the Spring of 1577 but war
^Garica SimOes, 7*11.1576.
did not break out and furtive prospecting for silver mines continued.
A more serious problem than Mbundu hostility was the difficulty of 
enforcing upon the Portuguese the governor's claim to a monopoly of 
the slave trade on the whole coast. Traders continued to negotiate 
directly with the Congo River ports without his permission, and this 
seriously reduced the potential revenue of the colony. During these 
early years the Jesuits seem to have been more preoccupied with the 
depredations of leopards and elephants than with the serious problems 
of war and evangelisation. They also suffered from fevers and both 
Garcia Simftes and a lay brother died and had to be replaced from Lisbon.
The picture of the colony during these early years was one of fevers, 
frequent deaths and large-scale slave trading. The general gloom was 
only tempered by the dreams and hopes of riches to come and of souls 
to be saved.
Open war between the Ngola and the Portuguese appears to have broken 
out in 1579* In April of that year Pero da Fonseca, the Governor's 
representative at Kabasa, the royal capital, reported that a clash had 
occurred there between those Portuguese whose first loyalty was to the
2
Governor, Dias, and those who recognised the Ngola as an absolute sovereign. 
A Portuguese trader who had long been resident in Ndongo apparently told 
the Ngola to beware of the conquering ambitions of Paulo Dias. To the
"Sias de Novais, 3*1*1578. B.M. add. Ms 20 786, fls 45-47* Brasio IV, 
292-299*
2
Testimony of Pero da Fonseca, 18.4.1579. B.M. Add. Ms 20 786, fl 145.
Brasio IV, 308 - 309.
Portuguese this was treason. The Ngola took the warning eeriously and 
consulted his most senior advisers, among them the Tendaliand the Kitinga. 
They decided to take the initiative. Rumours of an imminent attack on 
Kabasa were spread and in the panic which followed, the thirty or forty 
Europeans at court were mobilised to help repel the fictitious enemy.
Once outside the town the Europeans were killed by the soldiers who ac­
companied them. Other white traders dispersed over the country were also 
killed.^ Frutuoso Ribeiro, a Jesuit priest, said that in addition to 
the thirty Portuguese, a large number of their Christian slaves were 
killed.
It seems that at this time Kabasa was the main staple for the slave 
trade. Traders and soldiers who could obtain credit, went to the city 
with loads of goods, especially cloth, which they gradually bartered 
for slaves. The ships which brought the goods waited meanwhile in Luanda 
for a return load of slaves. In 1579, when the Ngola killed all the 
Portuguese in his kingdom, the trade goods stock-piled in Kabasa were 
said to represent the cargoes of ten or twelve ships. These goods fell 
into the Ngola* s hands without his having to pay for them since their 
owners were dead. The loss to the Portuguese was estimated at 20,000 
cruzados (8 million reis) and several ships had to leave Luanda empty.
The Ngola followed up this challenge to the Portuguese by a direct
*^Pero Rodrigues, op.cit.
military assault* An army of 12,000 Hbundu soldiers attacked the 
small fort of Nzele* which Paulo Dias had huilt some thirty miles 
inland from Luanda. The governor managed to hold out with sixty Euro­
pean and 200 African troops, but from then on all-out war was inevitable. 
Dias said that he would never trust the Ngola again or offer him peace 
terms should he ask for them. The Portuguese would fight all the way 
to the silver mines, using Kongo allies if necessary.^*
The Portuguese offensive began in September 1580. The plan was 
to follow the line of the Kwanza River inland as far as the supposed 
mines at Cambambe. Dias crossed the neck of land between Luanda and the 
northward bend of the Kwanza with an initial force of 500 European soldiers 
and 200 trained slaves. It was intended to recruit more followers as they
advanced. Whenever possible the Portuguese used terrorist tactics rather
2
than risking pitched battles. Their main difficulty was obtaining food.
No provisions could be carried since none were available at the coast.
The army had therefore to live off the land, and raids on villages were 
often carried out primarily to obtain food supplies rather than to de­
feat the enemy.
The Portuguese army was at all times small in terms of European
3
soldiers. Rodrigues says that Dias arrived with 700 men of arms but
1Frutuoso Ribeiro, 4*3*1580. B.N.L. CA Ms 308 fls 221-223. Brasio III, 
187-190. (Other MSS in Porto and Paris give this document the date 14 
or 24 March 1580.)
2
Balthasar Afonso, S.J., 4.7.1581. Father Afonso describes how the Portu­
guese burnt people alive in their huts and how disembodied heads were 
used to great effect to frighten adversaries.
^Pero Rodrigues, op.cit.. 364-365*
*Anzelle.
Abreu put his army at 350, ’mainly rogues and cobblers’, many of whom
1
returned on the ships which had brought them. The high mortality 
among Europeans on the fever-ridden coast meant that reinforcements 
were continually being demanded. In 1578 Antonio Lopez Peixoto arrived 
with 400 soldiers and much ammunition and trade cloth which had been 
sent by Antonio Dias, the father and financial babker of the Governor.
In 1579 Cardinal Henrique, temporarily king of Portugal, helped to 
finance a further force of 200 men. After Philip of Spain had 'bought, 
inherited and conquered’ the Portuguese crown in 1580 he sent out three 
more batches of reinforcements. In 1584 JoSo Castanho Velez led 200 
soldiers who went to Angola with the new public treasury officials and 
experts on mining. In 1586 Jacome da Cunha sailed with 90 more and in 
the following year 350 Germans, Flemings and Castillians reached Angola. 
These last nearly all died of fever before seeing any military action.
To summarise the situation, the Rodrigues document estimated that over 
two thousand soldiers went to Angola in the 20 years from 3575 to 1594*
Of these three-fifths died of fever or left the country, 450 died in war 
and by 1594 a mere 300 still survived in the camps and garrisons of the 
colony.^
Because of this constant shortage of European troops, the army de­
pended largely on African slave-soldiers and the private armies of allied
Abreu e Brito, op.cit.
2
Pero Rodrigues, op.cit. 364-565.
or conquered Mbundu chiefs, or sobas as they were called. With one 
or two hundred European guns and several thousand African bowmen and 
lancers the Portuguese were usually willing to risk a battle, although 
they suffered several heavy cbfeats against the huge armies which opposed 
them. The quality of the guns sent to Angola was so bad that they some­
times killed theuser instead of the enemy, but fire-power was nonetheless 
considered essential, so that when powder supplies ran low the Portuguese 
were confined to their fo:bts.^
During October 1580 Dias marched the Kwanza from the settlements 
on the lower reaches. Palm oil, grain and cattle were the main booty 
taken. A salt depot was destroyed on the trade-route from the Ndemba
*
mines in Kisama to the markets of Ndongo. The chief Mushima Kita Mborje 
offered his subjection to the Governor and became a vassal of the king 
of Portugal. Early in November the party landed at Kakunde a short way 
below the confluence of the Lukala with the Kwanza. They built a forti­
fied camp and settled down to rest. The rains began and fevers took a 
heavy toll of the more recently arrived European troops. Foraging parties 
went out from Makunde into the provinces of Ilamba to the north and 
Kisama to the south. The Mbundu kept up guerrilla attacks and at least 
one sortie ended in disaster for the Portuguese. Unable to move, Dias 
waited for a relieving army from Kongo to come and help him to attack 
the Ngola. This Kongo army was said by Father Afonso to comprise 60,000
“^Balthasar Afonso, S.J. 19.1.1585.
*
Mazima Quitambonge.
men, led by 50 European soldiers* It was however completely defeated
by the Mbundu before it was able to reach Makunde and the Kongo warriors
fled with heavy loss of life. This battle probably took place in the
first half of 1581.1
One of the main results of this defeat of Portugal's Kongo allies
was that Mbundu Sobas who had defected to the Portuguese side, now feared
that the Europeans would no longer be able to protect them against their
former suzerain, the Ngola. Many therefore transferred their allegiance
2
back to their fellow-countrymen. 1581 and 1582 were dark years for the 
expeditionary army trying to force its way through the hostile and densely 
populated Mbundu country to the supposed silver mines of Cambambe. To­
wards the end of the latter year however Dias moved on again from Makunde 
and on 2nd February 1583 came face to face with a huge army which the
3
Ngola had raised. The battle was fought at Tala Ndongo, the gateway to 
the kind's country. Although the Portuguese claimed the victory, they 
were too exhausted to follow it up and fell back to a strong position 
at the confluence of the Lukala and Kwanza rivers. The site was named after 
Our Lady of Victory and the town of Massangano which grew up therebecame 
the focal point of Portuguese activity throughout the Angolan Wars.
Smaller battles were also fought during 1583 > and Father Afonso referred 
to one in which 619 noses were cut off as trophies by the Portuguese and
^Balthasar Afonso, S.J. 4.7.1581 and Balthasar Barreira S.J. 31.1.1582. 
^Barreira 31.1.1582.
3
The absurd references to the army being one million strong is probably 
a misreading: 'hum conto' (one million) instead of 'sem conto' (without
number)•
to another in which a Soba was made to pay ICO slaves before his head
was cut off.1 In order to cause the greatest hardship to their enemies
the Portuguese cut down the palm trees in the villages, thus depriving
2the Mbundu of palm wine, their main alcoholic drink.
By the time Jo&o Castanho Vellez arrived in Luanda with his re­
inforcements in 1584, Massangano was desperately short of powder and
shot. The new captain was sent almost immediately up country to launch
*
a new attack, on the Soba Kalunga in the province of Museke beyond the 
Lukala. Museke was the rich country in which the Ngola lived and in 
which the mines were supposed to be. Velez attacked an army of people 
called 'Soasas1 who probably belonged to the Imtangala invaders discussed 
in the next chapter. This enemy was defeated but while the Portuguese 
were rejoicing and feasting on the spoils, the Soasas returned, ostensibly 
to ask for peace, but in fact to wipe out most of the unsuspecting Portu­
guese force. The survivors buried their guns, burnt their trade cloth 
and limped away under cover of the night while the Soasas killed the 
wounded who rested by the wayside. This defeat took place on Christmas 
Eve 1585. Meanwhile on the other side of the Lukala River Andre Pereira 
Pereira, who was later to govern the colony for a short while in 1591 > 
had more success in resubjugating the sobas of Ilamba who had risen against
Afonso 3.10.1583.
2Afonso 19.1.1585.
*
Moseque
the Portuguese as soon as the main force had moved towards Cambambe.
A battle was fought in thick mist during which many of the leading 
Mbundu chiefs were killed. Pereira sent the heads of three of them to 
Lu^anda as trophies.
The small size of the European armies and the unreliability of 
the allied sobas meant that little progress was made in the year im­
mediately after 1585. The Portuguese were more or less confined to 
Massangano. It was rumoured that the Ngola had fled from Kabasa. He 
had built a line of timber foirts at intervals of one day's march by 
which he could retreat if the threat of his enemies came too close.1 
It was not until 1589 that the next major effort to capture Kabasa was 
made. Before the campaign began Dias himself died, probably on 9 May
p
1589. In his will he appointed Luis Serr&o to succeed him as governor.
*
SerrSo led his army along the Lukala to a site called Ngoleme a Kitambu 
which may have been the Ngoleme at which Father Gouveia had been a cap­
tive in 1564. It was probably in the region of the later fort of Mbaka. / 
At this place Ser&o was severely defeated on 28 December 1590 by a large 
army which, according to Abreu, was an alliance of the 'King of Matamba',
some Kongo troops, the Ndongo army, the 'Guindas* and the 'Yagua Kings'
3who bordered on the kingdom of Angola. It must be suspected that Abreu
1
Diogo da Costa S.J. 20.7.1585.
2
Sinopsis Analium Societatis Jesu ... 1540-1725 p. 151. Cited by Mathias 
Dalgado (ed) in Cadomega, I, 45*
3
'Abreu e Brito, op.cit.. 41.
* /
Anguoleme Aquitambo. r Ambaca.
was trying to justify the Portuguese rout by listing all the powerful 
rulers he could think of as the united adversary*
The beaten Portuguese force comprised 125 European ; arquebus
infantry, 15,000 African bowmen and three Portuguese horsemen.^ The
‘Matamba army*, as Abreu called it, was composed of three sections
which attacked frontally and then sent out wings which surrounded the
enemy. Serr&o decided to retreat as best he could and in fifteen days’
march arrived in the vicinity of Massangano. The defeat was costly
in terms of cash as well as in the number of lives lost. It was the
practice for traders with their loads of trade-goods to accompany the
army and buy slaves during the campaigns. When SerrSo's army was routed
he not only abandoned the army* s baggage but also all the fazenda or
trade cloth which the merchants had with them. This loss was serious
even if Abreu1s estimate that it represented the cargoes of twenty-four
2
ships is an exaggeration.
The death of Dias and the defeat of 1590 mark the end of the first 
stage in the Portuguese struggle for Angola. They also mark the end of 
the donataria which had already been challenged by the Spanish kings.
The crown now took over all proprietory rights and responsibilities for 
Angola. Abreu e Brito was sent out to Angola to conduct a full investi-
^Abreu e Brito, op.cit. 41*
2
Ibid. Pero Rodrigues op.cit. Brasio IV, 574; Pelner op.cit. 170, Abreu 
gives the date as the day of Innocents (28 December), 1590. Rodrigues 
gives 29 December 1589* The former date seems confirmed by a doc. B.N.L. 
CP Ms 644 fl 333 in Brasio III, 429-430 which refers to a split in SerrSLo1 
army following,on 26 Dec. 1590.
gation into the political and military situation and to form an 
opinion about the commercial prospects of the colony.
Abreu's report is particularly curious in its acceptance of all 
the old myths. It re-states the attitudes and ambitions of the donation 
charter written twenty years earlier. Angola is still ’the most popu­
lous country on earth1 and its riches are still the silver mines and 
other minerals.^ The aim was to conquer the Mbundu; and Abreu devotes 
most of his time to discussing how this should be achieved. His atti­
tude is that adopted by the Jesuits^maintaiing that it was intolerable 
impudence on the part of 'native' princes to resist the wishes of the
p
king of Portugal. The Portuguese clung to the conviction that for any­
one to fight against them was 'rebellion', and that to oppose them was 
'treason1. Abreu's case held that it was useless to send small re­
enforcements to Angola .because they were just frittered away against 
the might of the Mbundu armies. A large army should be sent out which 
could settle the question once and for all. The noble sobas must be 
conquered and subjugated each in turn. The army must be seen to be 
oonquered-and subjugated- eaoh-ia— turn.— The army-mu&t-bo-seon to be 
powerful enough to protect those who joined it against their own masters 
and suzerains. Once the governor had gained the support of a few power­
ful sobas, each with two or three thousand bowmen, the conquest would
Abreu e Brito, op.cit. 6.
Diogo da Costa S.J. 31.5-1586 for instance.
be easily completed.
To achieve this Abreu estimated the need for one thousand ex­
patriate soldiers and fifty or sixty horses. There were about one 
hundred European traders in Kongo who should be called upon and they 
could bring with them the thousand armed slaves whom they maintained 
for their protection. More recruits could be obtained from Sao Tome 
and a suggestion was made that five hundred criminal Mamelucos^ be 
recruited from Brazil. The lesson of Serr&o's defeat had to be learnt, 
and armies should not be allowed to conquer beyond a territory which they 
could defend. Abreu also gave detailed estimates of the cost of guns 
and uniforms for the new army. It would need seventy hundredweight of 
powder and a hundred of lead; To allay the doubts which Iberian kings 
always felt about incurring any expenditure in their colonies, Abreu 
continually stressed the richness of Angola just as Dias had done. The 
Mbundu fidalgos had estates like the greatest lords of Portugal which 
were full of cattle and ivory and people. The silver mines were better 
than those of Peru^and water power and slave labour were abundant. Ade­
quate enterprise and skills would be forthcoming provided free access 
were given to the mines on payment of the royal fifth. Miners would 
provide their own equipment on this basis.
If Abreu was over-optimistic about the wealth of Angola, he was 
even more so about the prospects of reaching the gold mines of Monomotapa. 
Francisco Barreto's expedition to conquer IDnomotapa from the Zambezi in
^Mamelucos were the part-Amerindian and part-European people of Brazil.
the 1560’s had been a more complete failure than the attempt to con­
quer Angola. The penetration of Angola therefore had the secondary 
attraction that it might prove possible to reach the gold mines from 
the west, seeing that it had proved impossible to get to them from the 
east. Abreu1 s calculation of distance was seriously wrong. He thought 
that the Soasos who lived east of Ndongo would be able to provide runners 
who could carry dispatches from India across Africa in fifteen days and 
so save the long and dangerous voyage round the Gape. His calculation 
reduced the thousand miles between Monomotapa and Ndongo to a mere one 
hundred.
The remaining sources of profit were the ones mentioned by earlier 
advocates of Angolan colonisation. The salt mines were said by Abreu 
to be so large that they supplied 'all of Ethiopia and parts of Persia'. 
He recommended that a fort be built on the site in addition to the chain 
of forts which was to link Luanda to the river-port and silver mines of 
Gambambe. The revenues from salt taxes could be made to equal the total 
revenue from all sources previously exploited. Great profit could also 
be drawn from the pitch lake which would provide admirable materials 
for caulking ships. Finally sugar could be grown in Angola;making the 
colony into a second Brazil. Its advantages over Brazil would be that 
the necessary laboqr was locally available to work on the plantations and 
operate the sugar mills.^
1
Abreu e Brito, 1591, op.cit.
Abreu e Brito's report strongly influenced the policy which the 
Spanish monarchy^- adopted towards Angola, its new Crown colony. Con­
quest by private charter had not been particularly successful, and the 
crown decided to take the matter up seriously and try to do better.
An all-out effort was to be made to reach the silver mines which were 
still believed to exist at Cambambe, the ferocious resistance of the 
Ngola to Portuguese advance on Cambambe being interpreted as a sure 
sign of its value. It was not recognised that because Cambambe was 
on the threshold of his capital, the Ngola would naturally not want 
to see an enemy camped there.
Dorn Francisco de Almeida, the first royally-appointed governor 
of Angola, arrived in Luanda in about June 1592, bearing the title 
’captain-major and governor of the conquest and other provinces of Angola 
He brought with him an army later estimated to have been 600 strong. 
Despite the size and importance of the expedition which Almeida led, 
his tenure of office was short and disturbed. He immediately found him­
self in conflict with the Jesuits, who were probably the most powerful 
political and economic force in the settlement. They had lad a great deal
Strictly speaking, of course, it was the Portuguese king, Philip I, who 
directed overseas policy. He did so, however, from Madrid where he was 
better known as Philip II of Spain.
2
A.T.T. liv. 23, Filippe I, fl 38v in Lopez de Lima, vol. Ill, p. xviii. 
also documents in Luciano Cordeiro: QuestSes Historico-Coloniaes. I, 217
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Pero Rodrigues, op.cit.. Brasio IV, 565.
of autonomy under the rule of the conquistadores and were probably
strongly opposed to the extension of effective colonial government.
They may even have hoped to establish a Jesuit theocracy in Angola.
The issue on which Almeida clashed openly with the Jesuits was 
the allocation of Mbundu chiefs as 'serfs1 to white masters. This 
practice had especially benefitted the Jesuits who had become the 
overlords of many sobas and expected them and their families and sub­
jects to work on the Society's estates. Paulo Dias and his successors, 
Luis Serr&o and Andre Pereira Pereira, had also rewarded many of their 
army captains by the gift of a chief together with his lands and sub­
jects. A description of this method of conquering and allotting Mbundu 
sobas is given by Battell:
"The Portugals make war against the negroes in this manner.
They have out of Congo a nobleman, which is known to be a 
good Christian and of good behaviour. He bringeth out of 
Congo some one hundred negroes that are his followers. This 
Macicongo is made Tandala, or general over the black camp, 
and hath authority to kill, to put down Lords and make Lords, 
and hath all the chief doings with the negroes. And when any 
Lord cometh to obey he first cometh to the Tandala and bring­
eth his present, as slaves, kine and goats. Then the Tandala 
carrieth him before the Portugal Governor, and bringeth two 
slaves for the Governor's page,*, before he goeth in. Then he 
must have a great gift for the governor, which is sometimes . 
thirty or forty slaves, besides cattle • But when he cometh 
before the Governor he kneeleth down and clappeth his hands, 
and falleth down with his face upon the ground, and then he 
riseth and saith: 'I have been an enemy, and now I protest
to be true, and never more to lift my hand against you.1 Then 
the Governor calleth the soldier, which hath deserved a re­
ward, and giveth the Lord to him. This soldier seeth that he 
have no wrong; and the Lord acknowledgeth him to be his master, 
and he doth maintain the soldier and maketh him rich. (...)
113.
So that there is no Portugal soldier of any account, 
but hath his negro sova, or Lord.”l
Almeida arrived in Angola with a royal order to abolish this
system which was much abused. All Mbundu chiefs were to be restored
to their autonomy with direct allegiance to the Portuguese crown. An
attempt to withdraw such lucrative benefits and privileges met with
the combined resistance of the conquistadores and the Jesuits. After
2less than a year in office Almeida withdrew to Brazil. The army which
he had brought from Portugal only took part in one campaign, and that
3
was abandoned because of fever. The governor's brother, Dorn Jeronimo 
de Almeida, took over the government and calmed the violence of the 
army and clergy by suspending the order to withdraw the sobas from- their
4
white masters.
The military career of D. Jeronimo was an active one. In June 
1593 an army of 160 men and 18 horses joined forces with the garrison 
from Massangano and crossed into Kisama where they defeated a ruler called 
Songa with much arson and killing. The governor then marched to the 
Memba salt mines, about thirty miles from the riverfwhere he built a 
fort and garrisoned it with 100 men and 4 horses. By thus controlling 
the salt mines he hoped to cripple the Mongo economy and make a substan-
1Battell, 64-65.
^Probably on 8 April 1593, see Cordeiro I, 217.
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See Catalogo dos Govemadores de Angola, Lisbon Academy of Science 1825, 
ed. ArftUtvos de Angola. Vol. for 1937 and Silva Corr§a, Historia de 
Angola, for unconfirmed reports of this campaign.
4A.R.S.I. Lus 79, fl. 57 v. 10.6.1593. Brasio III, 466.
tial profit for the Portuguese colony* Salt was the chief commodity
for buying slaves inland and was noted already as the normal currency
in the Mbundu markets.’*' This fort only survived for a short while
however and was later reported to have been abandoned by its garrison
2
who fired it and left two wounded soldiers to their fate. During the
campaign twenty-six minor Kisama chiefs were subjects. A more power-
*
ful chief, Kafushe Kambare, had not yet been attacked by the time 
D. Jeronimo fell ill and retired to Luanda. Balthasar de Almeida de 
Sousa was left in command and after entrenching one half of his army 
he went in search of Kafushe with the remainder. Kafushe met the chal­
lenge with guerrilla tactics and wiped out all but a handful of Sousa's 
army in April 1594* Kafushe thus continued to control the south bank
of the Kwanza and a century later Cadoraega described him as having
4
been the most powerful ruler in Angola next to the Ngola himself.
The second royal governor to be sent out to Angola was Jolfo Pur-
tado de Mendonga. He arrived with his large army probably on 1 August 
5
1594* The Catalogo dos Govemadores de Angola, published by the Lisbon 
Academy of Science in 1825, gave some details of Mendonja's career which
■*Tero Rodrigues: Historia, op.cit. Ch. 7* Brasio .17,' 570-^571.
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Cafuxe Cambare.
are mostly confirmed by Battell. His first campaign up the Bengo
was undertaken in the rainy season and was seriously undermined
by fevers. His second campaign, probably in 1596, took him up the
Bengo and into Ilamba. It was probably to this campaign that Battell
referred when he said that the army consisted of 400 Europeans and
15,000 Africans who were recruited during the campaign. Battell was
especially struck by the lush, green country and the fresh water to
be found inland. The campaign finally resulted in the defeat of 20,000
bowmen of Ngombe who were unable to face the Portuguese guns. The
'lord of Gombe1 submitted with a great fan^re of drums and trumpets,
and enriched the governor with many presents.^
¥hile the Governor was in Ilamba, the Ngola besieged Massangano.
Balthasar Rebello de Arag&o was sent to relieve the place. On his way
back down the Kwanza' afterwards he stopped to build a new presidio
at Mushima. This fort had the triple aim of re-inforcing the line of
communication to Massangano, imposing greater control on Kisama and
was optimistically intended to replace to some degree the lost fort 
2
of Ndemba. The building of Mushima and, less certainly, the forty- 
fying of Luanda against foreign enemies, were the most lasting achieve­
ments of Mendon^a's governorship. In later years it was remembered as 
a time of peace and prosperous trading.
^Battell, 15-36 and xiii-xiv. Also Catalogo, 469-471.
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AragSo, Terras e Minas Africanas, in Cordeiro, op.cit.. I, 222. See 
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When Kendonja returned to Portugal in 1601 or 1602 to pursue
his political career, his place was taken by Jo&o Rodrigues Coutinho,
a former captain of Elmina on the Gold Coast.^ As well as being
governor, Coutinho held the Angola slave contract, which,according to
Battell, had been sold to him on the understanding that he would build
2
three Ports, at the ITdemba saltmines, Cambambe, and the Bay of Cows. 
This contract was sold by the crown for a fixed number of years in 
return for an annual fee. The contractor could then sell slave ex­
port licences to individuals. In 1601 Coutinho sold 400 such licences 
to Jorge Rodrigues Solis for forty ducats each. In the years 1603 
to 1607, Coutinho1s brother and heir sold a total of 15,768 licences
4
to take slaves to the Spanish Indies. This was rather less than the 
figure of 4,250 slaves per annum which Coutinho had contracted to send. 
It is not clear whether the contractor was normally a trader on his own 
account or whether he was purely a 'tax farmer' who bought from the 
crown the right to levy all export duties and make as much profit as 
he was able over and above the price he paid for the contract.
After the contracto had passed out of the Coutinho family it was
^A.T.T. Chanc. de Filipe II, liv. 7, fl 174 , 30.1.1601. Brasio V, 60. 
^Battell, 36.
Brasio V, 29-31, quoting George Seelies: La traite negriere aux Indes 
de Castille, I, 811.
^A.G.S. Secret Provine. (Portugal) liv. 1499, fl* 46. Brasio V, 487-488
5Colecc&o de tratados de Borges de Castro, 1856, II, 44-45, cited in 
Felner, op.cit.. 186.
sold for eight years to Duarte Dias Henriques for 25,000,000 reis 
per annum. A large proportion of the purchase price was to be paid 
out on the administrative expenses of the colony. A small amount was 
to be paid to the Portuguese captain in Kongo, and the balance spent 
according to royal instruction, part of it at least in the mother- 
country.'*' Among the items which the contractor was especially respon­
sible for were the governor's salary and the army's uniform, the value 
of which had to be paid to the administration in cloth at fixed inter­
vals. The governor's salary was comparatively low, about 800,000 reis 
per annum, so long as he was allowed to supplement it by trading. When, 
in the eighteenth century, the governor was debarred from trading on 
his own account, his salary was enormously increased to about 6,000,000 
reis per annum. It became a heavy burden on the contractor and some
governors were worried lest the taxes should prove inadequate to pay
2their remuneration.
When Coutinho arrived in Luanda, probably in late 1601 or early 
1602, he found the colony at a low ebb. All the Mbundu sobas had ap­
parently reasserted their independence; the Cambambe mines were still 
out of reach and the Ngola remained unconquered. Furthermore it was 
rumoured that Kongo had been aiding and abetting the Ngola. The new 
governor immediately prepared for a new war with the large army of re-
•“■B.A.L. Ms 52-VIII-58, fls 256-257V. Brasio VI, 174-177.
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inforcements which he had brought. He marched to Tombo on the north
bend of the Kwanza and sailed up stream to land at Songo or Kakulu kia 
*1
Kimone ka Songa. From there Coutinho sent for the best soldiers from 
Massangano and marched to 'Machimba' (possibly Mushima), 'Kalombe* 
and 'Angoykayongo1. Here the Portuguese defeated an army of 60,000 
men and settled in the pleasant town, capturing all the women and child­
ren and eating Angoykayongo’s cattle and grain. After being there
2
eight days Coutinho died of fever.
The temporary governor who took over command was Captain Manuel 
Cerveira Pereira, a man of great energy but erratic temper. He was a 
forceful campaigner but his cruelty made him unpopular with his Soldiers, 
many of whom deserted. According to Fem&o Guerreiro and the Catalogo, 
his first action was to attack and defeat an old enemy, Kafushe. This 
resounding victory inspired such awe into the Mbundu that many sobas
4hastily made peace with the Portuguese lest they, too, should be destroyed. 
There is however some doubt as to whether Pereira did in fact defeat 
Kafushe. Battell, who had been made a sergeant in the Portuguese army, 
makes no mention of such a battle, and says that after spending two months
^Battell, 37, refers to Songo, 60 miles from the sea. In a foot-note 
Ravenstein identifies this landing place with the one mentioned in the 
Catalogo.
2Battell, 37.
^Battell, 38.
JettxSjE.guerreiro, in Brasio V, 54. Also Catalogo. 472.
at Angokayongo, Pereira marched in three days to Cambambe where he
1
crossed over to the north bank of the river. This suggestion that
j
Kafushe was not beaten is strengthened by the complainijiater made
against Pereira that when he and an African ally, Langere, were about
to attack Kafushe, Pereira desisted on receiving a bribe of forty 
2
slaves. The document said that this was particularly culpable since 
Kafushe had been guilty not only of killing two hundred Portuguese, 
but of eating them as well.
About 1603 Pereira at last reached Cambambe, the fabulous mountain 
of silver which the Portuguese had been seeking for almost a century.
In spite of the warning of Balthasar de Castro, in 1526, that there 
was no silver in Ndongo, the Portuguese had struggled on. Their bitter 
disappointment on not finding silver or mines of any sort at the hill 
of Cambambe may have been partly responsible for the viciousness of the 
governor's temper, and for the fact that he spent the next twenty years 
trying to prove that there really was important mineral wealth in the 
Angola and Benguela copper mines. Having reached Cambambe, Pereira 
was unable to march any further with his depleted army and one of the 
accusations later levelled against him was that he had failed to make
3
any real effort to conquer Ndongo even when he had got so close. In-
■“■Battell, 38.
2
Bartholemeu Roiz Lucas, B.N.L, Reservados SeccSo Pombalina, Ms 526 
fl 294, Impresso. In Felner (1933) op.cit. 423-424*
^Battell, 38. Pelner (1933)> 421-422 of doc. quoted above.
stead Pereira negotiated with a delegation which the Ngola sent to 
Cambambe* The Ngola later sent an impressive embassy to the governor 
when he was re-established in Luanda* The king of Ndongo offered pre­
sents of silver and offered to open the road from Cambambe to Kabasa.'*'
He apparently hoped to retain his freedom by friendly means since it 
was beginning to seem unlikely that his army would be adequate for 
the job. He also undoubtedly wanted to trade.
After the Portuguese had suffered their great defeat of 1590, 
three governors were sent out to Angola by the crown. Each one took 
a large army, but, owing chiefly to their inexperience of African con­
ditions, not one of them made any notable progress in the conquest. 
Luring the four years in which Captain Pereira acted as governor, the 
Portuguese did make one step towards Ndongo, but it was only to meet 
with a major disappointment. The silver mines which had lured them on 
for thirty years did not exist. Having reached Cambambe fruitlessly, 
the Portuguese tried to turn their costly advance to some effect by con­
centrating their attention on the conquest of Ndongo. In so doing they 
became increasingly aware of the fact that they were faced not with one 
African people, but with two. Behind the Mbundu kingdom of Ndongo were 
the people of Lunda whose tentacles reached right into Angola.
■*Tern&o Guerreiro, in Brasio V, 55-56. Also B.M, add 20. 786 fls 325-325v. 
Brasio V, 60-62.
Chapter Pour
THE LUNDA-IM BAN GALA. INVASION 
OF NDONGO c.1550-1605
European activities in Kongo-Angola and the opening of the At­
lantic slave trade soon began to have repercussions beyond the pale, 
in the regions outside the sphere of European knowledge. These re­
percussions took the form of attacks on the comparatively wealthy states 
of Ndongo and Kongo. These attacks, or some of them, might be inter­
preted as crude attempts to benefit from the wealth derived from over­
seas trade. The three main invaders were the Teke, who came from the 
north and had little or no direct effect on the Mbundu, the Jaga who 
came from the east and invaded Kongo, and the Imbangala, also from the 
east, who invaded Ndongo.
The attacks of the Teke or Anzica and of the Jaga were in some 
ways so similar as to be confused by several observers. Both were fero­
cious and probably cannibal nations of warriors. There were, however, 
major differences between them. The Teke came from an organised state 
system with highly developed metal and cloth industries and a sound 
knowledge of trade organisation.^- Such organisation was not apparent 
among the Jaga who were content to plunder and destroy for immediate
See Lopez-Pigafetta on the Teke or Anzika. The identity of the Anzika 
with the Teke seems to be proved by Pacheco Pereira*s description of 
the spiral-shaped facial scars which are peculiar to the Teke today. 
(Pacheco Pereira, op.cit. 144 and Placquaert, op.cit.15.)
gain without caring for trade or political structures. Moreover the
Jaga migrated bodily, eating their way through the country-side. The
Teke on the other hand conducted raids and then withdrew to their
home-land. The sixteenth century chronicles of JoSo de Barros and
*
Pacheco Pereira refer to Teke raiders and to their great king the
$ 1Makokop .
The kings of Kongo were /preoccupied with a Teke war in the 1560's 
when the Jaga began to infiltrate the kingdom. Duarte Lopez described 
the latter as tall, ugly cannibals who attacked their enemies with bra­
very and cruelty. He compared their nomadic plundering to the depre­
dations of the Arab tribes. Their arms were javelins, knives and shields. 
It is interesting to note that Lopez does not mention bows and arrows 
which were the chief weapon of the Imbangala. It is possible that the 
Jaga, like the nineteenth century Ngoni, found fighting at close quart­
ers with a knife and a shield more effective than long-range shooting.
By the time the Jaga overran Mbata, the eastern march, and caused panic
in the kingdom of Kongo, they were said, already to have travelled over
2great distances and conquered many countries.
Perhaps the most likely hypothesis as to the origin cf the Jaga 
bands is the one mentioned in the first chapter, that is that the Jaga
1Jo%o de Barros: Asia, Dec. I. Bk III, Ch. 9* Pacheco Pereira, 144.
2
Lopez-Pigafetta, Book II, Chapter 5*
* . 6 Mundiquete. Emcuqua-anzico.
were Luba escaping from the destruction of the Songye-Luba empire.
It is known from the Luba traditions that when the Kunda attacked 
the Songye dynasty, many Luba fled westward to the Kasai-Lulua con­
fluence where they formed the nation of the Bena Lulua or Kasai Luba.
If any of these refugees had gone another 200 miles due east in their 
flight they would have crossed the Kwango into the Kongo province of 
Mbata. It seems not improbably that that is what the Jaga did and 
that their origins are therefore Luba, and more specifically Bena 
Lulua.
The number of the Jaga invaders was probably small. As they ad­
vanced they probably recruited support from the peoples whom they over­
ran. It seems likely that by the time they were expelled from Kongo 
in about 1572 a large proportion of the so-called Jaga were in fact 
Bakongo. When they were driven out of Kongo the Jaga recrossed the 
Kwango and settled on the right bank of that river. There they undoubtedly 
formed an important element of the Yaka nation which emerged in that re­
gion. A century or more later these Yaka suffered an invasion of Lunda 
who founded the dynasty of Kasongo.
The third outside invader to come upon the Kongo-Angola scene was 
the Lunda or Imbangala group. The entry of the Imbangala would appear, 
at first sight, to have been more unobtrusive than the invasions of either 
the Teke or the Jaga. This, however, is misleading. The difficulty in 
assessing the history of the Imbangala invasion is that nearly all con-
temporary observers confused them with the Jaga* In fact they were 
a quite distinct people and the confusion arose from the similarity 
of their methods and from the fact that to the settled ..of
Kongo and Ndongo one invader was much like any other invader. Because 
of the cloak of anonymity which the Jaga lent to the Imbangala, their 
presence among the Mbundu in Angola was not extensively reported until 
Andrew Battell started trading along the coast south of the Kwanza 
about 1600. The date of the Imbangala invasion was calculated to be 
circa 1610 in the most recent study of the questinn by Vansiua.^ A 
new look at the records and traditions, however, makes it clear that 
the Imbangala invasion in fact took place about half a century earlier. 
This reassessment is of fundamental importance to all Bantu history.
Battell's trading expeditions were undertaken on behalf of JoSo 
Furtado de Mendonga, the governor of Angola. On his first trip he 
visited the Ndombe at the Bay of Cows near the modem city of Lobito, 
and bought cattle, sheep, copper, beans and cereals. On his second trip 
Battell went to buy slaves and it was then that he met the Imbangala at 
the mouth of the Kuvu River. The Imbangala sold slaves *so cheap that 
many did not cost one real which were worth in the city twelve milreis, 
12,000 realms)". Battell said that these people called themselves 
’ Imbangolas1 but that the Portuguese called them the Jaga and said that
^Vansiua: "Kasanje1*, op.cit.J.A.H.» 1963 > 3* 
Battell, 16-20.
they had passed through the city of Kongo and travelled round the 
great city of Angola called Ndongo, before they had reached the
* 1
Benguela coast. Their leader was called Imbe Kalandu or Kalandula •
The assumption that these people were the same as the Jaga who had 
been expelled from Kongo aquarter of a century earlier is certainly 
wrong.
Battellfs description of the Imbangala is interesting. They 
lived in a 'mighty camp' on the south side of the Kuvu River. These 
camps were elaborately built and fortified. Each section had its own 
leader and its own exit from the peripheral wall of timber and thorns.
The way of life of the Imbangala was entirely unproductive. They never 
stayed in one place long enough to raise a crop but lived a semi-nomadic 
existence in which they moved on to new conquests when they had eaten 
all the food they could find in one place. They were not notable hunters, 
nor did they raise domestic animals. Their most striking characteristic 
was that they ate human flesh as a matter of course and apparently found 
it palatable, as well as being more readily available than any other.
Their chief luxury was palm wine and the wanderings of the Imbangala 
were strongly influenced by the availability of palm trees. They tapped 
the wine by the wasteful method of cutting the tree down and drawing 
the juice Until it ran dry, rather than by the Mbundu system of tapping 
the top of the live tree.
1Batten, 19-20, 28 , 31, 84.
■ifr
Calando or Calandola.
To enable them to be more mobile in their campaigns the Im- 
bangala did not rear any children. Although the leading chief had 
many-wives, all their children were killed at birth. To increase 
their ranks the troops adopted the adolescents from among the peoples 
whom they conquered. These 'apprentices’ wore a collar, as a sign 
of slavery, until they qualified for the title of soldier by present­
ing the severed head of an enemy to their leader. The troop of Imbe 
Kalandula only had about a dozen original 'Jaga' warriors. The rest 
of its estimated sixteen thousand members were recruits who had been 
picked up as the troop moved about the country. Before attacking an 
enemy the Imbangala normally camped on the edge of the territory they 
proposed to overrun. They then undermined the opposition's piorale 
by a series of human sacrifices and other ceremonies. Battell wit­
nessed their attack on Old Benguela, on the north bank of the Kuvu, 
after he had ferried them over the river for the assault. For five 
months Kalandula and his followers lived off the livestock, the gran­
aries and even the populous of Old Benguela. At the end of this time 
they exhausted the supply of wine and moved away.
When the Imbangala left Old Benguela to attack a chief called
*
Mbala , a group of fifty Portuguese and Mulattoes decided to follow and 
continue their profitable trade with them. Two days' journey from the 
coast they were stopped by a chief named 'Mofarigosat' whose lands had
been burnt by the Imbangala. He compelled the Portuguese to use their
Bambala,
guns to assist him in a war he was conducting. The Portuguese event­
ually escaped only by offering Battell as a hostage in guarantee of 
their return. Battell escaped also, however, and reached the large 
and well planned town of 'Cashil* whence he was taken to the new IM- 
bangala settlement of ’Calicansamba'. After five months there they 
moved on to 'Calango* for six months feasting on the north bank of the
Longa River. They then marched to the Kwanza in the vicinity of Mongo.
*
They burnt the sumptuous Hbundu city of Shilla Mbanza, belonging to an
uncle of the Ngola, and then moved westward past Cambambe. When they
entered ICisama they were attacked by Kafushe and a great battle was
fought but without decisive result. The Imbangala fortified a camp
and the war continued for some months, with Battell effectively using
his musket in support of Kalandula against Kafushe.
Soon after this war between Kalandula and Kafushe Battell escaped
from the Imbangala with some pombeiros from Massangano who had come to
buy slaves from them. He rejoined the Portuguese. After his escape
Battell gave a vivid portrait of Kalandula, the leader of this Imbangala
troop with which he had been travelling for eighteen months.
"The great Gaga Calando hath his hair very long, embroidered 
with many knots of Babba shells, which are very rich among 
them, and hath about his neck a collar of masoes. which are 
also shells that are found upon that coast and are sold among 
them for the worth of twenty shillings a shell: and about
his middle he weareth landes, which are beads made of the 
ostrich eggs. He weareth a palm-cloth about his middle, as 
fine as silk. His body is carved and cut with sundry works,
*
Sillambansa.
and every day is anointed with the fat of men. He wear­
eth a piece of copper cross his nose, two inches long and 
in his ears also. His body is always painted red and white.
He hath twenty or thirty wives, which follow him when he 
goeth abroad; and one of them carrieth his bows and arrows; 
and four of them carry his cups of drink after him. And 
when he drinketh they all kneel down, and clap their hands 
and sing.
Their women wear their hair with high trompes full of bamba 
shells, and are anointed with civet. They pull out four of 
their teeth, two above and two below, for a bravery. And 
those that have not their teeth out are loathsome to them 
and shall neither eat nor drink with them."!
The Imbangala, whom Battell called the Jaga, were in fact Lunda
invaders who had migrated to Angola after the establishment among their
2
fellow-countrymen of the Luba dynasty of the hunter Kibinda Ilunga.
The name Imbangala or Bangala survives as the name which the Portuguese 
apply to the people of the kingdom of Kasanje which was established on 
the upper Kwango by Kasanje, one of the leaders of the Lunda exodus.
The most detailed account of this exodus is contained in the traditions 
of the Kasanje state which were collected there by a Portuguese soldier
called Neves in the mid-nineteenth century. This tradition can be sup-
3
plemented with the Lunda tradition collected by Luysters.
The fusion of Lunda and Luba ideas to form a new, vigorous hybrid
nation is traditionally remembered by the marriage of the Lunda princess
4
Lueji to the Luba prince Kibinda Ilunga. Many of the Lunda subjects
1Batten, 31-32.
2
See Chapter I.
3
See Chapter I.
4See Chapter I.
did not accept the new regime. Chief among 'ifs opponents was Kinguri, 
the brother of Lueji. Rather than submit to a foreign ’dynasty*, he 
decided to leave with his followers. After crossing the Luisa and 
Lulua Rivers he stopped in the hope of being recalled by his compatriots. 
When no call came he proceeded westward across the Kasai, Kayila, Luembe, 
Lulueji, Lufiji, Tshimhumbu, Luatschinru, Tshikapa and Kwango Rivers to 
the region of the Luando river, just east of the elbow of the upper
Kwanza.^" The Neves tradition takes the story up and says that Kinguri
2 * kya Bangela took with him the chiefs Ndonga, Kakengo , Kibonder,
i £ 5 *Mbandi-Mbumba, Kinda, Kahete-ka-Kinzunzu, Ngunza a Bangela and 
4
Kalanda . After being settled for some time in his new home, he was 
joined by Munjumbu-a-Kafushe, Kapenda-ka-Mulemba, Bumba-a-Tumba, Kambunje-
o
ka-Tembu, Mushi, Ndumba-a-Tembo, Ndumba-a-Peso, Malundu and Songo • Prom
this country between the upper Kwango and the Luando Rivers, Kinguri sent
out hunters to explore the regions to the west and see if any good land 
3
was to be found.
While Kinguri was settled on the Luando, he heard from his chief 
Songo that there were white men in the Mbundu country. These white men
1
Duysters, op.cit.. 84* All these rivers except the Kayila can be found 
on a map of Angola.
2
Quingure-Quiabanguella. Banguela is probably the origin of the name 
of Imbangala.
3
A. R. Neves: Hemoria da Expedis&o a Cassange em 1850. Lisbon 1854f 97-98.
* 6 £ 5Canguengo. ^Quibonde. Pande-ambumba. Quinda.
^Cahete-caquinzunzu. *Gmza-abanguella. ^Calanda (or Calandu).
°Kussongo.
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had beautiful wares and fire-arms which the Lunda did not know about.
Kinguri moved nearer to the Portuguese and settled at Bola Kas£aSh
on the other side of the Kwanza from Pungu a Ndongo. The traditional
account of Kinguri's death is a cliche which said that the ruler of
this country, Sungwe a Mboluma, grew tired of Kinguri's great cruelty.
He therefore conspired with the macotas or courtiers to build a strong
hut in which Kinguri would be immured in his sleep. The old man was
unable to break out of this prison and died there.
The tradition continues, in Neves' words:
*
"When Kinguri-ka-Bangela was dead, the macotas elected a 
new ruler, Kasanje-ka-Imba^ or Kasanje-ka-Kulashingor who, 
spurred on by a desire for pretty goods, resolved to seek
out the white men. He and his courtiers and some of his
people travelled down the Kwanza but could not present 
themselves to the Chief of the Portuguese because he was 
still on the island of Luanda which was then called Mushima-
a-Lunda. The ruler of the Mbundu,[whom the Kasanje traditions
always refer to as the 'Queen of the Jinga' regardless of sex 
and name*]} was on the site where Luanda is to-day and thus 
Kasanje was unable to speak to the Portuguese."!
Kasanje was not strong enough to attack the Mbundu king. He gradu­
ally overcame the obstacle by recruiting allies among the dissatisfied 
Mbundu sobas. The Ngola was driven back to Milembo-aka-Ngola? now 
called Teba. Kasanje then presented himself to the 'Portuguese Chief' 
and invited him to settle on the mainland. The Portuguese replied that
the Mbundu were still too close and that they would only come to the
mainland if the Mbundu were driven further back. In a joint campaign
^Neves op.cit., 93-100.
* ^ 1 r .| 
Quinguri-cabangu ella. Cassange-caimba. '
°Milemba-achangolla.
Kasanje and the Portuguese drove the Mbundu back through Cacuaco,
^ 5t
Kifa-Ndongo, Muju-a-Prata , Kalukembu , to Nganga-Mboa , now called
Pungu a Ndongo.^
The meeting of Kasanje with the Portuguese was very ceremonious.
The Portuguese chief gave the Imbangala chief two flags, a golden pict-
*
ure- (presumably an ikon), a uniform, some cloth and some fire-water,
in recognition of his services. The Portuguese then wanted to brand
Kasanje to show that he was a true vassal of the King of Portugal.
Kasanje declined this honour, however, and suggested that the markings
be put on his flag instead, which was done. There is no mention in the
2
tradition of the gift of any fire-arms to the Imbangala.
This would appear to be a straightforward tradition of the advance 
of Kinguri kya Bangela and his successor Kasanje ka Kulashingo from Kus- 
sumba, the capital of the Lunda empire to Luanda the main port used by 
Portuguese traders. The tradition finds confirmation, either from oral 
or from written sources, at all its stages.
The departure of Kinguri kya Bangela from Lunda and his march to 
the Luando River where the dispersal of the Imbangala took place, is 
told in the traditions collected by Henriq.ue de Carvalho. Kinguri refused
1 and 2 Neves, 100-101.
* £ $ XQuifandongo. Mujo-aprata. ^Calunguembo. Gamga-amboa.
to pay homage to Kibinda Ilunga and organised a seditious opposition* 
Persecution and fighting grew in intensity until Lueji began to fear 
for the safety of her Luba husband. In the end, however, Kibinda re­
ceived support from his brother, Kassongo, the ruler of the Luba, 
which caused Kinguri to flee to the west. He intended to build a new 
Lunda state from which to return and overthrow the Luba invaders. He 
travelled in a west-south-westerly direction living by hunting and 
by plundering the peoples who barred his way. After several years 
Kinguri came to the upper Kwanza and crossed into Libolo. There he 
settled down in the territory of a chief called Ngongo whose sister 
he married.^
The story of the dispersal of the Imbangala from their first stop­
ping place in the Luando valley, before Kinguri crossed the upper Kwanza, 
is told in the traditions collected by Cavazzi in the 1650’s and 1660's. 
It would seem from Cavazzi's evidence that while the Imbangala were 
settled in the Luando valley region between the upper Kwanza and the 
upper Kwango, they incorporated a certain number of Jaga. This would 
help to explain the confusion between Imbangala and Jaga in the minds 
of contemporaries. Unfortunately Cavazzi himself was apparently unaware 
of the distinction and the history which he records is therefore diffi­
cult to unravel.
*
The great leader of the Jaga or Nga Njiagi in this tradition, is
^Henrique de Carvalho: 0 Jagado de Cassange. Li&bnn, 1898 (?) 27-50.
*
Hngangiaghi.
Zimbo. Cavazzi attributes the mid-sixteenth century raids on the 
coastal settlements of both East and ¥est Central Africa to the
*
followers of Zimbo. One of the successors of Zimbo was called Donji •
Donji and his wife Hussassa conquered a province of the upper Kwango 
region which they called Donji. Their allies conquered provinces 
called Dumba and Kandonga. Donji was succeeded by his daughter, Temba 
Mumba, a very cruel woman. It was she that the tradition held re­
sponsible for introducing the 'Kishili Laws', the customs of infanti­
cide and human sacrifice which came to be so feared by the enemies of 
the Imbangala. Temba Ndumba was eventually killed by a soldier called 
Kulemba who ruled the followers of Donji until they were conquered or 
absorbed by a 'local ruler' called Kinguri.7^ If Donji and his men were 
'true' Jaga, as seems likely, it would appear that they arrived in the 
region between the Kwanza and the Kwango after Kinguri had settled there 
since they described Kinguri as a local chief.^
Cavazzi went on to describe the second stage of the advance of 
the Imbangala, from the Luan^io valley towards the sea. Kinguri invaded 
Ndongo and fought like a lion. He died still fighting and the chiefs 
chose Kulashingo as his successor. He proved to be a poor and weak leader, 
however, and was soon assassinated. After that time the Imbangala did
not have one leader but broke up into about thirty bands, of which the
K 0most famous were led by the chiefs Kasanje, Kayomba , Kabuku, , Kasa
Cavazzi, 182-186 and 204.
* / jZ5 £ 0
Dongij. 'Chingurij. Cajomba. Cabucco. Casa.
* 1
and Kahete .
It is at this point in the progress of the Imbangala that the 
first documentary references begin to appear. In 1563 Antonio Mendes 
described a major campaign which Ndambi, the Ngola of Ndongo, had con­
ducted in person against the ’King of Banguela’ • This king was killed 
and the Ngola appointed two of his sons or subjects to govern the 
country. This arrangement did not work and by 1563 the Ngola was hav­
ing to organise a new campaign against this enemy. It seems highly
2
probable that this 'Kin^ of Banguela' was Kinguri kya Bangela. Cavazzi 
confirms that Kinguri died fighting the Ngola. Cavazzi's traditions 
also recall that it was Ngola Mbandi - alias Ndambi - who first suf­
fered from Imbangala depredations, although Cavazzi, of course, called 
the invaders Jaga. Mbandi called for help first from Kongo and then 
from the Portuguese;with the result that the mission of Paulo Dias 
arrived at his court. It was argued in Chapter II that Mbandi or his 
predecessor might have sent off an appeal for help to the Portuguese 
as early as 1548. If this were the case the Imbangala colony of Lunda 
refugees must have been settled in the Luando territory beyond the 
upper Kwanza by that time, and already have begun to send probing raids 
into Ndongo.
■^Cavazzi, 205.
2
Antonia Mendes, 9*5.1563. Quoted in Ch. II. Brasio II, 509*
3Cavazzi, 296. See Chaper Two.
* /
Caette.
The last stage of the Imbangala advance brought them, according
to Neves1 version of Kasanje tradition, to the sea at Luanda. T^ere
is clear evidence that Kasanje ka Kulashingo did in fact reach Luanda
and was not stopped by the Portuguese further up the Kwanza as Vansina
supposed in his article on the history of the kingdom of Kasanje.^
It would even appear that some of the Imbangala settled down and formed
a small state called the Nsaka de Kasanje not far to the east of Luanda.
This state caused the Portuguese a great deal of trouble during the
2first part of the seventeenth century. Confirming that the meeting 
of Kasanje and the Portuguese really did take place at Luanda, the tradi­
tion says that the Mbundu were driven back beyond Cacuaco, which is a 
salt-producing village twelve miles along the coast north-east of Luanda. 
This coincides well with the Mbundu1 s own traditions, as remembered by 
the Pende, which claim that their first grievance against the Portuguese 
was that they stole the Mbundu salt pans.
The Imbangala tradition claims that Kasanje invited the Portuguese 
to come and settle on the mainland. If this is true, Kasanje must have 
arrived at Luanda before 1576, the year in which Paulo Dias and his sett­
lers moved to the mainland with the traders who had been living on Luanda 
Island for some years. Since the tradition says that Kasanje had to
^Vansina: "The founding of the Kingdom of Kasanje", J.A.H. IV, 1963» 3.
2 *
See for instance Cadomega: Historia Geral das Guerras Angolanas,
Luanda 1680, (ed.) Lisbon 1940, Vol. I, pt. 1, Ch. 10.
3
Haveaux, op.cit.. 35-37.
undermine the Mbundu opposition to his meeting with the Portuguese 
by gaining the support of individual Mbundu chiefs, it might be sup­
posed that Kasanje was in the neighbourhood of Luanda for some years 
before 1576.
From the beginning of the Portuguese conquest of Angola the Im­
bangala were at least as much an obstacle to progress as the Mbundu.
The followers of Dias, however, do not seem to have been particularly 
aware of the differences between people whom they all considered to be 
barbarous black adversaries. The first brush took place in 1575 when 
J0S.0 Castanho Velles took 80 soldiers to attack an enemy called 'Ca^anze' 
who must surely have been Kasanje. The entire force was captured, twenty 
men were killed and the remainder ransomed. This Ca^anze is referred to 
as an enemy of Kongo^which suggests that Kasanje may have been inter­
rupting the trade-route by which Kongo received its supplies of hzimbu 
shell currency.^ There is evidence from a rather late source, Andre 
Velho da Fonseca writing in 1612, that 'Mani Cassamje1 attacked the Portu 
guese after they were settled on the mainland and forced Dias to abandon
the ’City of Sebaste'. As a result of this the Portuguese on their re-
2
turn to the mainland, built the fort of Luanda. Duarte Lopez, who 
visited Luanda in 1578, was another to mention ’Cazzanzi1 as one of the
3
chiefs established in the Luanda area. All these references seem to
^Pero Rodrigues, op.cit., Brasio, IV, 571.
2
A. V. da Fonseca, 28.2.1612. Arquivos de Angola. Ser I, Vol. Ill, 67-77
3
Lopez-Pigafetta, 50.
indicate without much doubt that one branch, at least, of the Imbangala 
had reached the coast of Angola before 1575.
The other Imbangala leaders spread out in various directions while
*
Kasanje was camped near Luanda* Songo , one of Kinguri1 s original fol­
lowers and the captain who first reported the presence of the Portuguese 
while Kinguri was still beyond the upper Kwanza, was probably the same 
as the Songo^ who settled in the westernmost tip of Kis^ama, This chief 
was at one time defeated by the Portuguese, but later given presents and 
baptised with Paulo Bias as his god-father. A close eastern neighbour 
of Songo was Kafushe with whom the Portuguese fought many hard battles.
He too was one of ICinguri*s followers as listed in the Neves tradition. 
Kalanda, or Kalandula, was a late arrival on the Kwanza front, as is shown 
by Battell*s evidence given at the beginning of this chapter. He attacked 
Kafushe, with the help of Battell and his musket, in an attempt to take 
over the trading advantages which earlier groups of fellow Imbangala had 
gained from being near to the Portuguese slave markets. When this en­
deavour failed, Kalandula appears to have attempted to make closer con­
tact with the Portuguese and gain a special relationship with them which 
other Imbangala, who eicouraged Portuguese trade but opposed Portuguese 
conquestJ did not have.
The establishment of an alliance between Kalandula, a late Imbangala 
arrival, and the Portuguese, would appear to be the event recorded in the
*
Hussongo. Songa or Cassonga.
second half of the Carvalho tradition. This account says that when
1 Kinguri’ arrived on the south hank of the Kwanza the Portuguese were 
fighting the Mbundu on the north bank. The fort of Massangano had 
apparently been established, but not yet that of Cambambe. The Portu­
guese were also fighting the peoples on the south side of the river in 
Kis^ama. Kinguri forded the Kwanza and presented himself to the Portu­
guese captain saying that he was seeking ’Kwene Puto*, the king of Portu­
gal, and that he had come from very far off. He was taken to Massangano 
and then to Luanda where he was presented to the governor whose name was 
Dom Manuel. The governor accepted Kinguri’s offer to help with the con­
quest of Mongo. He gave him fire-arms and powder and allocated lands
on the Lukala River where he and his people could settle and plant the
crops which the Portuguese assumed they would want to plant.^ In fact,
it later turned out, these Imbangala did not settle down, but within
2
two years were on the move again.
Since the original Kinguri had b een killed by the Mbundu quite 
early in the last phase of the Imbangala advance, it must be assumed that 
this was some other Imbangalachief who had adopted the name or title 
Kinguri for prestige reasons or whom Carvalho confused with Kinguri.
The probability would seem to be that the story relates to Kalandula.
The first governor to be called Manuel was Manuel Cerveira Pereira who
^Henrique de Carvalho: 0 Jagado de Cassange. Lisbon, 1898 (?) 27-50.
2
See Chapter Five.
governed from 1605 to 1607 and built the fort of Cambambe. He was 
therefore governing when Kalandula arrived on the Kwanza, an event 
dated by the chronology of Battell's adventures. Carvalho may have, 
obtained the tradition from followers of Kalandula who became incor­
porated into the complex nation of Kasanje which the heirs of Kinguri, 
Kulashingo and Kasanje built from Imbangala and Mbundu peoples who 
retired to the upper Kwango in front of the Portuguese advance. Carvalho 
may alternatively have obtained the tradition from some other Imbangala 
group which retained its own identity in nineteenth century Angola.
The kingdom of Kasanje whose foundation will be discussed in the 
next chapter, seems to have been only the last of a series of kingdoms 
in the Angola region which were built by the Imbangala, that is the Lunda 
who left the Kasai region under the leadership of Kinguri kya Bangela 
together with the peoples whom they recruited. Mention has been made of 
some of the notable chiefdoms of the Luanda district, Nsaka de Kasanje, 
Songo, Kafushe, and probably also Hushima since Hushi was a follower of 
Kinguri. There were also a number of states or peoples to the east of 
the upper Kwanza, in the region in which Kinguri first settled before 
he heard about the Portuguese, which probably owe their formation to 
Lunda-Imbangala political concepts. Balthasar de Arag&o, a Portuguese 
captain who attempted to crcsss Africa in about 1608, found four major 
states to the east of Ndongo which, he said, spoke languages which. were 
akin to each other and to that of the peoples who stretched far into the
* / 1east. These states were Matamba, Malemba, Shinje , and Songo' •
Shinje and Songo still exist and are normally classified as peoples
related to the Lunda. Malemba is harder to define. It is interesting
to note that Matamba, after being conquered by Kongo rulers in the
fifteenth century, and before being overrun by Mbundu peoples escaping
from the Portuguese in the seventeenth century, appears to have been
invaded in the Sixteenth century by the Imbangala. The fact that Matamba
was still ®nding tribute to Kongo in 1^530 suggests that the Imbangala
2invasion of Matamba did not take place before that date. Cavazzi’s
traditions would appear tentatively to suggest that Matamba was one of
3the first places which they conquered. Finally the report by Abreu on 
the great battle of the Lukala in 1590 suggested that the main partner 
in the alliance which defeated Luis Serr&o and the Portuguese was the 
’King of Matamba’. It seems not at all implausible that it was the Im­
bangala, and not the Mbundu, who were chiefly responsible for routing
4
the Portuguese on that as on other occasions.
The history of the Imbangala invasion of Angola is interesting 
not only for itself, but also for the link which it furnishes between 
the written records of coastal activity, with an absolute date ascribed
^Balthasar Rebello de AragSo, Bal Ms 51-viii-25 fl. 42-44v. ? 1618. In 
Luciano Cordeiro: QuestSes Historico-ColoniS.es, I, Lisbon 1935*
TCing of Kongo to Jofio III, 28.1.1530. A.T.T. CC 1-44-70. Brasio I, 540.
3
Cavazzi, 182.
4
Abreu e Brito, op.cit.
* /
Mas singe. 'Mas songo.
to each event, and the oral records of the Bantu of central Africa 
which are only dated by relative chronology. Past attempts to study 
this link have mistakenly supposed that Kalandula-cum-Kinguri ’ s meeting 
with ’Dom Manuel’ indicated the first arrival of the Imbangala. They 
have, moreover, tended to identify ’Dom Manuel' with Dom Manuel Pereira. 
Forjaz, and not with Manuel Cerveira Pereira. This has led to the assump­
tion that the Imbangala first made contact with the Portuguese circa 1610.^
In view of the re-appraisal of the Imbangala invasion it must now 
appear that the Luba invasion of Lunda took place not towards the end 
of the sixteenth century as had been supposed, but more probably to­
wards the beginning of that century. From this new date it might be 
possible to infer the date of the ICunda infiltration into the empire of 
the Songye-Luba. If the time-lag between the establishment of the new 
regime and the sending out of migration* to form new states was as long 
in the Kunda-Luba state as it was in the Luba-Lunda state (that is over 
a century) it might be supposed that the Kunda overthrew the Kongolo dy­
nasty early in the fifteenth century and that they had been infiltrating 
Lubaland during the fourteenth century.
The Imbangala migration of ICinguri kya Bangela seems to have been 
the first of two such migrations out of Lunda. The second phase of the 
exodus was led traditionally by Kinyama, the ’brother’ of Kinguri and 
Lueji. In fact the departure of the Kinyama wave of peoples might have
^ e e  for example Verhulpen, op.cit. and Vansina, J.A.H.. 1963 (5) op.cit.
been some considerable time after the departure of the Imbangala, 
possibly in the seventeenth century. The Kinyama migrations never 
reached the Mbundu country, nor did their leaders ever make contact 
with the Portuguese as far as is known. For these reasons this is 
not the place for a detailed study of the traditions relating to Kin­
yama. It should however be noted that this second wave of ’refugees’ 
from Lunda was at least as important as the first. One branch resulted 
in the Lwena peoples who are sparsely but widely scattered over the 
north-west of the upper Zambesi basin in eastern Angola. The other 
branch led to the forming of the Tschokwe peoples whose nucleus lay on 
the upper Tshikapa River. From that point the Tschokwe spread out 
widely and in the nineteenth century eventually overran the Lunda capital 
of the Mwata Yamvo himself. Finally it seems possible that Lunda of the 
second wave, together perhaps with Lunda of the first wave and Mbundu 
refugees, might have played a part in the founding of the Ovimbundu king­
doms of the Benguela plateau country.
After the departure of the Imbangala and the Tschokwe, the Lunda 
appear to have settled down to organising their new Luba-type kingdom. 
Duysters gave a list of the main officials of the government of the new 
state. The king took the title of Mwata Yamvo. One of the key symbolic 
figures was the Lukonkeshia who m s  the Queen Mother. The two main offi­
cials were the Swana Mulopwe (Swana means heir, and the Swana Mulopwe 
was supposed to be a descendant of the first Mwata Yamvo or Mulopwe) who
was the chief minister, and the Sanama who lived in, and governed, the 
southern conquests of Lunda and was often the heir to the Mwata Yamvo.
The Kanapumba were two officers who commanded the rear-guard while 
Swana Mulopwe guarded the flanks of the army. The advance-guard was 
led by the Kalala. The Mutie were judges and the Mwanate were the guard­
ians of the traditions. The Tubungu, who were the Lunda chiefs before 
the Luba invasion, became the guardians of the ancestors and the ’owners 
of the land'. Finally the Swana Mulunda was the symbolic mother of all 
the Lunda and the heir and representative of Lueji.*^  Although the Lunda 
retained their matrilineal form of succession, the Mwat'a Yamvo was ap­
parently succeeded normally by a son in the male line.
After the departure of Kinguri and Kinyama the Lunda country was 
for a time even more sparsely populated than before. The hunting, on 
the other hand, was even better and the Luba were quite content. Lueji 
had no children, so she gave Kibinda a second wife called Kamonga Luaza 
who bore him a son called Naweji. He took the title Mwate Lusenge. Kam­
onga Luaza was the first Lukonkeshia or queen-mother. It was f^ aweji who 
was traditionally responsible for the establishment of the powerful and 
complex military and political hierarchy of the Lunda empire. It seems 
likely however that i^ at/eji was not one man but represents a whole period 
in Lunda history, possibly stretching from the mid-sixteenth century un­
til the late seventeenth century. The first Lunda ruler to be remembered
^Duysters, 76.
as an individual was Yavo Naweji. It was he who inaugurated the title 
of Mwata Yamvo
Yavo Maweji began a second series of migrations from the Lunda 
country. These migrations were very different from the first ones of 
Kinguri and Kinyama. Instead of being led by chiefs who wanted to get 
away from Lunda, the migrations of Yavo Naweji were composed of peoples
sent out from the central government to explore the surrounding regions,
found vassal states, and exploit new resources of wealth for the Mwata 
Yamvo, Thus it was that in the eighteenth century the Lunda once again 
came into contact with the Mbundu, this time not as immigrants, but as
traders. In the mean time, however, the Portuguese had been advancing
up the Kwanza valley repelling the Mbundu and Imbangala as they went.
^uysters, 84-85.
Chapter Five
THE EXPULSION OF THE NGOLA FROM NDONGO 1603-1641
During the first half of the seventeenth century the slave trade 
continued to be the major activity of the peoples of Angola. The chief 
participants were the Portuguese and the Mbundu. The Kongo share in 
the trade was apparently declining, while the Imbangala participation 
was on the increase. The territory covered by the trade was being ex­
tended but still remained mainly within the regions known to the Portu­
guese. The peoples beyond the Portuguese sphere of knowledge probably 
only later in the century began to feed many slaves into the Angolan net­
work of trade routes, and only in the eighteenth century did long-distance 
caravans come to contribute a major part of the slave supply. In the 
seventeenth century, and especially in the first half of that century, 
slaves came predominantly from the Mbundu and their immediate neighbours.
The Portuguese had three main methods of obtaining slaves. The 
first was as tribute which subject chiefs paid either to a Portuguese 
master or to the governor representing the crown. The second was by dir­
ect warfare, a method officially discouraged, but much favoured by gov­
ernors who wanted to make the maximum personal profit from their short 
tour of duty in Angola. Such wars sometimes had official objects, such 
as the conquest of the supposed silver mines, but were often conducted 
with the primary aim of capturing slaves-to sell. -Common excuses for ■ •
war were the recovery of run-away slaves, or the punishment of 
tax-defaulters. The third, and probably the most important means 
of filling the slave slips, was by trade with the chiefs. This trade 
was organised through markets in the Mbundu country to which the 
pombeiros went to buy slaves."^ The system depended to a greater or 
lesser extent on the co-operation and goodwill of African rulers, and 
in particular of the Ngola who seems to have alternately,and perhaps 
even simultaneously, fought and traded with the Portuguese.
In the early seventeenth century much of the slave trade was 
conducted in two stages. In the first stage salt and shells as well 
as European trinkets and beads were used to buy palm cloth from the 
peoples of the forest regions to the north and east of Kongo. In the 
second stage this cloth, which was used for clothing as well as being 
the most widely accepted currency in Angola, was exchanged for slaves. 
Pombeiros were sent to ’Congo de Batta’ (or G-ongon and Batta in Battell’s 
terminology) to buy the cloth. According to Pedro Sardinha this trade
2
had expanded enormously in the first decade of the seventeenth century.
Sardinha described the differing sizes and qualities in which 
these panos,or pieces of palm cloth, were made. The best sort was 
called ’painted cloth' and cost 640 reis a piece. It was probably dyed 
or had coloured strands woven into it. Twelve to fifteen thousand of 
these cloths were brought to Luanda each year at a cost of about eight
Although the earliest pombeiros were Europeans, the high mortality among 
them soon led the Portuguese to use mestiyos and trusted African slaves 
as pombeiros.
2
Sardinha, A.H.U. Cx 1. Brasio VI, 52-56, ? c. 1611 (Brasio’s estimate).
million reis. The second quality cloth, called 'songa', was priced 
at 200 reis a piece and forty or fifty thousand were bought every year 
at a cost of nine million. A further thirty or forty thousand pieces 
of the cheapest cloth, worth 100 reis, were also bought. In addition 
to these cloths from beyond Kongo, a number of cloths called 'exfulo* 
were imported from the Loango coast. Each year two or three small vess­
els went there to fetch cargoes of six or seven thousand pieces. A 
rarer and more valuable Loango cloth was the ’ensaca1 of which only 
about 500 were obtained each year costing 1,200 reis apiece. Battell 
visited Loango at about the same time as Sardinha wrote his report, and 
saw 'a great store of palm cloths of sundry sorts'.^
Accurate estimates of the numbers of slaves exported from Luanda 
in the first half of the seventeenth century are difficult to obtain.
Not until the eighteenth century were there annual trade reports from 
the governors. Before that the only records, in so far as records ex­
isted, were probably kept by the contractor. Andre Velho da Fonseca,
writing to the King of Spain in 1612, estimated that 10,000 or more slaves
2were being shipped from ngola each year. About the same time the lic­
ences to export slaves to the Spanish Indies alone amounted to about 4000 
3
per annum. A figure drawn from the estimated tax values suggests that
■*;Battell',, .43-44............... .........................................
2
Andre Velho da Fonseca to the King, 28.2.1612. Arquivos de Angola,
Ser. I, Vol. Ill, 71-90.
^A.G-S. Secret. Prov. (Portugal) liv. 1499# fl 46, Brasio V, 487-488.
about 13,000 may have been leaving each year towards 1620.1 When
the Dutch captured Luanda in 1641, their estimates for the annual
2
export of slaves ranged from 13,000 to 16,000. A population drain 
of this magnitude inevitably had far-reaching consequences for the 
population of Angola. One incidental effect of the trade was the 
growth of a rivalry between the old Mbundu middlemen and the more re­
cently arrived Imbangala. This clash became especialfcr violent in the 
second half of ‘the seventeenth century.
Manuel Cerveira Pereira, the acting governor of Angola from 1603 
to 1607, had advanced nearer to Mongo than any previous governor had 
done, and had built the presxdio of Cambambe on the fringe of the Ngola’s 
territory. For a few years after this there was a lull in hostilities 
during the governorship of Pereira's successor Dom Manuel Pereira Forjaz 
who arrived in Angola in 1607* This lull was followed, however, by renewed 
wars which grew in scope and intensity. This may at first have been part 
of a policy of trying to get closer to the source of slave supplies. It
According to Antonio Diniz, writing c. 1622, (Luciano Cordeiro: QuestSes 
Eistorico Colonizes, I, 316-324) the export tax for Brazil-bound slaves 
was 4,000 reis and for others 7,000. A survey of the Angola slave con­
tract made in 1624 by Antonio Bezerra Farjada (B.A.L. M s 51-viii-25, fls 
29-32, 24 Feb. 1624. Brasio VII, 205-214) suggested that the actual value 
of the contract was 60-80 million reis per annum although it was being 
sold for much less. If one supposed that half the slaves were paid for 
at the cheap Brazilian, rate, this figure would indicate, an export. of 
about 13,000 slaves per annum. If, as seems possible, more than half 
were paid for at the cheap rate (regardless of true destination) the num­
ber exported would be higher.
2
A Little Forraine Newes, London 1641.
later degenerated, however, into an attempt to increase the numbers 
of slaves available by fostering warfare. The state of chaos in 
Angola was heightened by the presence of an unknown number of Imbangala 
armies in and around the Mbundu territory.
The King of Spain issued Forjaz with a regimento of instructions 
concerning the policy which he was to carry out. The most important 
matter was the slave trade. Because the military effort involved in 
attempting to mine silver at Cambambe had disrupted the trade and given 
little return, mining was to cease. To prevent any rebellion in Angola 
which might be injurious to the trade, a new policy of peace and justice 
was to be embarked upon with regard to the Mbundu. The defences of the 
colony were to be strengthened so that both African armies and foreign 
navies could be repelled should they try to capture Luanda. Above all 
the buying of Africans had to be encouraged and increased so as to swell 
the tax returns to the royal treasury. Only after stressing these safe­
guards to the slave trade, did the regimento say that the prime function 
of the colonial administration was, of course, the spreading of Christian­
ity.
The document went on to elaborate on relations with the Mbundu.
The governor was to draw up a list of Mbundu sobas. both the 'peace- 
loving rulers' and the enemy chiefs. A renewed attempt was to be made 
to enforce the ruling that all sobas would in future owe allegiance 
direct to the crown and not to the individuals to whom Paulo Dias and
other governors had allocated them. Tribute which had previously- 
been paid to the Ngola would now be paid to the royal exchequer 
and never to private masters who might abuse their position. Only 
peaceful methds were to be used to bring the sobas to offer allegiance 
to the Portuguese crown. Forjaz should try to make peace with the 
Ngola who had been alienated by warlike action, especially Pereira’s 
destruction of the town of Shila Mbanza.^ If possible an embassy should 
be sent to the Ngola* 3 capital, Kabas^a, bearing a letter from the King 
of Spain, and seeking pennissicn to spread the gospel in Ndongo. In 
spite of the peaceful co-operation envisaged, all the citizens of Luanda 
were to be given military training on Sundays and saints' days. The 
magnitude of the task of bringing the Mbundu under peaceful Portuguese 
domination was revealed by the fact that in 1607 no soba paid tribute 
of any kind either to Portuguese individuals or to the crown.
An important proviso in the regiment0 was that no white man 
should ever be allowed to go to the feiras, the inland slave markets, 
to buy slaves or even to administer justice. Europeans who frequented 
these markets were in the habit of.sending their pombeiros along the 
supply routes to snatch slaves. This practice reduced the supplies and 
raised the prices. In the markets African traders could usually buy more 
cheaply than Europeans. Forjaz was also encouraged to investigate the 
trade potential of the Benguela coast where Battell had traded sc[profii- 
ably on behalf of Mendon$a.
Axilla Ambanza. In fact it was the Imbangala Kalunda who destroyed this 
city and not Pereira as his Portuguese critics claimed.
The idea of mineral wealth from Angola was not abandoned. Although 
mining at Cambambe was to cease, prospecting was to continue elsewhere. 
The silver mines were reported by Pereira to be just a little further 
inland, near to Kabas^a and at various other places. Copper, lead and 
iron were all alleged to be plentiful. The possibility of building an­
other fort on the site of the Ndemba salt mines was considered. Finally 
all land grants which had been made in Angola were to be reviewed to make 
sure that the conditions under which they were made had been carried out. 
Agricultural development was to be encouraged, especially in cotton and 
sugar. ITork on public buildings and on a water supply were to continue 
in Luanda.^"
Forjas arrived in Angola probably in August or September 1607.
He governed for four years during which time he did not apparently lead
2
any major expedition against the Mbundu. This was probably not so much 
from a desire to conform with the pacific policy laid down in his in­
structions, as from a reluctance to deplete the garrison of Luanda at a 
time when the Dutch, who had started trading at the Kongo port of Mpinda, 
were an increasing military threat. An additional explanation for the ab­
sence of campaigns may have been that the slave trade was flowing well at 
that time.
■^A.H.U. Angola, Cx. 1. The regimento is published in full in Brasio V, 
264-279.
2
Catalogo, op.cit. 473-474 and note 15.
The comparatively peaceful government of Forjaz came to an end 
with his death on 15 April 1611. His place was taken by the conquistador 
Bento Banha Cardoso who was elected governor the next day.^ The four 
years of Cardoso’s government marked the beginning of a phase in which 
the Ngola was driven out of Ndongo. According to the Catalogo Cardoso 
immediately launched an active campaign against the Ngola. The power­
ful Kbundu soba Kilonga was captured and beheaded and three of his court-
■jt-
iers were hanged. Mbamba Tungu, a chief who had once been a Portuguese
ally, was also put to death. Cardoso then established a new Port at Hango
a Kikaito^ on the lower Lukala. This brought the Portuguese even closer
to the Ngola’s capital at Kabas^a. The Mbundu retaliated strongly and
almost succeeded in forcing an entry into the fort of Cambambe before
2
finally being driven off.
Andre Velho da Fonseca, writing in 1612, was harshly critical of 
Cardoso’s actions. He said that the building of a new fort at Hango
on the Lukala was risky. It was sited too near to the Ngola’s capital
and stood open to attack. In addition it could only be adequately gar­
risoned by withdrawing soldiers from the other three forts which were
.3
already undermanned. Fonseca was also critical of the way in which cam-
■^ A.T.T. CC Baeo 319 pi 2. Doc. 144. Felner, 455* Catalogo 542.
2
Catalogo 474. . .
3
The forts which survived at this time were Mushima, about 80 miles from 
the sea on the south bank of the Kwanza, Massangano 30 miles beyond and 
Cambambe 40 miles above that, both on the north bank.
*
Bamba Tungo. Hango Aquicaito.
paigns were conducted. He said that a force of 200 European soldiers 
was inadequate for penetrating a hostile country. If sobas who had once 
been ’pacified’ by Portuguese arms, saw that any ’rebellion1 inevitably 
led to destructive reprisals on their villages, they would soon learn 
that it was futile to try to resist Portuguese rule. Although advocat­
ing a strong deterrent force, Fonseca was outspoken in his criticism of 
the cruelty and greed of the captains of the army who terrorised the 
chiefs and bullied them into making frequent gifts of slaves. Many re­
belled against this arbitrary extortion and preferred to pay the fixed
annual tribute which the Ngola levied on his chiefs. On the vexed quest­
ion of whether peace or war was the more advantageous to the slave trade,
Fonseca was firmly in favour of peace.
After his war against the Ngola, Cardoso had to fight off an in­
vasion of the Portuguese territory by Nambo-a-Ngongo, a Ndembu chief 
from southern Kongo who marched almost to the gates of Luanda in search 
of food.^ There was apparently a year or two of peace after that, and 
in 1614 Cardoso wrote from Luanda to say that all was quiet in Angola 
and the slave fairs were flourishing. The chiefs in the neighbourhood 
of the new presidio of Hango were beginning to pay allegiance to the 
Portuguese crown. It was fortunate^ . Cardoso said, that peace persisted, 
because the colony was extremely short of gunpowder and would therefore 
be unable to mount an expedition in the event of a rebellion, in the in-
^Cardornega, I, 78.
terior. The governor was wcrried, however, about unrest in Kongo
9
and felt the need for military supplies so that action could be taken 
there if necessary.'*'
While Cardoso was acting governor in Angola, Manuel Cerveira 
Pereira was in Europe defending himself against the accusations that 
had been brought against his four year term of office. He cleared his 
name with King Philip III and persuaded that monarch to found a new 
Portuguese West African colony in Benguela with Pereira himself as 
governor. A letter-patent to this effect was issued on 14 February 1615 
and in the autumn of the same year Pereira returned to Luanda with author­
ity to take over the government of Angola from Cardoso while he made pre-
2
parations for the conquest of Benguela. Despite his preoccupation with
this new venture, Pereira appears to have had time for a new war against
the Mbundu. He defeated some 'rebellious' chiefs in the vicinity of
*
Hango fort and then attacked the soba Kakulu-ka-Hango whom he accused
3
of giving refuge to run-away slaves from Luanda. After eighteen months 
Pereira's preparations for the Benguela venture were completed and he 
left Luanda in the charge of Antonio Goncalvez Pita, one-time captain
^Bento Banha Cardoso 28.6.1614* A.H.U. Cx 1. Brasio VI, 178.
^A.T.T. Char\. de Filip II, liv. 35, fls 32-33* 14 February 1615* Brasio VI, 
195*
Catalogo. 476.
•ir
Cacullo Cahango.
of the Portuguese in Kongo.^ A few months later, in August 1617,
Luis Ilendes de Vasconcelos arrived to take up the governing of the
colony in earnest.
It seems possible that the old Ngola, who the Portuguese called
Kiluanji and who may have been Ndembi, died about this time. Although
there may have been a reign in between, it seems likely that this was
the Ngola who had been fighting and trading with the Portuguese ever
since the first wars of Paulo Lias in 1578, forty years earlier. The
evidence that it was in 1617 that young Ngola Mbandi succeeded to the
throne is tenuous. This is the date of Mbandi's succession according
to the Catalogo, an account apparently based on Cavazzi, although the
2
latter gives no date for the event.
At the time of his death, Kiluanji, the old Ngola, is traditionally 
alleged to have had one 'legitimate' son whose claims were passed over 
because he was an infant and because his mother was in prison for adult­
ery. He also had a son by a 'slave' wife and three daughters. His son, 
Mbandi, rallied his supporters and was elected king of Ndongo. He put 
several of his rivals to death including his brother and also the son of
his sister Nzinga. His three sisters Nzinga,Mukambu, and Kifunji were 
3
spared. Mbandi then turned his attention to resisting the attacks of
Cadornega I, appendix by Mathias Delgado says that Pita governed 
1.4*1617 to 27.8.1617.
^Haveaux, 49; Catalogo. 477; Cavazzi, 295-296. Matias Delgada (Cador- 
nega I, 49 fn. l) also assumes that 'Ngola Kiluanji', who was Ngola in 
1575, died in about 1617 but he says that this was unimportant and of 
no relevance whatsoever to the history of Angola!
7
Cavazzi 296-297; Catalogo, 477*
the Portuguese led by Luis Mendes de Vasconcelos, governor since 1617 , 
and his son JoSo Mendes. By the time of Mbandi's death in 1624, however, 
Portuguese military authority in Ndongo had been greatly increased owing 
to the efforts of Vasconcelos, and the Ngola's resistance had failed. 
Cadomega's chronicle described these wars as a most glorious feat of 
Portuguese arms. Three centuries later, however, Cadomega's editor, 
Matias Delgado, called Vasconcelos one of the most pernicious governors 
that Angola ever had.^ Contemporaries were divided on the issue. Some 
praised his military achievements while others condemned the extortion 
and brutalities which were practiced in order to squeeze slaves from the 
territories he overran.
One of Vasconcelos' first actions on arriving in Luanda was to 
write a strong indictment of his predecessors and deplore the run-down 
state to which Pereira had reduced the colony. Pereira was accused of 
having taken 50,000 cruzados from the treasury and most of the available 
soldiers, ammunition and powder, to conquer Benguela. Whereas Cardoso, 
in 1614, reported a flourishing trade, Vasconcelos found three years later 
that trade was almost at a standstill and the feiras, which had been moved 
to new sites, had almost ceased to function for lack of slaves* Many of 
the chiefs who normally supplied slaves had been destroyed by Pereira 
during his short second term as acting governor. Gonsalves Pita had led 
an army into the Mbundu territory to tell the chiefs that they were now 
direct subjects of the king and must pay tribute to him, as governor, and
Cadornega I, 83-98, two chapters on Vasconcelos. Editorial comment: 
98 fn 1.
not to their private European masters. Vasconcelos promised that 
all sives which had been acquired in this manner would be confiscated 
and sold for the sole benefit of the royal treasury.^"
In the same letter Vasconcelos bitterly denounced his predecessors1 
use of ’jaga’ auxiliary troops. To have introduced these cannibal brig­
ands into the colony, he said, was a great disservice to both God and 
king. Governors and settlers had used them like hunting dogs but they 
had eaten more slaves than they had delivered alive, in Vasconcelos’ 
opinion. Old residents tried to persuade the governor that it would be 
impossible to maintain the colony without the 'jaga' troops but Vascon­
celos persisted in believing, for a few weeks at any rate, that the de­
predations which these allies caused were liable to depopulate the colony 
as they had depopulated other areas. The accusations which Vasconcelos 
levelled at his predecessors in this matter were confirmed by a complaint 
which Dorn Alvaro III of Kongo sent to pope Paul V in 1617# He said that 
far from helping the kings of Kongo, as the kings of Portugal had ordered, 
the governors of Angola had invaded Kongo as though it were enemy terri­
tory. To make matters worse they had united with the ’Jaga1 nation, who 
2
ate human flesh.
When he first arrived in the colony Vasconcelos promised to restre 
order and free-flowing trade. He felt that many settlers and the two
^Vasconcelos to King of Spain 28.8.1617. A.H.U. Cx 1. Brasio VI 285-285.
T>. Alvaro III to Paulo V, 25.10.1617. B.V. Cod Vat Lat 12516 fl 66.
Jadin, 348-352. Also Brasio VI, 288-291.
previous governors, deserved to be sentenced to death for the way they 
had acquired slaves by robbing, capturing and killing, with a complebe 
disregard for the interests of the crown. Under the new regime all 
people who had been unjustly captured as slaves would be freed. All 
traders who were marauding in the interior would be called back to Luanda. 
Peace and justice would be enforced and trade in the markets would re­
place recruiting.
Vasconcelos soon found, however, as his predecessors had done, 
that these aims were incompatible; once again, as always before, the 
requirements of commerce took precedence over the establishment of just­
ice and peace.1 It was not long after his arrival in Luanda that Vasconcelos
set off to campaign in the interior. Under the pretext of subduing a chief
*
called Kaita Kalaba Langa who had revolted against the Portuguese, the
governor recruited all the available settlers, soldiers, gagas', subject
chiefs, slaves and fquimbaresf or free African soldiers. It was soon
obvious that he was not leading a small punitive expedition but was in-
2
tent on marching straight to Ndongo to attack the Ngola. The governors 
eldest son, Francisco Luis de Vasconcelos, was left in charge of the ad­
ministration in Luanda. The younger son, JoSo Mendes de Vasconcelos ac­
companied the governor and the army which marched to Tumbo and sailed
^Vasconcelos to King, 28.8.1617. A.H.U. Cx 1. Brasio VI, 283-285.
2
Bishop Manuel Baptista to King, 7.9*l6l9« A.H.U.
*
Cayta Calaba Langa.
up the Kwanza, attacking a few Kisama villages and visiting the fort 
at Mushima. When they arrived in Massangano they began, with the help of 
the local garrison, to plan the conquest of Ndongo.
The sequence of events in the campaign is not easy to establish.
It would seem, however, that Vasconcelos began by removing the fort of 
Hango on the lower Lukala, and marched up that river to a point north 
of Kabasa, the Ngola1 s capital, where he planned to rebuild the port. 
Mbandi was acutely worried by this move and appears to have sent an ally, 
'Gaita1, who may have been the leader of one of the Imbangala camps, to 
attack the Portuguese.^- The latter retaliated by crossing the Lutete 
River, a southbank tributary of the Lukala, and attacking the Ngola.
The Ngola’s huts, magnificently built and sumptuously decorated with 
peacock feathers, were burnt to the ground. Many prisoners were cap­
tured. The Portuguese army then entered the abandoned city of Kabasa 
and settled down for the rainy season, probably that of 1618 to 1619.
The white soldiers suffered severely from the fevers of that winter.
The governor tried to negotiate but Ngola Mbandi refused to discuss 
peace while the Portuguese were camped in his territory. The governor
*
then withdrew northward to the upper Lufcala and built the fort of Mbaka 
on the site where his work had been previously interrupted, retiring after­
^Matias Delgado (Cadomega I, 89, fn.) says that Gaita was probably the 
Jaga Caiete or Caita. Neves (p. 97) mentions Cahete as one of the fol­
lowers of Kinguri, hence the suggestion that this may have been an Im­
bangala army which Ngola Mbandi sent to attack Vasconcelos.
*
Ambaca.
wards to Luanda to recover his health, leaving his son to lead the new
1season1s campaign.
3o£o Mendes seems to have successfully campaigned in Ndongo.
According to Faria he captured and beheaded ninety-four chiefs, including
Gaita. Sending half his army to Mbaka, he set out with the other half
2
to attack the 'Mani Cassange1. According to Cadomega, who is far 
from lucid about these events which had taken place twenty years be­
fore he himself arrived in Angola, JoSo Mendes also had orders to attack 
two 'jagas* - that is probably Imbangala chiefs - called Domgo and Kasa.
3
These were former allies of the Portuguese who had turned against them. 
Cadornega goes on to relate how J0S.0 Mendes marched into Matamba, further 
than any previous Portuguese captain had ever gone. On his way he de­
feated several chiefs such as Kijilu, Kiteshi, Kiluanji ka Kongo, Kilamba
*
Bamba a Kwanza and Ndala Mdanji. He finally destroyed the compound of
4
Queen Mulundu a Cambolo of Matamba, and put her army to flight.
Faria, who is less voluble but possibly more accurate than Cador­
nega, reported that Jo&o Mendes was less than successful in his campaign 
against Kasanje. Kasanje remained hidden in the bush and sniped at the
^Manuel Severim de Faria, op.cit. Cadomega I, 88-89 fu, and BrasioVI.
^Manuel Severim de Faria, op.cit. Cadomega I, 89 fn.
Matias Delgado (Cadornega I, 155, fn) suggests that this campaign took
place in 1618, but this date does not seem as likely as 1619.
4
Cadomega, I, 93-95.
*
Quijilo, Quitexi, Quiloanji ka Congo, Quilamba Bamba Quanza, Andola Andamgi.
Portuguese. 'When they decided to retreat Kasanje captured their
baggage train. The captain then returned to Luanda, but was soon
sent back to the front. Prom Mbaka he launched a new attack on Ngola
Mbandi with conspicuous success. The king's mother and wives were
captured by the Portuguese and the king himself had to flee and take
refuge on the islands in the Kwanza River.^ He was still there when
Jo&o Correia de Souza arrived in Luanda to take over the government
2
in October 1621. Faria's last word on the campaigns of Vasconcelos
was one of despair. He could not see what gain could be had from so
much carnage. The Mbundu were already suffering severely from a four
year drought and a pointless war crowned their misery. It was not
even as if the Portuguese wanted the lands which they conquered: all
they cared for was trade and preaching the gospel. War did nothing to
3
further either pursuit.
With the arrival of the new governor, Jo&o Correia, attonpts were 
made to renew friendly contacts between the Mbundu and the Portuguese.
It seems that the Portuguese were coming to realise that the Ngola and 
the leading Mbundu chiefs played an important role in the slave trade.
If they chose, they could block the trade routes and close the slave
^"Manuel Severim de Faria, op.cit. in Cadomega I, 89, fn.
Report by FemSo de Souza, 2.3.1632. B.A.L. 51-viii-31, fl 30. Brasio VIII 
156.
3
Manuel Severim de Faria, op.cit. in Cadomega I, 90, fn.
markets. It was probably for this reason that Correia sent Manuel 
Dias and Father Dionizio de Faria Barreto, an African priest, to en­
courage Ngola Mbandi to leave the Kwanza island and re-settle in Ndongo. 
Mbandi laid down three conditions before he would return to Kabasa.
First of all the fort of Mbaka, which was only one day’s march from 
Kabasa, should be withdrawn to its old site on the lower Lukala. Se­
condly, the Portuguese should help the Ngola to expel Kasanje from Ndongo. 
Lastly the governor should restore to the Ngola all the chiefs and sub­
jects who had been captured in the last of Vasconcelos* campaigns.
Manuel Dias was sent to Luanda to lay these conditions before the governor. 
The governor, advised by the Luanda Municipal Council, agreed to accept 
them, and dispatched Bento Rebello to carry his answer to Mbandi.'1’
To cement this new friendship Mbandi sent his sister Nzinga to 
Luanda as ambassadress. This remarkable woman is believed to have been
b o m  in 1582. From 1620 until her death in 1663 she was the most import-
2
ant personality in Angola . According to Cavazzi she arrived in Luanda 
while Jo&o Correia de Souza was still governor. He gave her an audience, 
but since he supplied her with no chair upon which to sit in his presence, 
she seated herself on the back of one of her maids-in-waiting. During 
the interview she persuaded the governor to recognise Mbandi as an allied 
king of equal status to other independent monarchs, and not as a subject
^■Report by Fem&o de Souza, 2.3* 1632. B.A.L. 51-viii-31 fl 30. Brasio
VIII, 156-157.
2
There is a full-length biography of Queen Nzinga written in Flemish.
Mgr. J. Cuvelier: IConingin Nzinga van Matamba, Brugge 1957.
163.
of the Portuguese crown. She was afterwards baptised by the name of
Dona Ana de Souza and the governor became her god-father.^ FemSo
de Souza, in his account of 1632, made no mention cf the baptism of
Nzinga. He said, however, that since Jo&o Correia, who left Luanda
in 1623 after a quarrel with the Jesuits, departed before carrying out
his promises,, Nzinga went to Luanda to obtain satisfaction from his
successor, Captain Pedro de Souza Coelho. Perhaps Nzinga went on two
missions to Luanda, or perhaps she was in Luanda when Correia made his
2
precipitate departure.
Although Correia worked for a peaceful settlement in Ndongo, he 
carried on active warfare in other directions. Not far from Luanda in
• ¥ r
a district known as the 'Nsaka de Kasanje' , there was a small army, 
the leader of which called himself Kasanje, and which may have been a 
remnant of the Lunda invaders of Angola. They subsisted by frequent 
pillaging expeditions to the outskirts of Luanda and to the Bengo valley 
farms from which they could retreat rapidly to their territory of thick 
undergrowth and small lakes. Their depredations had apparently been 
going on for half a century since the arrival of Paulo Dias in Luanda. 
When Correia took over the government they were seriously hindering 
trade from going in or out of Luanda. Correia ordered the army to sur­
round the area and then close in, cutting the bush as it advanced. The
"^Cavazzi - Labat V, 35-40.
2
Report from PemSo de Souza, 2.3*1632. B.A.L. 51-viii-31 fl 30. Brasio
VIII, 156-157*
*
Ensaka de Cassange.
leader, Kasanje, was captured trying to escape across the Bengo.
He was brought before the Governor who admired his courage and leader­
ship but nonetheless had him and his two lieutenants executed. The
1
rest of his chiefs were then rounded up and deported to Brazil.
The Portuguese government were very disturbed about this, possibly
fearing that free Negroes in Brazil might lead a slave revolt. The
governor of Brazil was instructed to send any of the deportees who
2
wished it back to Angola at JoSo Correia’s expense.
Having rid Luanda of its most immediate threat, Correia sent
*
hi& army to attack Nambu. a Ngongo • It seems that the governor's 
main aim was to coerce the chief into supplying him with slaves. The 
most valuable perquisite of the governor was the opportunity to manage 
campaigns so as to gain from selling prisoners-of-war. Correia, how­
ever, was rather foolhardy in his choice of victim, because Nambu a 
Ngongo was a subject of Kongo and had the backing of the ’Duke1 of 
Mbamba and the 'Marquis' of Mpemba. When Nambu a Ngongo refused to 
submit to threats, the Portuguese and their 'jaga' allies were forced 
to attack him and had orders to capture the chief together with Mbamba 
and Mpemba. The Kongo army attacked first however, and scattered the 
auxiliary troops. They were unable to overcome the core of arquebuses 
however and Mpemba and Mbamba were killed. The Jesuits reported that
1 tA ,
JoSo Correia de Souza to Marquis of Frecilha, 3*6.1622. 9-1-6/
B-4, fls 130-133* Brasio VII, 17-24*
^King of Spain to Governors of Portugal, 9*12.1622. A.H.U. Cx 1 Brasio
VII, 64-65.
Namboangongo.
they were even eaten by the 'jagas1. Nambu a Ngongo was captured and 
sent in chains to Brazil. The main result, however, from the point of 
view of the Portuguese, was disastrous. Those who traded in Kongo, 
estimated to be a thousand strong, bore the brunt of the retaliation. 
Traders living in Mbamba, in particular, were killed with their wives 
and families. Those living elsewhere who survived did so through the 
intervention of the Kongo king.'*’
After this diversion into Kongo, organised by Jo&o Correia, the 
new governor, Pedro de Souza Coelho, returned to trying to establish 
the Mbundu trade markets on a regular and friendly footing. He agreed 
to expel Kasanje, (that is the Imbangala leader of eastern Ndongo, and 
not the chief near Luanda,) from Ndongo by farce. Before Coelho took 
any action, however, he was superseded in the government by Sim&o de 
Mascarenhas, the newly arrived Bishop who disembarked at Luanda about 
9 August 1623. Mascarenhas ordered Coelho to continue with the planned 
campaign, but Ngola Mbandi specified that he should march up the line 
of the Lukala River rather than through Ndongo where the Mbundu were 
just beginning to resettle after the Vasconcelos wars. Coelho disliked 
being ordered about and instead of obeying his instructions he retired
^"Report by Mateus Cardoso S.J. 1623. A.R.S.I. Lus Cod 55 fl 51-54v.
Brasio VII, 176-193.
T\ de Souza 2.3.1632. Brasio VIII, 157.
Mascarenhas, 3.2.1624. A.H.U. Cx 1. Brasio VII, 199-203.
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1
to Mbaka where apparently he died in January 1624. Still nothing
had been done to re-open the markets and satisfy Ngola Mbandi, who
became so distrustful of the Portuguese that Father Dionizio, the
2
African priest at his court, had to escape hastily.
while the Portuguese were doing very little to help Ngola Mbandi, 
the Imbangala armies were apparently causing serious damage in Ndongo. 
Two of them, referred to in a letter by Mascarenhas as Tjagasf, de­
stroyed the Mbundu villages around Cambambe and impeded what trade 
movement there was. Lopo Soares Lasso was sent to drive them off.
3
He also cfefeated and captured two other 'jagas', Zenza and Bangobango.
Kasanje, however, still remained unchecked, when in June 1624 a new
and effective governor arrived in Angola in the person of Fem&o de 
4Souza.
By the time FernSo de Souza arrived in 1624 it must have become 
obvious that an effective slave trade required a co-operative African 
state through which to work. The old trade had been conducted through 
Ngola Kiluanji. With his death the trade had faltered and although 
Vasconcelos had tried to get it moving again by massive military action, 
he had only succeeded in destroying the old Ndongo and had been sent 
home to Portugal in disgrace. Correia had made a wild excursion into
^Mascarenhas, 3*2.1624* A.H.U. Cx 1,Brasio VII, 199*
^Fern&o de Souza, 2.3*1632. Brasio VIII, 158.
Mascarenhas, 3.2.1624. A.H.U. Cx 1 , Brasio VII, 199-203.
4B.A.L. 51-vii-30, fl 472. Brasio VII, 243.
Kongo in the hope of finding a new source of slaves, but with little 
success. Souza, the new governor, tried to revive the Ndongo monarchy 
and get the trade flowing through Mbundu agencies in the old way. Not 
succeeding in this he later made an attempt, heavily censured after­
wards in Portugal, to establish a new Mbundu monarchy.
Ngola Mbandi probably died shortly before Fem£o de Souza arrived
in Luanda. He had entrusted his son to the care of the ' jaga1 Kasa,
expecting him to give the boy a military training and to protect him
from any attempt on his life by his aunt Nzinga, whose son Mbandi had
killed a few years earlier to consolidate his power. This move failed
and after Mbandi1s death Nzinga successfully bribed ICasa into handing
over her nephew. It was believed that she killed him and ate his heart.
Bento Rebello, who was in Ndongo at the time of Mbandi *s death, ascused
Nzinga of having poisoned Mbandi. She had been opposed, Rebello said,
to his policy of conciliation with the Portuguese.^" Since Nzinga had
been the chief instrument of this concilation she is unlikely to have
been totally opposed to it. She may, however, have poisoned Mbandi in
order to gain absolute power in Ndongo for herself. Fem&o de Souza,
writing from Luanda in 1624, thought that Mbandi committed suicide in
2
a fit of despair.
^Fern&o de Souza, 2.3*1632. Brasio VIII, 158.
^FerntLo de Souza, 15.8.1624, B.A.L. 31-viii-30, Brasio VII, 248-250.
Nzinga was now undisputed queen of the Mbundu although she lived 
in exile on the Kwanza Islands in eastern Ndongo. To stimulate trade, 
which was almost at a standstill, she wrote to Fernao de Souza once 
more offering a settlement. If the governor would withdraw the Mbaka 
presidio Nzinga would leave her hide-out on the Kwanza islands. She 
would also re-establish the slave market of Kisala (Qui^ala) and instruct 
the Mbundu to sell their slaves there. Souza strongly recommended that 
this offer be accepted but decided that he could not act without royal 
permission.^ Nothing more seems to have been done for about a year.
The governor, meanwhile, was preoccupied with strengthening the seaward 
defences of Luanda against the Dutch threat. He also organised the col­
lection of taxes and tribute among the chiefs who had remained loyal to 
the Portuguese,but he did nothing to extend the area under Portuguese 
control. The levying of the baculamento or tribute washard work. Many 
of the chiefs were so impoverished by the relentless extraction of slaves 
by previous governors and captains, that they were unable to pay their 
quota. Alternatively they sent young boys or old men Instead of the
regulation Peqa da India - a young adult slave. Some tribute was even
2paid in palm cloth instead.
The fierce pressure to supply slaves which was exerted on those 
Mbundu chiefs who were under the domination of the Portuguese forts
P. de Souza, 15.8.1624. B.A.L. 51-viii-30 fl 298-299. Brasio VII, 248-250. 
T*. de Souza, 13.8.1625. A.H.U. Cx 2. Brasio VII, 348.
began to drive many of them away to the eastern part of Ndongo where 
they joined forces with Nzinga. The Queen thus slowly built up an 
armed force hostile to the Portuguese. She also gave shelter to run­
away slaves from Luanda. This caused particular concern to the sett­
lers some of whom claimed tojiave lost up to 150 men in this way. To
(
make matters worse a number of the Portuguese war-slaves, who formed
the bulk of their army, went to join Nzinga. The settlers and traders,
wanting to get their refugee slaves back, demanded a war on Nzinga, but
the governor1s instructions said explicitly that he might only declare
war for defensive purposes or in the event of a rebellion.^" Souza sent
two Jesuit fathers to negotiate with Nzinga over the return of slaves
who had unquestionably escaped from Portuguese captors. They had no
success however and returned to Luanda. Nzinga sent an embassy to
Luanda to discuss the re-opening of the trade but her ambassadors made
no progress and were accused of encouraging chiefs under Portuguese dom-
2
ination to abandon the white man's cause and join Queen Nzinga.
In 1625, when negotiations with Nzinga seemed to be leading nowhere, 
Fern&o de Souza made an alliance with a Mbundu chief close to Nzinga's 
camp. The soba Ayre Kiluanji, chief of the rock enclosure of Pungu a 
Ndongo, was friendly towards the Portuguese. He asked to become a vassal 
of the Portuguese crown and was ordered to present himself at the fort
T. de Souza, 22.8.1625. A.H.U. Cx 2. Brasio VII, 359-364. 
P. de Souza, 2.3.1632. Brasio VIII, 158-161.
at Kbaka. There he was asked to find out what Nzinga planned to do*
It had been reported by a soldier who had spent four years with the 
Mbundu fighting against the Portuguese, that a general rebellion against 
the Portuguese was being planned.^ "When Nzinga heard that Ayre had been 
to Mbaka, she immediately declared war on him. He appealed for Portu­
guese protection and thus gave the governor the legal right to declare
2
war on Nzinga in defence of a subject of the Portuguese crown.
Early in 1626 the captains, municipal councillors and officials 
of the justice and treasury departments were called to a council of 
war in Luanda and agreed to launch a full-scale attack on Queen Nzinga*
It was necessary to establish a new and loyal king in Ndongo who would 
be a vassal of the Portuguese crown. The army set out on 7 February 1626 
with the old conquistador Bento Banha Cardoso in command. Nzinga was 
driven out of the Kwanza islands and the war was successful^ concluded 
by the time Ayre Kiluanji died, probably towards the end of 1626. Car­
doso chose another Ayre as his successor with the approval of the chiefs
and captains accompanying him. This new chief was made Ngola of Ndongo.^
In the Spring of 1627 he was baptised as Dom Felippe and his queen as
^This soldier was called Manuel Fernandes Ladroal and was presumably a 
Portuguese.
^ e m S o  de Souza, 21.2.1626. B.A.L. 51-viii-30 fl 329-530. Brasio VII, 
417-420.
5F. de Souza, 21.2.1626. B.A.L. 51-viii-30 fl 329-330. Brasio VII, 417-420.
F. de Souza, 2.3.1632. Brasio VIII, 162.
Dona Guyomar. Their son was sent to Luanda and took the baptismal
name of Francisco.^ The new puppet-Ngola agreed to pay tribute to
the Portuguese of one hundred slaves per annum* He also permitted
2
the Jesuits to build a church at Pungu a Ndongo* Ngola Ayre agreed
■Jfr
to re-open the trade fairs* That of Ifbumba a Kisansu was once more
functioning by March 1627 and the Mbundu chiefs were instructed to
3
send all pombeiros there rather than trade with them privately. In
the following year a captain was despatched to the eastern border of
Ndongo to open a new fair at Ndala Kissuba.^ He was instructed to
explain his missinn to Ngola Ayre as he passed Pungu a Ndongo and make
sure ofANgola!s co-operation. The chief of Ndala Kissuba was to be
thanked for the assistance he had given to some pombeiros who had had
to flee from Nzinga. An offer of Portuguese military assistance was to
be made to him if he would agree to open a new slave market and allow
a
traders to pass freely through his lands* This new trade centre was 
temporarily established and flourished for a while in the latter part 
of Femao de Eouza's government*
1F. de Souza, 30.1.1627 and ? 1627. B.A.L. 51-vii-30 fl 235 and 244. 
Brasio VII, 497-499 and 524-525.
2F. de Souza, 2.3.1632. Brasio VIII, 162.
3F. de Souza to Ngola Ayre, 27.3.1627. B.A.L. Ms 51-viii-30 fl 242-242v. 
Brasio VII, 506-507.
A
FernSo de Souza to Capt. F. de Castro, 8*4*1628. B.A.L. 51-viii-31 
fl 171v. Brasio VII, 549-550.
^F. de Souza, 23.2.1632. B.A.L. 51-viii-31, fl 19-29. Brasio VIII, 140.
* /
Bumba Aquizanzo. r Andalla Quissuba.
In constructing a new and amicable Ndongo monarchy, Souza had 
to contend not only with the inevitable enmity of Nzinga but with the 
suspicion of the chiefs. The latter complained that Ngola Ayre was 
the son of a 'slave1 and that they therefore could not obey him. An 
important function of the Njfcla was that of rain-maker. The Mbundu had 
suffered a long drought during the time when Ngola Mbandi was a refugee 
from the attacks of Vasconcelos ,and were convinced that unless they re­
cognised the true leader, they would suffer many more such hardships.
They asked that one of the sisters of the late Ngola Mbandi be made 
Queen. In the meantime many chiefs were abandoning Ndongo to live 
elsewhere. The Bishop of Luanda recommended that Ayre be deposed in 
favour of a more acceptable candidate, but the Jesuits and others sup­
ported Ayre's claim since he paid the tribute which he had promised.
Souza referred the matter to the King in Madrid with a recommendation 
that if Ayre was to be replaced with one of Mbandi's sisters, it should 
not be Nzinga but rather a young sister, 'Maria Camfo', probably MuWambu.^ 
Nzinga's opposition to Ngola Ayre took a military form. She re­
turned to the Kwanza islands from which she had been driven by Bento 
Banha Cardoso, possibly with the support of the 'jaga' Kasa. Her chief 
lieutenant had gone to Luanda to negotiate with the Portuguese and had 
been executed for spying in December 1627* She stacked the Portuguese
1F. de Souza, 23.2.1632. B.A.L. 51-viii-31, fl 19-29. Brasio VIII, 138-141.
2F. de Souza, 1627. B.A.L. 51-viii-30 fls 247-247v. Brasio VII, 526-528.
173.
a second time but was defeated by Payo de Araujo de Azevedo who had
*
succeeded Cardoso, Nzinga herself fled to Hako, south of the Kwanza 
River, or to the Songo country east of Ndongo, but her sisters were cap­
tured and taken to Luanda. The army was prevented from following Nzinga by an 
outbreak of small-pox.'*' According to Fem&o de Souza she then joined forces 
with the Kasanje army which could put 80,000 bowmen in the field. For 
the second time she returned to the Kwanza islands and persuaded the 
Mbundu to close the new fair at Ndala Kisuba and block the trade routes.
By the time Souza left Angola there were therefore growing demands from
the trading interests to give in to Nzinga's pressure and allow one of
2
her sister^ to become Queen of Ndongo. The attempt to establish a new 
monarchy was already seen as a failure. In the reports which he wrote 
in 1632 on the Angolan situation, Ferm-Lo de Souza stressed, perhaps un­
justly, that the ill-fated idea had come from Bento Banha Cardoso, now
3
dead, and not from himself.
The mention of Kasanje in Fern&o de Souza's report of 1632 would 
appear to refer, perhaps for the first time, to a state beyond Ndongo 
near the Songo country. The kingdom of Kasanje was founded during the 
retreat of the Imbangala from the Portuguese frontier which followed their
Cavazzi - Labat V 72-73.
2P. de Souza 2.3.1632. Brasio VIII, 162-163.
3rbid. Brasio VIII, 162. 
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invasion into Angola. Although no contemporary document seems yet 
to have come to light describing the founding of the Kingdom of Kasanje, 
the oral traditions of the Imbangala do give an account of the events 
which led up to their establishment in the wide plain between the Tala 
Mugongo Mountains and the winding upper Kwango River.
The aim of the Imbangala in moving eastward seems to have been to 
get away from the Portuguese military influence which dominated the 
peoples within range of the forts. At the same time they wanted to re­
main close enough to carry on trade with the Europeans. This movement 
seems to have spanned approximately the first third of the seventeenth 
century. Although the Imbangala were normally referred to by the Portu­
guese as 'jagas' and although they maintained the traditions and the 
customs of the old Lunda leaders, the majority, at least, were of Mbundu 
origin by the time they had been in Angola for a generation. This was 
an inevitable consequence of their custom of infanticide. The Pende, the 
Mbundu people who left Angola during the early seventeenth century to 
emigrate to the Kasai, said that the 'Imba-Ngola' were their brothers 
and that Kasanje was the son of an Imbangala woman.^ This 'Kasanje', 
who founded the Imbangala kingdom on the Kwango, was probably not the 
same as the Kasanjetfio took over the leadership of some of the Imbangala 
invaders on the death of Kingur». He was probably an Imbangala leader 
connected with the troop of Kalandula who arrived at Masyax^ ana. about 1603*
^Haveaux, op.cit. 49.
According to the Imbangala traditions, Kasanje gave military
assistance to the Portuguese when he arrived at Massangano. In return
they offered him lands near their forts on which to settle. Kasanje
however declined such a doubtful privilege and asked for a territory
a little further afield at Lukamba on the Lukala River, near the future
site of the fort of Mbaka. Kasanje settled down there and was joined
*
by some followers of Kinguri who had settled at Bola Kasash. in Libolo 
during the last stages of the Imbangala advance into Angola. Accord­
ing to the tradition Kasanje stayed at Lukamba for two years and at­
tempted to grow a crop. This was a long stay by the standards of Im­
bangala armies, and to attempt to grow their own food was an entirely 
new departure.
After two years an elephant came and destroyed Kasanje's crops.
He sent his hunters out and they followed it right across Bondo to Kil- 
amba where the chief gave them tobacco and salt, commodities for which 
his country m s  famed. The hunters returned with such glowing accounts 
of the fertile country which they had seen that Kasanje decided to leave 
Lukamba where soils were poor and wood scarce. He sought permission to 
emigrate from the Portuguese 'chief', Miguel. This permission was given 
on condition the Imbangala sent back frequent embassies with presents 
and tributes." It has been suggested by Vansina that this Miguel may 
have been Roque de SSo Miguel who was commander of the fort of Hango
*
Bola Cassache.
T
a Kikaito from 1611 until some time before 1617* If this hypothesis 
is accepted, as seems reasonable, then Kasanje probably took his 
leave from the Portuguese between 1611 and 1617. The date can be 
further narrowed because the Portuguese were fighting the Ngola in 
1611 and again after 1615, it is only between 1612 and 1614 that they 
are likely to have allowed an ally to move away from the colonial front­
ier. This is obviously weak evidence, bat a small clue that Kasanje 
had at least not left the Portuguese and founded his new kingdom long 
before this is given by Balthasar Rebello de Arag&o who in 1607 described
the kingdoms which lay to the east of Ndongo, and made no mention <f a
2
state of Kasanje.
Kasanje's migration away from Lukamba was probably much slower 
than the tradition would suggest. When Bat tell travelled with an Im- 
bangala army, he found ihat it settled for six months at most of the 
localities to which it came. It seems likely that Kasanje's advance 
towards the Kwango was of a similar nature. It will be remembered that 
in 1618 or 1619 Kasanje was attacked by Jo&o Mendes de Vasconcelos.
The exact location of this battle is mt known but it was probably on the 
frontier between Ndongo and Matamba and is unlikely to have been much 
further inland towards the region of the Kwango tributaries. The next 
mention of Kasanje was made in 1621 when the Ngola agreed to a peace
Hansina, J.A.H.. 1965, 570-571 and sources quoted therein.
2
See Chapter Pour.
with the Portuguese after the Vasconcelos wars on condition that 
the new governor, Jo&o Correia de Souza, would help him to expel 
Kasanje from Ndongo, Vansina had assumed that Kasanje had "by this 
time been to the Kwango, founded a kingdom, and returned to attack 
Ndongo.'*’ This suggestion seems doubtful. One objection is that it 
probably took the Imbangala a long time to change from the concept 
of a self-sufficient roving army, to that of a settled state from 
which an army could be sent out leaving the basic state structure be­
hind. It seems much more likely that the Imbangala found a site on 
which to settle and evolve a kingdom after 1625 rather than before 1621. 
Nhen the Ngola appealed to the Portuguese between those years to help 
him to expel Kasanje from his territory, it seems probable that the 
Imbangala were still in the process of moving out of Ndongo, and not 
attacking it from a base on the Kwango.
The suggestion that the founding of the kingdom of Kasanje did 
not begin before the later 1620's instead of a decade earlier, is 
strengthened by the. oral tradition of the Pende. The Pende remember a. 
defeat of Queen Nzinga by the Portuguese as an event which took place 
before their departure from the Kbundu homeland. That defeat may even 
have been one cause of their departure. When the Pende fled they went 
to Musenge Kihunda near the Lui River salt pans. They were joined 
there by 'Kasanji ka Kingudi'. Kasanje imposed harsh levies on the
^•Vansina, J.A.H. 1965 (3), 371.
Pende and eventually drove them away towards the Kasai. The Car­
valho version of the Imbangala traditions records a similar story.
The Imbangala migrated towards the north-east from Ndongo over a 
period of several years. As they went they continually drove other 
peoples in front of them until they came to the salt pans in the
country of the Solo people. There they settled down with the intention
2
of working the salt deposits. Prom these traditions it would seem 
that the Pende left Ndongo before the Imbangala did. Since the Pende 
remember Queen Nzinga^they are unlikely to have left before 1624 when 
she came to power, and possibly did not do so until she was expelled 
from Ndongo after a battle with the Portuguese in 1626. If it be sup­
posed that the Pende left Ndongo in 1626 and that the Imbangala fol­
lowed thou for several years towards the Lui River, it is unlikely that 
the conquest of the Imbangala1s fined settling place be£an before about 
1630 and not, as Vansina suggested, about 1614* Such a date is com­
patible with Nzinga’s negotiations with Kasanje in the ’wilderness1 'of 
Ganguela, in about 1630 to close the trade fair of Ndala Kisuba.
i/hen Kasanje arrived on the Lui River, he had to set about con­
quering the territory in which he wanted to settle. He was helped by 
Ngonga Mbandi, a Mbundu general of Queen Nzinga who had attached himself 
to Kasanje with a number of his troops. Their first enemy was Kilamba
^Haveaux, op.cit. 49-50.
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Carvalho; 0 Jagado de Cassange, Lisbon 1898? 31*
■who was so successful in resisting the Mbundu-Imbangala aggression that 
he managed to capture the person of Kasanje himself. In order to rescue 
him, Kasanje1s wife, a girl from Libolo, called on her three brothers 
to help Ngonga Mbandi. Kikata kya Hango and Huava Hango came to the 
rescue and successfully destroyed the Kilamba chief by inviting him to 
discuss peace terms and then catching him in a hidden pit underneath the 
seat of honour. The people of Kilamba fled after the death of their 
ruler and Kasanje was rescued. In gratitude for the help of his asso­
ciates Kasanje laid down, according to the tradition, that the succession 
to the throne should go in turn to a member of the Kulashingo family 
of Kasanje himself, then to a Hgonga and finalfer to a member of the Kaluaga 
dynasty to which Huava Hango belonged. Kikata kya Hango was styled Kasa 
and made ruler of a large province of the new kingdom. He was also made 
an elector and became very influential in the choice of a new king."**
After the conquest of Kilamba the new kingdom grew easily. Many 
small chiefs from the surrounding country came to pay homage to Kasanje 
for fear of being attacked by him. The capital was moved from Kilamba 
on the excuse that the camp was continually being disturbed by lions.
Kasanje went to the lands of two chiefs Kisongo kya Paso and Kanga rya 
Ndungo a little further to the south. It is possible that the real reason 
for this move was to open a new and more southerly trade route from Kas­
anje to the Portuguese. During the 1630*3 Nzinga was conquering Matamba and
^Neves, 103-106.
the old route across thoT country to the Lukala may have been closed.
The last important resistance to the Imbangala settlers came from 
Use a Nzingwe who lived on a well defended hill, but he too was eventu­
ally overcome. One and a half years later Kasanje died and was succeeded, 
though not without a struggle, by Kasanje ka Kulashingo who claimed to 
be the last of KungiiV s nephews. The centre of the Kingdom of Kasanje 
remained in the region in which Kasanje died until the mid-nineteenth 
century when Neves visited it.^
This conquest completes the story of the Lunda-Imbangala invasion 
of Angola, the progressive tMbunduization' of the Imbangala armies, and 
the retreat of one of them to found a new kingdom between the Lunda empire 
and the Portuguese colony. According to the interpretation given here 
these events were spread over more than half a century and were not in 
a rapid sequence as might be supposed from the oral traditions. Kasanje 
developed into an important trading kingdom in the second half of the 
seventeenth century and will be frequently referred to in the next chap­
ters.
While the Imbangala 7/ere conquering the plain between the Tala
Mugongo and the Kwango River and establishing the kingdom of Kasanje,
the Portuguese were trying to increase the prosperity of their colony.
On 4 September 1630 Pemao de Souza was replaced as governor by Dom
2
Manuel Pereira Coutinho. By this time the Portuguese must have been
^Neves, 106-108.
Siatias Delgado: Gadornega I, appendix.
aware of the fact that they had over-exploited the Mbundu slave supplies. 
To establish a strong Mbundu dynasty willing to trade in slaves would 
not now solve the problem caused by the serious depopulation of Ndongo.
In 1633 Father Gon$alo de Souza reported a situation very different 
from the optimistic account of Fern&o de Souza shortly before. Very 
little trade was being conducted and the fairs had dried up* One cause 
of this to which Father Gonialo pointed was the wars, especially those 
of Nzinga and the Imbangala, whom he referred to as the 1 cannibal jagas'. 
Another reason was that the burden of the slave tax was driving sobas 
away to the hinterland of Ndongo. Pombeiros were having to travel 
several months journey to buy slaves. This was costly both in time 
and in the numbers of slaves who died on the road. It also meant that 
pombeiros travelledbeyond the limits where their Portuguese masters could 
effectively control them. Some settled down to trade on their own ac­
count with the goods which had been entrusted to them. This was a heavy 
loss to their owners in the impoverished town of Luanda.^
Portuguese action in Ndongo at this time was hampered by the con­
stant threat of a Dutch attack on Luanda. The governor dared not leave 
the capital unprotected for very long to indulge in military exchanges 
with Nzinga and Kasanje. This Dutch threat, although not new, was an 
increasing hazard. In 1623 and 1624 two attacks on Luanda had been beaten
■^ Father Gon§alo de Souza, 6.7.1633. A.H.U. Cx 1. Brasio VIII, 241.
off, although not before several Portuguese ships had been burnt*
Duch traders were especially active in Loango and Kongo and sometimes 
waylaid Portuguese merchant vessels on their way to Luanda and relieved 
them of their cargoes of trade good.'*'
The Dutch threat and the depopulation of Ndongo were probably the 
main reasons why Coutinho turned his attention to the Ndembt* country 
of southern Kongo when he wanted to activate the slave trade. This 
region was not far from Luanda^so that the army could be recalled quite 
rapidly if necessary. It is also possible that this region had been 
less extensively exploited than Ndongo because it was part of Kongo, 
nominally a friendly kingdom allied to Portugal. A campaign was launched 
against the Utembw. chief Mbwila on the old pretext that he had been har­
bouring run-away slaves. Antonio Bruto commanded the white troops and 
tendala,or African captain, Antonio Dias Musungo led the black 
'guerra preta1. The tendala1s chief insignia was a large iron bell 
without a clapper which he beat to give instructions to the 1 jaga1 or 
Imbangala troops. This bell was held in great awe by them and it is 
perhaps significant that a similar bell was the chief insignia of the
Mwata Yamvo of Lunda. Cadornega dismissed this respect as mere super-
2stition on the part of the 'jaga*.
In the fighting Bruto capturedmany slaves but also suffered heavy
Por a detailed analysis of Dutch activities in Angola and the reason 
for them at this time see C.R.Boxer: Salvador de Sa and the Struggle 
for Brazil and Angola 1602-1686. London 1952.
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losses owing to the unexpectedly large number of fire-arms which 
Mbwila could muster. The war was still progressing when Coutinho 
was replaced, in 1635, by Francisco de Vasconcelos da Cunha. Mbwila's 
rocky stronghold was tightly besieged at this time and the Membd asked 
the new governor for peace, promising to return all refugee slaves and 
to become a vassal of the crown. The governor accepted the terms and 
ended the Ndembtt campaign. He may have been influenced by the news 
of a Butch squadron which lay up-wind from Luanda. When that alarm 
was over, he organised a new campaign, this time in the directiai of 
Kis^ama where a chief called Kimbambala was accused of harbouring slaves 
from the settler estates of Cambambe and Hassangano.^
While the governors were preoccupied in the regions close to 
Luanda, Nzinga had been active on the eastern side of Ndongo. According 
to Cavazzi, who was at one time a missionary at her court and was in a 
position to have learnt Nzinga1s history from the best sources, the 
Queen, after being expelled from Ndongo, adopted the way of living and 
of fighting used by the Imbangala. Cavazzi called this the ’law of the 
jagas’ or the *KishifcLaws' whose brutality he contrasted to his own laws 
of Christianity. Nzinga may have recruited followers from among Im­
bangala hordes, but for the most part she probably imposed upon her ex­
isting followers a discipline which was akin to that of the Imbangala. 
The cannibalism which she practised was strongly ritualistic rather than
■'"Cadornega, I, 181-182, 190-192.
a normal way of feeding as it had been among the early Imbangjdfala
troops. She also adopted the Imbangala custom of infanticide.^-
By building up a hardened corps of followers with a strong religious
element in their political association, Nzinga was able to conquer
new territories as effectively as Kasanje had done.
Nzinga1 s second return to the Kwanza .islands .V; about 1629 or
1630 was to recruit followers among the many Mbundu who were migrating
eastward away from Portuguese oppression. Nzinga intended to conquer
Matamba and then turn on Ndongo to expel the Portuguese and Ngola Ayre.
The old king of Matamba, Matambo Kalombo, was dead and the country was
being mled by his daughter,' Muongo, whom Nzinga defeated, captured,
and branded as a slave. Queen Muongo did not survive long after her
2
defeat, but her daughter outlived Nzinga and was baptised in 1667.
This campaign probably took place in the period from 1630 until 1635 
or even later. Nzinga had then founded the second kingdom of peoples 
who had migrated away from the Portuguese colony. Matamba and Kasanje 
now began to develop as the main rivals in supplying the slave trade. 
Once her authority in Matamba had been consolidated, Nzinga turned her 
attention to Ndongo as planned. She entered the lands of Ngola Ayre 
(Dorn Pelippe) and approached the fort of Mbaka. The governor sent his
nephew, Bartholemeu de Vasconcelos da Cunha, to defend both the Portu-
3
guese and the Ngola. Nzinga, however, had to return hastily to Matamba
Cavazzi - Labat, V, 51-54. 
2Ibid. 73-75.
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Cadornega, I, 193-194*
when Kasanje took advantage of her absence to invade it, causing 
widespread destruction and carrying off sives and cattle* He was, 
however, able to escape behind his own border before Nzinga reached 
him.^
At about this time Pedro Cezar de Menezes arrived in Luanda as
governor, on 18 October 1639* He brought the first European troops
to be sent to Angola since Bento Banha Cardoso had fetched re-inforcements
in 1625* The most famous of these soldiers was Antonio de Oliveira de
Cadornega, who wrote a chronicle of the Angolan Nars and personally
2
witnessed many of the campaigns of the next forty years. Menezes im­
mediately opened negotiations with Nzinga on the question of returning 
slaves to their masters. The Queen sent him an embassy carrying pres­
ents for himself, the chief justice and the bishop, as well as a few 
run-away slaves who were so old that no one knew who their masters had 
been. It was thought that Nzinga* s motive in sending this delegation 
was to obtain first hand intelligence of the strength of the new white 
troops. She sought this information to supplement the reports which
her sister, Kifunji, was believed to be sending to Matamba from her
3
captivity in Luanda.
"^Cavazzi - Labat, V, 75-76.
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The governor sent Gaspar Borges Madureira to try to arrange 
a trade agreement or a peace with Nzinga*^ Cavazzi believed that 
the scope of the mission was wider, seeking to prevent any rapproche­
ment between Nzinga and Kasanje unless the Portuguese were included
2as a third party. Cavazzi was probably right in his assessment of 
the importance which Kasanje was attaining. The Portuguese had failed 
to build a serviceable trade state in Ndongo and their relationship 
with Nzinga was precarious as always. The new Imbangala kingdom, how­
ever, might already have begun to provide a new source of supply, or 
at least some traders may have realised that it was a potential sub­
stitute for Ndongo. If the Portuguese were going to co-operate suc­
cessfully with Kasanje they did not want Nzinga to interfere in the 
arrangements beforehand.
Madureira was only partially successful in his mission. Kasanje 
was willing to sign a peace treaty with the Portuguese and even to for­
get his alleged claim to Matamba. He was not, however, prepared to 
adopt Christianity. Nzinga was less accommodating. She claimed that 
if she became a Christian she would lose all her 1 jaga1 following.
She also said that she would never forgo the fruits of victory and stood 
by her claim to Ndongo. After six useless months in Matamba Madureira
3
returned to Luanda where he accused Nzinga of having tried to poison him.
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Having failed to make an agreement with Nzinga, Pedro Cezar de 
Menezes called all the notables of Luanda to a council of war. It 
was pointed out that the king of Kongo had been having treasonable 
dealings with the Butch, Nzinga was more treacherous than ever, and 
the Ndembtt. chiefs were preventing pombeiros from trading in southern 
Kongo. In view of the seriousness of these problems it was agreed 
to establish a standing army under the command of Antonio Bruto.'*'
Before these decisions could be put into effect, however, the 
situation in Angola was radically altered. On 25 August 1641 the 
Butch captured Luanda.
1
Cadornega, I, 222 and 227*
Chapter Six
THE FINAL DESTRUCTION OF NDONGO. 1641 - 1684.
During the mid-seventeenth century Angola was a pawnin several 
international struggles. These included the struggle between the Vatican 
and the Portuguese crown for control of the mission field, the struggle 
between Dutch and Portuguese for control of the slave trade, the struggle 
between Spain and Portugal for sovereignty over the whole Portuguese em­
pire. The most important of these struggles as far as the Mbundu were 
concerned, was the Dutch attempt to gain control of Angola in order to 
supply slaves to those Brazilian colonies which Holland had captured. The 
importance to the Mbundu of this challenge to Portuguese rule was that 
when the Dutch conquered Luanda they provided alternative trading and 
military alliances to those offered by the Portuguese. Before this the 
buying of slaves had been virtually a Portuguese monopoly which had put 
the Mbundu sellers in a weak position.
When the Dutch entered Luanda the Portuguese beat a hasty retreat. 
Before dawn on 26 August 1641 they marched out of the city to the Bengo 
River, about twenty miles away, where the Jesuits and other residents had 
their agricultural estates. Here they settled down to plan a campaign.
■*Tor the causes and details of the Dutch cfctack on Angola and the history 
of Brazil of which this episode forms a part, see Boxer: Salvador
Correia de Sa and the struggle for Brazil and Angola. London 1952; and
Silva Rego: A dupla RestauratpSo de Angola, Lisbon 1948.
Their first concern was to isolate the Dutch and try to insure that
they gained no African support. In this they were largely unsuccessful.
The Portuguese domination and trading monopoly had been almost universally
unpopular and the refugees on the Bengo soon discovered that only forceful
coercion would retain the loyalty of vassal chiefs. The first test case
arose when the governor Pedro Gezar de Menezes, received reports that a
*
Ndembu chief of southern Kongo called Nambu a Kalombe was negotiating
with the Dutch. Captain Antonio Bruto was ordered to administer severe
punishment to deter other Ndembu and Mbundu chiefs from treating with
the enemy. Nambu a Kalombe was defeated and the captain built a cairn
1
with the skulls of the prisoners of war whom he executed.
The small rulers in the vicinity of Luanda were not the only pot­
ential allies of the Dutch. The Portuguese believed that the king of Kongo, 
whose predecessors had been in correspondence with the Dutch in Brazil
for several years, had ordered the governor of Luanda Island, a Kongo de-
2pendency, to give assistance to the invader. A few months after the 
Dutch arrived, Garcia II of Kongo wrote to Prince Maurice of Nassau offer­
ing facilities to trade and build forts. He asserted that he was dis­
enchanted with the evil and ambitious Portuguese who had planned to conquer
^Cadornega, I, 260-262.
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Namboa Calombe.
his kingdom under the guise of friendship. He stressed, however, that
he would remain a catholic and that although willing to trade with the
Dutch, he would receive n©- missionaries, ambassadors or settlers from
them.'*' In the following year Garcia wrote again to the Dutch saying that
he was worried by the continued presence of a small pocket of Portuguese
in the interior of Angola. He obviously, and rightly as it proved,
2
feared a vengeful return of the Portuguese.
When he realised that he was surrounded by hostile states, Pedro 
Cezar de Menezes decided that his camp on the Bengo was dangerously open 
to attack. He therefore organised a strenuous march of the exiled citi­
zens of Luanda up country to the fortified town of Massangano. On the 
march he tried, but with little success, to persuade the chiefs of Ilamba 
to support the Portuguese in their fight to maintain domination of the 
Mbundu. When they arrived in Massangano they were able, however, to gain 
the support of two important allies who later helped them in most of the 
major campaigns. The first was the 'Jaga1 Kabuku Kandonga whom Cadornega
claimed to be a direct descendent of the Lunda invaders. Kabuku had a 
*
Rilombo or mobile camp consisting of warriors and a few women but no 
children. The other loyal ally on whom the Portuguese were able to rely 
was Ngola Lyre, the king of Ndongo who had been established by Portuguese
■^ Garcia II to Maurice of Nassau, 12.5*1642. Algemeine Rijksarchief Congo 
1642-1645, le W.I.C., Brazilie, No. 58. Brasio VIII, 584-587.
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force of arms during the government of Fernclo de Souza. With the help
of these two allies and the possession of the three garrisonned forts
of I-'ibaka, Cambambe and Massangano, the Portuguese were able to maintain
some control at least over the Western Mbundu of the lower Lukala and
middle Kwanza valleys. Elsewhere their authority became negligible.
Ponbeiros were killed in the ITdembu states, and Kakulu Kahenda expelled a
Portuguese representative. To try to recover the positionfthe governor
*
sent Antonio Bruto in 1642 to attack Nambu a Ngongo, one of the most 
powerful of the ITdembu chiefs. In the optimistic hope of a profitable 
victory, Bruto took a large number of slave shackles. He was, however, 
easily overcome by Nambu a Ngongo who had the help of 200 Butch troops.^ 
In Matamba Queen Nzinga immediately realised the advantages of the 
Butch presence in Luanda and began to use them to her own commercial and 
political benefit. In order to get closer to the coast without meeting 
any Portuguese obstacles, she sent her army commander, Nzinga Amona, to 
infiltrate the Ndembu country and by-pass the Mbundu lands. Such was the 
old queen's fearsome reputation that most of the Ndembu chiefs gave way 
rather than resist her war-hordes. When Kiteshi ka Ndambi^ tried to 
oppose Amona1 s advance, the Butch sent 100 troops to crush the resistance, 
Nzinga formed an alliance with the Dutch and established her kilombo on 
the Dande River where she was strategically placed to send caravans to
Cadornega, I, 274, 278, 286-7, 290-293.
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Namboangongo. ^Quitexi Candambi.
Luanda and to conduct short campaigns against the usurper of Ndongo,
Ngola Ayre, and his Portuguese supporters.^
The Portuguese meanwhile were finding conditions in Massangano 
extremely arduous. Pood had beame very scarce and clothing was unobtain­
able. Since the African kingdoms all around them were hostile, they de­
cided to negotiate a truce with the Dutch. They succeeded by the end of 
1641 and trade relations were established between Luanda and Massangano.
The Dutch sent cheese, sugar, butter, cloth and other goods up country 
in return for slaves an^ JL silver bullion. The Portuguese apparently 
had considerable reserves of silver which they had presumably accumulated 
before the Dutch invasion by selling slaves to the Spaniards to work in 
the mines of Peru. Once a truce with the Dutch had been agreed, the Portu­
guese decided to leave Massangano and return to their farms on the Bengo 
where food was more plentiful. They may also have hoped to re-open in­
dependent trade routes overseas and be closer at hand to receive any assist­
ance which might come to them from Portugal or Brazil. Their second sojourn 
on the Bengo was short however. On 17 May 1643 the Dutch broke the truce 
and attacked the settlement. They may have been seeking to capture the 
Portuguese silver reserves, but it is probable that they also hoped to re­
move the Portuguese from Angola altogether. If this was the aim the attack 
was unsuccessful. Although they captured the governor, Pedro Cezar de Menezes
■^Cadornega, I, 293-294 and326-327.
a number of survivors under the leadership of Antonio de Abreu de 
I-iiranda marched back to Massangano over the hundred miles of dry savannah. 
There they negotiated a new truce and re-opened trade relations on the 
old basis that the hutch would tolerate the settlement and even provide 
it with food so long as the Portuguese would sell them slaves. After a 
few months captivity in Luanda, Ilenezes escaped and returned to the colony 
at Massangano which he ruled until a new governor arrived from Portugal 
with fresh troops to attempt to recover Luanda.^
The Dutch had come to Angola exclusively to obtain slaves. They
p
expected to find an export trade of up to 16,000 slaves per annum.
Their negotiations with the African states to obtain slaves were similar 
to those of their Portuguese predecessors. Queen Nzinga was especially 
anxious to sell them any prisoners of war whom she could capture. It 
was probably with the major intention of obtaining slaves that she sent
an army estimated by the king of Kongo to consist of 80,000 bowmen, to
* 3
invade the neighbouring duclyof Wandu in south-east Kongo. By making
the Portuguese dependent on the sale of slaves for survival, the hutch 
had reduced Massangano to a position similar to that of many small Mbundu
1Cadomega, I, 295-298, 299, 303, 307, 317-321, 336-340.
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chiefdoms. The Portuguese were forced to pay exhorbitant numbers of 
slaves to obtain European goods which they wanted even more urgently 
than the Mbundu chiefs did. Prom being the masters and regulators of 
the slave trade, the Portuguese had become its most servile participants, 
conducting raids wherever the risk of defeat seemed smallest. One such 
campaign was conducted in Libolo where the local chiefs appealed to the 
Portuguese for help against the Imbangala or 'jaga* army of Lulembe. 
Lulembe was defeated and driven out of the province, but the Portuguese 
army stayed on to recruit slaves among those whom they pretended to help,'*’ 
Apart from the raids and skirmishes conducted mainly for commercial 
purposes, there was a more fundamental war going on in Angola which led 
to several major campaigns. This was the war between Nzinga and the Dutch 
on one side and Ngola Ayre and the Portuguese on the other. The first 
of these campaigns probably took place in 1644, A chief called Ngoleme
■if
a Kaita attacked the Portuguese-dominated chiefs around the fort of 
Mbaka. The Portuguese sent both black and white troops together with 
their ally the 'Jaga' Kabuku to attack Kaita, who appealed to Queen Nzinga 
for help. She sent her general, Nzinga Amona, who overcame and destroyed 
the Portuguese army, Kabuku was captured and his kilombo was forced to 
elect a new leader, Funji Amusungu or the new Kabuku. Another captive 
was the chief of Mbaka, Ngola Kanini, known to the Portuguese as Jo&o 
Gutterres. He was a relative of Nzinga and she forgave him for having
1Cadornega, I, 317-321, 326-327, 344-345.
■if
Angoleme Acaita.
worked for Muene Puto, the king of Portugal, and gave him the title
of Kuene Lumho, the Lord Chamberlain of her court. The Portuguese
strength at Massangano was still further reduced by this defeat.^ "
In 16459 before attempting to recover their losses, the Portuguese
at last received re-inforcements from outside, ' The first relief column
which had attempted to reach them had met with disaster. Domingos Lopes
de Sequeira had sailed from Bahia with 260 men on 8 February 1645* He had
landed on the Benguela coast at the Kikombo River mouth on April 12. and
with 100 men attempted to march overland to Massangano. Seven days after
crossing the Kuvu River he ran into an Imbangala encampment, possibly the
one which the Portuguese had driven out of Libolo in the previous year.
In the ensuing battle Sequeira and all but four of his army were killed.
Those four took the news of the encounter back to the coast where Francisco
de Lotto Iiaior, the new governor of Angola, had meanwhile arrived with a
second re-inforcement of 300 men. From the fort which he built on the Kikombo,
Lotto Kaior moved up the coast in October 1645. At Cabo Ledo he landed and
marched through the Longa country to the Kwanza River, avoiding the fort
which the Dutch had built to bar the entry to the river mouth. He then
2
went up the river to take command of Massangano.
The main task which the new governor set himself in 1646 was to attack 
Nzinga. She had been raiding the Ndongo territories of Ngola ^ yre and it
■^ Cadornega, I, 349-555.
2
B.N.K, Ms 8.187 Relates Mss de Portugal desde 0 anno 1641 ate I646.
FIs 6l-65v and 57-60v. Brasio IX, 332-344 and 398-411.
was feared that she might gain Dutch support to destroy the fort of 
Mbaka, the Portuguese stronghold in Ndongo. Bartholemeu de Vasconcelos 
da Cunha led the Portuguese troops, Ngola Ayre commanded the Ndongo 
army and Amusungu supported them with the Kabuku troops. Soon after they 
had forded the Dande, they were attacked by Nzinga Amona, Ngola Kanini 
and a few Dutch soldiers. Nzinga’s army, although well equipped with 
guns supplied by the Dutch, was unable to resist the Portuguese who drove 
it back and entered the Queen’s compound. They captured the Ndembu chief 
Kakulu ICahenda and for the second time made a prisoner of Nzinga’s sister 
Makambw, or Lady Barbara as Cadornega called her. Their main disappointment 
was that all Portuguese prisoners of war had previously been transferred 
to the Ndembu Kiteshi ka Ndambi. Among Nzinga’s papers the victors 
found a letter from Garcia II of Kongo congratulating Nzinga on her pre­
vious victory over the Portuguese. They also found intelligence reports 
on all the Portuguese activities sent by Nzinga’s younger sister Kifunji 
(Lady Grace) who had been a captive for many years first in Luanda and 
then in Massangano. Although the battle was an important victory for the 
Portuguese, some of them were realistic enough to realise that their suc­
cess had been to some extent due to the support of Ngola Ayre and that if 
ever Nzinga ceased to threaten his right to the Ndongo throne, he would 
have little interest in supporting the Portuguese in their campaigns.'*'
While these wars were^oing on^the power of Kasanje was growing on
■'■Cadornega, I, 404-428.
the Kwango. The new state nay still have been more like an army than 
a kingdom, but it was becoming rooted in Its definitive location. In 
1645 or 1646, when the Portuguese felt their plight to be desperate, 
they sent J0S.0 Pinh&o on an embassy to Kasanje to ask for help in fighting 
Nzinga. There is no direct evidence as to who the ruler of Kasanje was 
at this time, but it may have been either Kasanje ka Kulashingo who pro­
bably became king of Kasanje in the early 1630’s, or Kalunga ka Kilombo 
who was killed in 1655 by the third of old Kasanje’s successors.^ In 
return for the military assistance which he would give the Portuguese 
in fighting Queen Nzinga, the ruler who received the embassy was offered 
the title of Gola Ambole or Kiambole, that is Captain General in the army 
of His Most Faithful Majesty the King of Portugal. The king of Kasanje 
accepted the proposed alliance and became a firm ally of the Portuguese.
This alliance survived, through mutual economic advantages, for several 
generations.^
By 1646 the Dutch were seriously worried by the continued presence 
of the Portuguese in Massangano. Previously they had considered them only 
a minor military threat and a major commercial asset. When the Portuguese 
smuggled a large army of re-inforcements up the Kwanza, defeated Nzinga, 
and made an alliance with Kasanje, the Dutch came round to the opinion 
of Kongo and Matamba that the presence of any Portuguese in the interior
^Neves, op.cit., 108. Carvalho: Cassangce, 33. Cavazzi-Labat, IV, 374-398*
More details about the rulers of the kingdom of Kasanje will be found later
in this chapter.
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was dangerous. They began to prepare for the suppression of Massangano.
The Portuguese meanwhile were in disarray. The governor, Sotto Maior, 
had died in mid-1646 and three interim governors had been elected in 
his place. The Dutch roundly defeated a Portuguese army with a disunited 
leadership on the western side of the Lukala not far from Massangano.
The Portuguese recovered some ground in a later skirmish near Kushima, 
but their position was still serious. To make matters worse, Nzinga, 
with the support of 500 Dutch soldiers, las planning an attack to recapture 
her sister Kifunji. Nzinga also gained the support of several Mbundu chiefs 
who considered her the rightful ruler of Ndongo and opposed the Portuguese 
and their nominees. The battle was fought on the north side of the Lukala. 
G.-.spar Borges and Kabuku were defeated and the Portuguese survivors with­
drew rapidly to defend Massangano. An order was given for all canoes on 
the lower Lukala to be broken up to prevent the enemy from crossing the 
river. To make sure that Nzinga would not recapture her sister the princess 
ICifunji was drowned in the Kwanza. This also ensured that she did not 
give treasonable support to the enemy.
The attack was not pressed home immediately. A new Dutch army was 
prepared in the middle of 1648 to try finally to solve the problem of 
Massangano. The Portuguese suffered their third consecutive rout and Dorn 
Francisco, son of Ngola Ayre, was killed in the battle. The Kongo-Matamba- 
Dutch alliance would probably have overcome the last of the Portuguese re­
sistance at this time if it had not been for the arrival of fresh Portuguese
support. On 12 August 1648 Salvador Correia de Sa e Benavides appeared 
off Luanda and by 24 August he had recaptured the city for the Portu­
guese. The small colony at Massangano had held on just long enough.-*- 
Vhen Salvador Correia arrived, he found the Butch almost as ill 
prepared for an attack from the sea as the Portuguese had been in 1641.
Over 200 Butch soldiers were up-country helping Nzinga in her effort to 
destroy Massangano. The Butch in Luanda were further weakened by the 
flight of their two main ships with fifty soldiers on board. On the 
other hand it was the Butch who had been victorious in the battle on the 
Lukala and they were more likely to receive support from the interior 
than were the invaders. The fact that despite this potential advantage,
the Butch commander surrendered with little more resistance than the Portu-
2
guese had offered seven years before, is something of a mystery.
With Luanda recovered, the main tasks facing the Portuguese were 
to consolidate their hold on the area of central Angola which they had 
once conquered and to negotiate or fight out settlements with the surround­
ing states. These tasks occupied them during the thirty years following 
the spectacular arrival of Salvador Correia. It is a period Of Angolan 
history which Ralph Belgado has called the fall of the black monarchies*
The Portuguese steadily increased their military domination of Angola 
at the expense of the neighbouring kingdoms. This military power was used
^Cadornegao, I, 490-528.
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not only to consolidate a political hold over their dominions, but 
also to speed up the slave trade. Later, when the chief burden of 
capturing slaves had shifted further inland, the role of the Portuguese 
and even of the Mbundu became predominantly concerned with the transport 
of goods up-country to the staples and the marching of slaves down to 
the port. In the years after the reconquest, however, direct military 
action was still an important means of supplementing the supply of 
slaves.
The Portuguese began their task of re-imposing their control on
the colony by punishing the chiefs who had helped the Dutch. Several of
these whose lands were near to Luanda had joined forces under the leader-
*
ship of Panji Ndona, reputed to be a descendant of the old Kasanje who 
had lived in the bush not far from the city. Vicente Pegado da Ponte 
was given the command of the Portuguese army which was to attack Ndona. 
Although he found the enemy well supplied with fire-arms and gun-powder 
left to them by the Dutch, they were unable to resist the new and confi­
dent Portuguese troops. Panji Ndona himself was killed and his people 
fled to the reed marshes of the Dande River where they were surrounded 
and eventually starved out.^
Prom the Portuguese point of view the defeat of Panji Ndona was a 
good beginning to the re-subjecting of the Mbundu. A more important 
issue,however, was the attitude of Kongo to the return of the Portuguese,
1Cadornega, II, 25-31.
*
Pangi Andona.
The king of Kongo had, as mentioned already, been well disposed to­
wards the Dutch, In additinn to this treasonable sentiment, he had re­
ceived a Capuchin mission which had been sent under Vatican and Spanish 
auspices and without the approval of the new monarch in Lisbon. Garcia 
II decided that he had better make his peace with the Portuguese as best 
and as quickly as he could. He did so through the intermediary of the 
Capuchin missionaries. The peace terms offered by Salvador Correia were 
severe. They. included a contribution by Kongo towards the cost of the re­
conquest of 900 basketfuls of palm cloth worth about 1,000 slaves; a
mutual defence pact; a peace treaty from which the three powerful Ndembu
■x*
chiefs, Nambu a Ngongo, Mbwila and Hutemu a Kingengo would be excluded; 
the recognition of Portuguese sovereignty south of the Dande; the cession 
of any gold mines in Kongo to Portugal, and the temporary transfer of 
Luanda Island and its nzimbu fisheries to the Portuguese as a guarantee 
for the supposed mines. This last provision concerning the gold mines was 
deleted by J0S.0 IV who lightened the burden of the treaty before he ap­
proved it. In later years, however, the governors acted towards the kings 
of Kongo as though the treaty had been ratified in full. Minor provisions 
in the treaty concerned the exemption from river tolls of Portuguese trad­
ers, the sending of royal hostages to Luanda, an exclusion clause in the 
mutual defence pact whereby Portugal would not help Kongo in its war with 
Sonyo, and a provision allowing the building of a Portuguese fort on the
*
Motemb Aquingengo.
Congo River estuary.^-
By October 1650 Salvador Correia felt that he was in control of 
the colony and could write, perhaps a little optimisiically, to the 
king that Kongo was now subdued, Kasanje /was friendly, Ndongo remained 
loyal, Kisama had been pacified, Loango was allowing trade with the Portu­
guese, Nzinga was lying low for the time being and Benguela had been re-
2
stored to Portuguese sovereignty. The army was currently occupied in 
Libolo. There was no longer any immediate military threat to Angola, 
and the Libolo campaign had the dual function of revenging the death of 
Domingos Lopes de Sequeira and his army who were destroyed in southern 
Libolo in 1645$ and of obtaining prisoners of war for the Luanda slave 
market. The open excuse for the campaign was that the sobas and ’jagas1 
of Libolo had been molesting pombeiros and hindering the ivory and slave 
trades. The Portuguese defeated Kiteki ka Banguela and then crossed the 
Longa River into the lands of a pastoral people. They captured several 
corrals of cattle and inflicted defeats on those whom they considered 
responsible for crushing the army of 1645* The captain wanted to go fur­
ther south beyond the Kuvu to the lands of the Sumbi and the 1Quimbundus* 
or Ovimbundus, but the foot-sore army refused to follow him any farther
3
and the expedition eventually returned.
1
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Two other military expeditions were made while Salvador Correia 
was still governor. One was part of the perennial skirmish with the 
Kisama chiefs whom the Portuguese were never able to subdue and who 
constantly threatened the safety of the Kwanza River navigation. The 
other was against the powerful Ndembu chief Kbwila who had been host­
ile to the Portuguese when they were shut up in Kassangano and whs 
accused of actively supporting Uzinga in her wars, for which reasons 
he had been excluded from the peace treaty signed with his suzerain, 
the king of Kongo. He was also accused of relieving both white and 
pombeiro traders of their goods when they passed through his territories, 
and of sheltering Portuguese-owned slaves who had run away from their 
plantations. Antonio Teixeira de Mondonga marched to Mbaka where he 
recruited the support of Ngola Ayre and of several Mbundu and Imbangala 
auxiliaries as well as troops of free and slave African soldiers. They 
then marched northward across the Zenza (or upper Bengo), the Dande
and the Lifua to reach Kbwila with the tacit permissicn of Kbwila's
*
main rivals, Kiteshi ka Ndambi and Ndambi Ngonga. The attack was made 
difficult by the thick undergrowth of the southern Kongo bush and by 
the strength of Kbwila's defences. Mendong&b force was largely in­
effective and when Mbwila sent an ambassador to Luanda to ask for peace, 
the Portuguese accepted the offer and retired.^
^Cadomega, II, 55-62. 
Dombi Angonga.
During the early years of the reconquest the slave trade did not 
develop as fast as the Portuguese would have liked. In 1652 Teixeira 
de Saldanha, the chief magistrate of Luanda, wrote that the only wealth 
which Angola had was the slave trade and that it was in a very poor way. 
Obtaining s3syes by direct warfare was forbidden, officially at least, 
and buying slaves in the pombos was proving difficult and slow. Hany 
Africans had preferred dealing with the Dutch and hated the Portuguese. 
Teixeira de Saldanha was not nearly so optimistic as Salvador Correia 
had been in 1650 and said that the Kbundu country was surrounded by 
hostile and unsubdued nations, Kongo to!the north, Matamba to the east 
and the Kisama states to the south. He recommended a serious war to 
open the trade routes, to strengthen the Portuguese hold on Angola, to 
stimulate the capture of slaves and thereby increase the royal revenue 
from the slave taxes which had recently been raised from 4,000 to 7,000 
reis a head.^
Apart from the direct needs of Portuguese Brazil, a lucrative busi­
ness with the Spanish American colonies was being encouraged on the basis 
that slaves bought to work in the silver mines would be paid for in sil­
ver. Spanish ships would be welcome in Luanda on condition they came 
direct from the New world, but not if they came from metropolitan Spain 
and carried wines and European goods which would merely compete with Portu' 
guese produce. Despite this policy a certain amount of Spanish wine does
^Teixeira de Saldanha, 15*7.1652. A.H.U. ngola Cx 4*
seem to have found its way to Angola and was placed high on the list 
of desirable trade goods. In return for good wine chiefs could some­
times be persuaded to sell even their own domestic slaves.
The inadequacy of the slave supply deplored by Teixeira de Saldanha 
demonstrated once again that it was almost impossible to conduct the 
trade satisfactorily without the help of one, and preferably more than 
one, powerful African state. One of the chief reasons for the sluggish­
ness of business was probably the withdrawal into the interior of Queen 
Nzinga. After flier- failure of her ambitious scheme to oust the Portuguese, 
recapture Ndongo, dominate the whole Mbundu territory, aid establish the 
Dutch as the major commercial power in Angola, Nzinga retreated from the 
Dande to I-Iatamba and apparently kept quiet for several years. In March 
1652 Rodrigo de Miranda Henriques arrived with new military supplies of 
men and materials to take over the government from Salvador Correia. He 
had instructions to get the colony moving again, to increase the trade, 
and to start levying the old annual slave tribute which all Mbundu chiefs 
under Portuguese domination were forced to pay to the Portuguese crown.
Henriques died barely a year after his arrival in Luanda and so 
achieved little. In his place Bartholemeu de Vasconcelos da Cunha was 
once again elected acting governor and it was he who began to open up 
the trade and made the first, very indirect, contact with Nzinga. It 
was reported in Luanda that Kabuku Kandonga, the main Portuguese ally, had 
been negotiating with Nzinga. Diogo Gomes Moralles was sent to Mbaka to
investigate the rumour. If it were true he was to attack Kabuku and 
capture the maximum number of prisoners. Moralles called Kabuku and 
his chiefs to a conference in Kbaka. They all came except Kalandula 
who made an excuse to stay away. Kabuku ms accused of treason and he 
and his companions were imprisoned and sent to Luanda. The Portuguese 
then attacked his kilombo and captured a number of his subjects. Kalan­
dula, however, was warned in advance and escaped to Matamba with his 
followers. According to Chicorrp,a later governor, Kabuku was sent to 
Brazil, but Cadornega says that he was allowed to return to I-Ibaka and 
lead his army in the Portuguese cause.^
The Portuguese were anxious to make contact with Nzinga and open 
a trade route to Matamba. Nzinga was undoubtedly equally keen to trade 
and would do so with the Portuguese if no other buyer were available.
She also wanted to obtain the return of her surviving sister MeUcambu (or 
Barbara) who was still a prisoner of war. Negotiations opened with the 
arrival of the new governor, Luis Mendes de Souza Chicorro, in October 
1654. Chicorro had explicit instructions from the king that he was not 
to embark on any war unless there was a genuine cause involving some 
new crime such as interfering ifith traders or missionaries. The king
did not subscribe to Teixeira de Saldanha1 s view that a war on Matamba
2
was necessary to extend and protect the trade. Soon after Chicorro
^Cadornega, II, 75-78. Chicorro, 17.2.1655 quoted by M. Delgado in 
Cadornega II, 498, Note 50.
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arrived Nzinga sent him a present of slaves and an embassy. The
governor accepted the offer of peace negotiations and sent Manuel
2Peixoto to the Matamba capital. Nzinga1s response was to write to 
the governor on 13 December 1655- She offered, in return for a peace 
settlement and the release of her sister, to open trade fairs on the 
border of the Portuguese dominions and to send a powerful army to 
help the governor conquer Kisama, a feat which no previous governor 
had managed to achieve. She also promised to give up the 'jaga' customs 
used in her war camp, especially the killing of new born children, and 
to adopt a settled way of life. Her subjects would increase and work 
on the land instead of being a recruited band of foreign mercenaries 
and conquered peoples. She finally agreed to the envoy's request that
3
Kabuku's sub-chief Kalandula should be sent back to the Portuguese.
Strongly divergent opinions were expressed about the advisability 
of accepting sudi terms or of negotiating with Nzinga at all. The Luanda 
municipal chamber were resolutely opposed to releasing Princess Mttkambu 
and allowing her to return to Matamba. The councillors reminded Chicorro 
of the harm which her brother Ngola Mbandi had done to the slave trade 
in the 1620's and of the bitter hatred for the Portuguese which her sister
^Cadornega II, 82.
^Chicorro to King 17.9.1655* A.H.U. Angola Cx 4*
Nzinga to Chicorro, Matamba 13*12.1655 (Copy by Bento Baptista)
A.H.U. Angola Cx 4*
Nzinga had always expressed. They also felt that any encouragement
to Nzinga would he harmful to the faithful ally Ngola Ayre who should
be considered the rightful ruler of Ndongo.^* The Overseas Council in
Lisbon, on the other hand, tool: the view that the security of the
colony would best be guaranteed by peace settlements with the most
powerful surrounding kingdoms. They therefore approved Chicorro's action
in negotiating with IJzinga on the basis of the return of her sister 
2
KuVrambu* On 12 October 1656 the peace treaty was signed at the court
of Matamba. The main provisions concerned the establishment of a Capuchin
mission in Matamba, a guarantee that Nzinga would help in Portuguese wars,
the free flow of trade and the handing over or at least expulsion from
Matamba of Kalandula. Nzinga also agreed to pay a ransom of 130 slaves
for her sister Mftfcambu. Two days later Chicorro wrote to the king that
4ninety-nine of the ransom slaves had already been paid.
while Chicorro had been negotiating with Nzinga on the eastern frontier, 
he had also been conducting one of the series of indecisive Kisama cam­
paigns. The Municipal Council had originally recommended such a campaign, 
but when it dragged on they petitioned for a withdrawal on the grounds
1
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that Luanda was being left dangerously open to the possibility of
a renewed Dutch attack.1 On 28 July 1656 they complained to the king
that Chicorro was wasting resources by keeping the largest army that
had been seen in recent years, 400 Portuguese and 16,000 African troops,
2
fruitlessly engaged in Kisama. Although the Portuguese had the sup-
*
port of Ifgola Ayre, the forces of Kafushe, Kimbambala and Mulumba a 
Kambolo^ were too strong for them. They also had to fight a ’jaga' 
army equipped with powerful long-bows which had come up from south of 
the Longa River. After the exceptionally long spell of one and a half 
years on the field, Chicorro recalled his army. He decided to concen­
trate his attention on the third of Angola’s frontiers, that with Kongo 
3in the north.
During the government of Chicorro the strained relations between 
Kongo and Luanda resulted in the outbreak of intermittent warfare which 
continued for ten years until the great battle of Mbwila in 1665. The 
peace settlement between Garcia II and Salvador Correia had settled none 
of the fundamental problems. These were that Kongo would not tolerate 
any infringement of her sovereignty by Europeans and that she preferred 
to trade with the Dutch rather than the Portuguese. The Dutch won trade 
from their rivals by commercial means, paying better prices and using
^Citizens petition to Chicorro and his reply, 30.3.1656. A.H.U. Angola Cx 4. 
2
Camara to King, 28.7.1656. Cx. 4.
■^Cadornega, II, 87-127.
* IQuibambala. ” Mulumba Acambolo.
better quality goods, whereas the Portuguese gained trade by military
means, imposing a monopoly and trying to exclude competition. The
peace settlement had merely avoided an immediate conflict between Kongo
and the Portuguese in 1648 and ensured that the Capuchin Mission,
which was largely instrumental in the negotiations, would be permitted
to stay in Vest-Central Africa although its establishment had not been
previously authorised by the Portuguese.
In the tension resulting from the conflict of interests between Kongo
and the colony, Chicorro complained that Garcia II was breaking the treaty
by stopping traders from entering Kongo, by imposing river tolls from
which Portuguese subjects should have been exempted, and by welcoming
runaway slaves, particularly ones who could help him in his conflict
with Sonyo. Chicorro also maintained that Garcia II was trying to kill
the duke of Kpemba who claimed to have a better right to the throne and ■
had asked for Portuguese support.1 Vhen these complaints were presented
to the Portuguese King, Jo&o IV, he advised caution in declaring war
on Kongo but agreed that such a course might be necessary if the leading
2citizens and missionaries of Luanda advocated it. • A council of war
in Luanda decided in favour of a war but apparently without the concurrence
3
of the missionaries. The army probably set out in the dry season of 1657,
1Cadornega II, 131-132.
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JoSo had died on 6.11.1656.
and attacked a small southern Kongo chief called the Marquis of
Hbumbi between the Dande and Loje rivers, Kbumbi was defeated and
driven north of the Loje into Mbanba. The captain wanted to follow
but his men feared to cross the Loje, claiming that white men who did
so never returned,^ The army was forced to withdraw to the Angola border
and soon afterwards Chicorro was replaced by Vieiawho arrived to take
up the government on 18 April 1658.
Khile the Portuguese were dealing with the threats of neighbouring
states, they were tending to overlook a serious danger in the centre of
Angola. This was the discontent in Ndongo. In 1653 Ngola Ayre wrote
to Jo&o IV asking for military help to repel Nzinga who was threatening
to invade Ndongo. He also complained of his treatment by the Portuguese.
He had become, he said, a king in name only. Antonio de Teixeira de
Mendon^a had stolen as many as 10,000 of the Ngola1 s subjects to make
them work on his estates. This wg,s most unjust treatment for a ruler
who had helped the Portuguese loyally throughout the Dutch occupation.
Hewas also continually being bullied into supplying carriers to head-load
trade goods up to the pombos. which was a very hard duty to impose on an 
2
ally. The Overseas Council in Lisbon reviewed Ayre's complaint and 
decided that the Ngola1 s subjects should be returned to him, that a proper
^Cadornega II, 133-134.
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price be paid for carriers who were recruited in his jurisdiction,
and that military assistance should be supplied when Nzinga threatened
Ndongo. The king accepted the first two points but refused to sanction
military aid for Ngola Ayre in his struggle with Queen Nzinga.^ * The
provision relating to the return of Ndongo subjects was later reversed
by the Queen Regent in 1661 when Mendon^a’s widow complained that her
2
slaves were being taken away by Ndongo.
In or about 1658 Serafim de Cortona wrote a report on the state 
of the Angola missions and found Ndongo in a lamentable condition. He 
estimated that three-quarters of the country became uninhabited when 
Nzinga was driven out. Those Mbundu who remained were seriously oppressed 
owing to the fact that they lived on the main routes to the trade centres 
of Kasanje and Matamba. The kingdom had suffered badly from drought 
and disease and the Capuchin father wasedistressed to find numerous 
life-sized statues built to protect the country from these scourges.
At the capital of Pungu a Ndongo he found no sign of missionary influence 
but on the contrary plentiful evidence of human sacrifices and other signs 
of the political and social decay in Ndongo. In contrast to this he re­
ported that missionary work was proceeding well in the flourishing trade
3
centres of Matamba and Kasanje.
^Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino 24.4.1654. King’s comment 16.6.1654.
Cx 5.
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^Letter from t'erafim de Cortona, n.d. arrived in Lisbon by December 1658.
On 25.1.1659 the Overseas Council authorised the sending of six more 
missionaries.
JoS.o Fernandes Viera, the new governor of Angola who took over 
in 1658, and his successor, Andre Vidal de Negreiros, were Portuguese 
from Brasil who were appointed to the governorship of Angola in payment 
for their services in the war against the Dutchin Brazil. They were
r
perhaps even more blatant than other governors in aiming to make the 
maximum profit from their period of office. This ambition brought them 
into conflict with the settled residents of Luanda who wished to place 
their prosperity on a more long-term basis. The governors xfere in favour 
of direct military action and of sending their appointees into the in­
terior to obtain slaves by force, or purchase them at whatever prices 
they found expedient. The residents on the other hand were anxious to 
avoid military disturbances and wished to cultivate the trade by keeping 
prices down and avoiding competition between themselves. In this conflict 
official policy was on the side of the settlers. The maximum profit would 
be got out of the African colonies if slaves were bought cheaply even 
though rather more slowly. The governors’ anxiety to make their profit 
in three to four years meant that they acted against official rulings 
that white men should not enter the interior and visit the trading states 
and that wars should not be fought except for sound military and political 
reasons. Since the governor was the man with authority on the spot, his 
orders were normally obeyed and he rarely had to account for his actions 
until after he had left the colony.
Viera conducted three campaigns during his term of office, probably
during the three dry seasons. His first attack, against a chief called
Ngoleme a Kaita, was a full scale military offensive with 400 white
troops and the armies of Ngola Ayre and Kabuku. The area overrun was
quite close to Luanda on the Bengo and Dande rivers.^ " . Viera was later
accused of having destroyed the subject chiefdom of Ngoleme, and of having
2
sent its inhabitants to work on his own private sugar estates in Brazil.
*
Vier's second campaign was against the Ndembuchiefs, Ndambi Ngonga
and Kiteshi Kandanbi, after the Municipal Council had petitioned him in
April 1659 to do something to prevent their slaves running away to south-
3ern Kongo from which they could not be retrieved. There was a great deal 
of fighting without obvious outcome during this campaign. It can, however, 
be reliably assumed that a considerable number of the black contestants
4
eventually found themselves in the new World.
Vieids third campaign turned to the south and the open spaces of 
Libolo and Hako, between the Ovimbundu highlands and Ndongo. The flow of 
trade from a southerly or south-easterly direction was apparently increas­
ing in importance at this time either from the Ovimbundu states or from 
further east, beyond the upper reaches of the Kwanza. The importance of
^Cadornega II, 141-149.
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both slaves and ivory from these sources was stressed by Cadornega.
Viera sent his army to try to increase the security of the routes in 
that direction which were subject to attacks by roving Imbangala armies 
as well as by the local Libolo chiefs. The attempt was not successful 
however and the Portuguese army was heavily defeateddeep in the Hako 
country.^ For a time the affairs of the country south of the Kwanza 
were left to one side as almost insoluble, at least as far as the Portu­
guese ambition to impose control on the area was concerned. NegreirQs
2
arrived in the Spring of 1661 to replace Viera and he devoted nearly 
all his attenticn to the affairs of Kongo.
Relations with Kongo were still strained, in contrast to the friendly 
contacts which had been established with other states. Cadornega sug­
gests that Garcia II had been trying to improve them by returning to 
their owners most of the slaves who had escaped from Luanda and gone to 
Kongo. At about the time of Negreiros1 arrived, however, Garcia II was 
replaced on the Kongo throne by Antonio I Mani Mulaza, the first king of 
a new Kulaza dynasty which replaced the old lines of Nzinga Mvemba and 
Lukeni lua Hvemba.^ It is not clear what activities Negreiros undertook 
in 1662, but in 1663 he became involved in a Ndembu war which led his army
^Cadornega II, 157-160.
Si. Delgado suggests on 10.5.1661. ^Cadornega II, 181.
^Cadornega II, 204. Jadin, op.cit., 30-31. Van Wing, op.cit.. 33-36.
Into Kongo.
In August 1665 Kakulo Kahenda had died and his chiefdom had been
claimed by Dom Francisco Cheques and by Dom Francisco Joannes. Nambu
*
a Ngongo and Ngombe a Mushama recognised Joannes whom they said had
been rightfully elected successor. Antonio I later recognised him also.
The Portuguese on the other hand had backed Cheques, partly it may be
suspected, because Negreiros wanted to become involved in a war. In
October he obtained the approbation of the Jesuits, Carmelites and Francis'
cans who certified that a war against Nambu a Ngongo would be just.^ The
governor's version of the story was that he defeated Joannes and had him
deported to Brazil. He then established Cheques as the rightful heir to
the chiefdom of Kabulo Kahenda. In doing this he had removed the danger
of a war on the fringes of Portuguese territory which could have been
2
dangerous to Luanda itself. BulhSo wrote a report on the campaign in
which he saw things differently. He complained bitterly about wars which
neither spread the faith nor re-inforced the authority of the Portuguese
crown. The chief result of the campgin which he noted was the capture of
2,000 slaves of whom 500 were alotted to the governor and his captain
major, while the rest were distributed among the European and African 
3
troops.
^Public Enquiry into the Namboangongo War. 4.3.1664. A.H.U. Angola, Cx 6.
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Negreiros to the King justifying the war. 30.4.1664. A.H.U. Angola, Cx 6.
■7
'"Report by BulhSo on post-Dutch governors’ activities. 16.5.1664. 
ligombe Amuchama.
After this success against the Ildemhu, Negreiros planned an attack
on the kingdom of Kongo itself. The excuse for hostilities was that
Antonio I refused to hand over the gold mines which his predecessor had
promised to the Portuguese in the peace treaty which he had signed with
Salvador Correia. The fact that the clause concerning the supposed mines
had been deleted from the treaty by Jo&o IV does not seem to have been
taken into consideration.^ These mines were supposed to be in or near
the Province of Wandu, a part of south-east Kongo over which the king had
little control. Antonio I sent his army into Wanda from which the ruler
fled asking the Portuguese for help in reasserting his rights. This gave
Negreiros a good cause to support. In addition he felt able to go to war
against Kongo on the grounds that once Antonio had invaded Wandu, the
Portuguese fort at Kbaka was in danger. The outbreak of war was delayed
fraa1664 to 1665 while the officials in Luanda waited to see if a threatened
Castillian attack on Luanda materialised. It did not, and eventually the
2
campaign could begin.
Luis Lopes de Sequeira was chosen as commander of the force. He had 
200 Portuguese troops, 150 Portuguese settlers from the city and inland 
posts, 100 African musketeers and 3,000 bowmen. The location of the cam­
paign was in Mbwila where the Portuguese wished to protect Dona Izabel, 
the queen-regent, from Antonio I who threatened to follow up his invasion
A^rquivos de Angola. Ser II, Vol. II, 172 and 187. 
2
Cadornega II, 204 and notes 56 and 57.
of Wandu with an attack on the adjacent Mbwila. The gold mines were 
believed to lie between the two. Both the Portuguese and Kongo claimed 
the suzerainty over Kbwila. The Kongo force was said to comprise 100,000 
men including 190 musketeers and 29 Portuguese settlers who served on 
the Kongo side under the command of Pedro Bias de Cabra, a mulatto captain. 
Early on the morning of 29 October 1665 the Mbwila force which was loyal 
to Izabel, joined up with the Portuguese. At dawn on the same day the 
Kongo army attacked. The assault came in several waves, the last of which 
was led by the king himself. It was of such force that some, if not most, 
of the African auxiliaries on the Portuguese side deserted. The remainder 
of the force was able, however, to use their guns to great effect despite 
the heavy rain which Antonio had relied upon to make gunpowder unusable.
The Kongo king was wounded, captured and decapitated. The battle ended 
after eight hours fighting with the death of many of the leading Kongo 
noblemen. Owing to the desertion of part of the guerra preta, the 
Portuguese were only able to make a disappointing number of captives from 
which to add commercial profit to the glories of victory.^
The king's head was pickled and taken to Luanda as a trophy together 
with his crown and sceptre. The Kongo monarchy had suffered a defeat from 
which it never truly recovered. The result was not that the Portuguese 
gained control of the country - far from it - but that no one else was in 
full control of it either. Kongo was no longer 'a serious threat to the
Relaj&o da mais gloriosa e admiravel victoria que alcan^ar&o as armas de 
el Rey D. Affonso VI neste Reino.de Angola contra el Rey de Congo governando 
o Senhor Andre Vidal de Negreiros. B.M. Add Mss 20953> fls 227-229. Ed.
C. R. Boxer. Huseu de Angola I960 No. 2.
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Portugese domains in the Mbundu country, nor could it any longer be 
reckoned a potential strong ally for Portugal's European rivals in 
Africa. In addition to this, although the victors of Mbwila may not have 
been fully aware of the fact, Kongo was probably a better field for slave 
recruiting when disorganised than when united under a strong monarch.
The relationship between Kongo and Angola after 1665 was in some ways 
the reverse of what it had been one hundred and fifty years earlier. In 
the sixteenth century Kongo had been a strong unified kingdom which had 
raided for slaves among the disunited petty states of the Mbundu. In 
the latter part of the seventeenth century^ Lt was Angola which was united 
and comparatively strong under a colonial administration. Kongo on the 
other hand was breaking up among several rival claimants to the throne 
and a number of autonomous or semi-autonomous small states. The oppor­
tunities for slave trafficking among disorganised, disunited states had 
thus shifted from the Mbundu to Kongo.'*'
When the threat of Kongo had been removed, the Portuguese in Angola 
were still faced with three important Mbundu and Imbangala kingdoms, Ndongo, 
Matamba and Kasanje. The most dangerous of these in the past had been 
Matamba and the powerful armies of Queen Nzinga. Since the signing of 
the peace treaty between Nzinga and Souza Chicorro in 1656, however, re­
lations between Nzinga and the Portuguese had been cordial. When the Queen's 
sister and heir, Mukambu or Barbara, arrived back in Ma/fcamba from captivity,
For a summary of the history of Kongo after the battle of Ambuila see 
L. Jadin: U af Rome 1961. Extract from the Bull, de
l'Inst. Beige de Rome.
Nzinga had wanted to marry her to the Mani Lumbo, Ngola Kanini, who 
also had a good claim to succeed Nzinga on the throne of Matamba. The 
Capuchins forbade this, however, on the grounds that Kanini had contracted 
a Christian marriage already at the time when he was chief of the Hbaka 
region. Kakamba therefore had to marry another of the powerful leaders 
of the kingdom, Nzinga Aznona, the captain-general of the army.^ *
Under the terms of the treaty, Nzinga was under obligation, once 
Mekamba had returned to Matamba, to hand Kalandula over to the Portuguese 
together with the 1,000 soldiers who had fled with him to Matamba. It was 
rumoured that the queen asked him to leave her lands quietly before she 
was forced to take action. Kalandula refused to move however and pre­
pared to defend himself. Nzinga therefore attacked and although some of 
Kalandula1s people escaped, Kalandula himself was killed and 1,500 prisoners 
were captured. This campaign probably took place from December 1657 to 
March 1653.^
On 17 December 1665 Queen Nzinga eventually died at the reputed age
3
of 81 years. In electing a successor her followers passed over the claims 
of Ngola Kanini and, possibly out of fear of the army, chose the captain- 
general, Nzinga Amona, and his wife Kakamba as sovereigns. Amona immediately
1
Cavazzi-Labat, V, 146-151.
2Cavazzi-Labat, V, 165-170.
3
Cavazzi-Labat, IV, 297.
began to consolidate M s  hold by executing potential rivals, but Ngola
1
Kanini managed to flee the country. The new king’s greatest problem
was the authority of the Portuguese captain-major at the court of Matamba.
The capital of Matamba was growing as an important trade centre. It had
a small resident colony of pombeiros who negotiated for slaves and ivory
on behalf of their masters in Luanda. Tqfceep a watchful eye on trading,
the governor appointed a Portuguese captain to act as peace-keeper and
chief justice. His position was invidious, however, in that he was at
one and the same tine responsible for defending Portuguese interests and
for impartially settling disputes. When there was a disagreement over the
relative prices of cloth and slaves, the captain decided the issue and,
if necessary referred the matter to the king for actinn to be taken. The
captain also had to ensure that no buyer paid more than the authorised
2
rate for slaves, and had the authority to punish offending pombeiros.
This partial diminution of sovereignty through the powerful authority 
vested in the Portuguese captain was obviously irksome to Nzinga Amona.
He did not oppose it strongly while Mufcamba was alive, but when she died 
on 24 March 1666, his hostility to foreigners became open and he began to 
persecute the missionaries. This growing opposition to their presence 
in Matamba, made the Portuguese willing to support any other ruler who
1Cadornega, II, 219-223.
2
Cadornega, II, 257*
■^Cavazzi-Labat, IV, 543. (Cavazzi 607) ?.
might replace Nzinga Amona and prove more amenable to their wishes. A 
first challenge, from the Ayre dynasty which the Portuguese had installed 
and maintained in Mongo, came to nothing when Ngola Ayre’s son, Diogo, 
was defeated and killed by Nzinga Amona while he was ostensibly on a 
hunting expedition to the Kindonga Islands.^ A second challenge to Amona’s 
authority came from Ngola Kanini. Kanini was supported by several Matamba 
notables who invited him to expel the ’tyrant’. The enterprise was suc­
cessful and Amona fled but was not defeated, A civil war followed in which 
the Portuguese backed Kanini who, with the help of Antonio de Figueiredo
de Souza and some white troops, was firmly placed in control of Matamba
2
while Nzinga Amona went into exile,
Ngola Kanini did not survive long on the Matamba throne. At his 
death, probably between 1667 and 1670, the electors chose Pom Luis as 
king. He was selected for his soldiering ability, but he proved unable 
to resist an attack from Nzinga Amona despite the Portuguese support which 
he commanded. Amona regained control of Matamba, killing several Portu-
3
guese soldiers in the process. Among the chiefs who opposed the return 
of Nzinga Amona was one called Dom Francisco Gutterres who was favoured 
by the Portuguese. He claimed to be a son of Ngola Kanini, whose Europ­
ean name had been Jo&o Gutterres, The Portuguese recognised him as king
Cadornega II, 250-251.
2
Cadornega II, 255-256. 
'’Cadornega, II, 295-297.
of I-Iatamba. There apparently followed a war between this Ngola Kanini 
and Nzinga Amona. Probably in about 1672 or 1673 the Portuguese set 
out to enforce Ngola Kanini's claim and called for the assistance of 
their ally Kabuku to deal with Nzinga Amona. Amona was finally caught 
and killed, leaving Ngola Kanini II as sole claimant to Nzinga1s con­
quest state of Matamba. The Portuguese had thus, after several years 
of spasmodic civil var, succeeded in imposing a king of their choice on 
Matamba just as they had put Ngola Ayre on the throne of Ndongo in the 
previous generation. They did not hav e the same leverage on Matamba how­
ever and their influence only survived while it was mutually beneficial. 
Ngola Kanini II accepted the presence of a Portuguese captain as being 
good for trade, and apparently received Gaspar dos Reis as the representa­
tive of Ayres de Soldanha who became govemorin 1676. He still maintained 
his freedom of action however and not long after this felt strong enough 
to reject the Portuguese economic domination at his court altogether.'*'
While the struggle for control of Matamba which underlay these suc­
cession disputes was being fought, there had also been trouble in Ndongo. 
Ngola Ayre had died about 1664 and been succeeded by a son called Dom 
JoSo or Ngola Ayre II. This new Ngola proved as hostile to Portuguese tute­
lage as Nzinga Amona had been in Matamba. The two rulers were also hostile 
to each other, both claiming the rightful sovereignty over all the Mbundu 
both eastern in Matamba and western in Ndongo. Ayre II began his reign by 
asserting his independence of action and attacking Ngoleme a Kakombe, a
Cadornega, II, 313, 354-355, 378 and 402 ff.
chief who controlled the trade route to Hako and the south-east. His 
father had once been reprimanded by the Portuguese for attempting to 
extend his authority in that direction, but Ayre II proceeded regardless 
of Portuguese interests and defeated and killed Ngoleme a Kakombe.^* In 
an even more direct afront to the colonial authorities, the new Ngola 
sent a brother to attack the soba Dumbo Apebo in the reginn of Mbaka.
The Luanda council which, in the temporary absence of a governor, admini­
stered the colony from February 1667 to August 1669, sent an army led by 
Jo&o Soares de Almeida to defend the soba and to order the Ngola to place
his army under the Portuguese banner. The Ngola refused and prepared to
2
resist any Portuguese encroachment on Ndongo.
"in the rock fortress of Pungu a Ndongo, Ngola Ayre thought himself 
to be invincible and freely flouted the Portuguese. He raided caravans 
on the route to Kasanje and welcomed Mbundu who had escaped from Portuguese 
slavery. He so interfered with the free movement of trade that the colon­
ial authorities finally decided that it was essential to re-conquer Ndongo. 
They also feared that the Ngola would recruit sufficient support success­
fully to attack Mbaka and reimpose independent Mbundu royal authority over 
the whole kingdom. Luis Lopes de Sequeira was chosen to lead the assault
on P ngu a Ndongo after his success in the battle of Mbwila. In order to 
v
meet the attack, the Ngola had moved all the available food into his fortress
^Cadornega, II, 224-225. 
Cadornega, II, 245-251.
both to deprive the enemy of local supplies and to feed the Mbundu in 
the event of a long siege. The new governor, Francisco de Tavora, made 
elaborate preparations for the campaign, bringing new troops from Rio 
de Janeiro and Bahia. The besiegers suffered one early set-back when a 
IJdongo prince made a dashing sortie, scattered the guerra preta, and set 
fire to the stores and quarters. After several months, however, the be­
siegers gained entry to Pungu a Ndongo on 29 November 1671. Ayre fled 
to Libolo with his wives and sons. The town was sacked and the inhabitants 
captured. The royal fifth of the slaves caught was valued at over 700,000 
reis, which probably represented a capture of several hundreds of slaves. 
Sequeira followed up the victory by capturing Ayre II in Libolo and having 
him beheaded. His brother and con fled to Matamba where Ngola Kanini, who 
was relying on Portuguese support in his struggle with Nziga Amona, handed 
them over.'*' The son, Dom Philip, was shipped to Portugal with several
other Ndongo royalty, and the Portuguese Prince Regent ordered that he be
2
sent to the monastery of Alcobaga.
This defeat of Ngola ..yre II, or Dom JoSo as the Portuguese called 
him, marked the end of the western branch of Mbundu kingship. The monarchy 
had grown powerful with the opening of the Atlantic slave trade in the six­
teenth century. In the early seventeenth century it had split in two, one 
branch under the redoubtable Queen Nzinga moving eastward to try to escape 
from European domination and the other remaining in the west, strongly 
allied to the Portuguese. Now, in the late seventeenth century, this west-
1Cadornega II, 298-325.
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Order by the Prince Regent 9• 5.1675. A.H.U. Angola Cx 8 . Also Cadornega,
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ern kingdom had proved less acquiescent than the Portuguese had wanted 
and was therefore crushed altogether. In its place a new Portuguese fort 
was built at Pungo a Ndongo to impose direct instead of indirect authority- 
over the central areas of Ndongo. The split in the Hbundu became more 
marked as the western peoples, sometimes called Ngolas, came increasingly 
under the influence of the Portuguese while in Matamba the eastern I-lbundu, 
also known as Jingas after Queen Nzinga, maintained an independent king­
dom in which direct European authority, which had never become very strong, 
dwindled even further.
By the time Ndongo was extinguished as an independent kingdom, Kas- 
anje had grown to be one of the most powerful states in Nest Central Africa. 
Cadornega wrote a description of it in about 1680. The king was called 
the Jaga of Kasanje and was the absolute ruler of several 'jaga’ hordes 
who lived mainly by warfare. Silva a Souza, the governor of Angola from 
1680 to 1684, still described the ruler of Kasanje as the general of an 
army rather than the king of a settled state.^ This ruler dressed in rich 
clothes of silk and linen and wore expensive ornaments. Nhen he left his 
compound he was escorted by numerous courtiers and musicians carrying the 
royal double bell and other instruments. His bodyguard consisted of 
musketeers, riflemen and bowmen. Inside his compound he kept many wives, 
all of whose children had to be born outside the city limits. Although 
the bulk of the Inbangala population of Kasanje, and indeed the ruler him-
^Silva e Souza to King. 18.3.1682. A.H.U. Angola, Cx. 9.
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self, were of Kbundu origin, many Lunda customs were retained despite 
the protests of the missionaries who accompanied traders to the kingdom.
The ruler’s sons had no right to the succession which Cadornega says was 
decided by election among the most capable military leaders.*^ The tradi­
tions add that the election was complicated by the need to choose one
2
ruler from each of the three founding clans in turn.
The area under the influence of the Kasanje armies was said by Cad­
ornega to be extremely large, and the capital, he claimed, had a population 
of 500,000 although this must have been an exaggeration. The conquest 
territories stretched far up the Kwanza and Kwango rivers towards the 
Ovinbundu states and over the Ngangela province to Songo. Imbahgala 
traders knew the country to the east of the Kwango as well, although they 
never allowed Europeans to visit those regions. The Kasai was known and 
referred to as the Great Kwango since the Kwango was already believed to 
be its tributary. The Lunda state was known and Lunda traders came to 
Kasanje to buy salt in particular. They brought their palm cloth to the 
right bank of the Kwango and made smoke signals to show that they had ar­
rived and were ready to trade. The king of Kasanje was reported to have 
occasionally killed and eaten Lunda envoys but this had not stopped the 
flow of trade. Kasanje was by this time almost certainly the largest of 
the inland slave trade centres. A majority of all trade cloths and wines 
sent to Angola found their way to this 'staple1. In view of this it is
^Cadornega III, 215-221.
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curious that Cadomega makes no menticnof the Mwata Yamvo, the ruler
of the Lunda Empire, sending slaves for sale. He merely refers to salt
and European cloth being bought by the Lunda with their palm cloth.
This omission may be an oversight on Cadomega's part, but it may mean
that up until 1680 the Kasanje slave supply came predominantly if not
entirely from its own military campaigns and that .there was not yet a
slave caravan route of any great importance from the Lunda empire.^-
The order of succession of the kings of Kasanje would appear to
have been as follows. First of all, according to the Neves tradition,
Kasanje ka Kulashingo succeeded Kasanje the founder of the kingdom. The
list then gives Kalunga ka Kilombo, Ngonga-nbande and Kiluanje kia Ngonga
2
as the second, third and fourth rulers. Cavazzi reported that a king
*
called Kalunga ka Kinguri ruled in Kasanje until 1655. It would not be 
unreasonable to suppose that this was in fact the same Kalunga, and that 
ka Kinguri was merely added to show legitimate succession from Kinguri. 
Cavazzi then goes on to say that ICalunga was succeeded by a Mbundu captive 
called Ganga who had been born near Mbaka in 1608 and had risen through 
the ranks of the Kasanje army. It is tempting to suppose that this Ganga, 
who took the title Kasanje ka Kinguri and was baptised with the name Lorn 
Paschoal Machado, was the same as the Mjonga Nbande of Neves' list.
Cadomega, III, 215-221.
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Neves, op.cit.t 108.
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Calunga Conquinguri.
It was this Dom Paschoal who prospered especially from the slave 
trade which had been developing since Kasanje and the Portuguese had 
made their alliance during the Dutch occupation. Kasanje had shorn 
more success than Ndongo or Ilatamba had done in maintaining its auto­
nomy while at the same tine trading with Europeans. It did not fail 
however to attract the jealousy of rival trading kingdoms. In particular 
Ngola Kanini II, once firmly installed on the throne of Matamba, re­
jected the restrictive influence ox the Portuguese who had put him there 
and decided to challenge Dom Paschoal of Kasanje, thus breaking a tacit 
non-aggression pact which had apparently been kept in later years be­
tween Nzinga and Kasanje. Kanini's first attempt was unsuccessful. His 
army, on approaching the kilombo of Kasanje, was deterred by the three 
battalions raised in its defence. Dom Paschoal warned the king of the 
Jingas that if he wanted to expand his kingdom he would have to look 
elsewhere. As an alternative Kanini then offered Kasanje an alliance 
against the Portuguese but this was rejected as Dom Paschoal preferred 
not to endanger his profitable alliance with them.^.
In or shortly before 1680, Ngola Kanini II found a second opportunity 
to challenge the trading dominance of Kasanje when Dom Paschoal died.
The death of a king always led to serious disturbances in Kasanje. The 
roads in and out of the metropolitan area were immediately closed, both 
to prevent foreign invasion and to stop those destined to be sacrificed 
on the tomb from fleeing. At the same time nombeiros were in danger of
^Gadornega, II, 402-403.
losing; their trade goods, especially spirits, as part of the celebrations.
To try to avoid too heavy a loss, if for no other reason, the Portuguese
captain in Kasanje at the time, Antonio de Figueiredo, tried to get a
new king chosen as quickly and painlessly as possible. His choice was 
*
Eitamba a Kaita, another native of Ndongo. Although this nominee was 
accepted by some of the electors in Kasanje, it was challenged by the 
ruler of Bondo, Kingwanga. This dissenting chief was captured however 
and Kitamba a Kaita handed him over to the captain-major to be sent to 
the governor at Luanda. In fact, the chief only got as far as Figueiredo1 s 
private estates at Massangano. The challenge to the new king at Kasanje, 
who had taken the same name as his predecessor, Dom Paschoal, was main­
tained by Kingwangall who attacked pcmbelros and disrupted the trade 
route which led through his territory of Bondo to Kasanje. Saldanha, 
the governor, wrote to Dom Paschoal ordering him to punish this trouble­
some vassal and restore all the plundered trade goods. The new king at­
tempted to do so but was unable to make any headway in the conquest of 
Bondo.***
From Matamba, Ngola R'anini II grasped the opportunity to interfere 
in the affairs of Kasanje and made an alliance with Kingwanga. Together 
they exploited the dissatisfactinn of several of the Kasanje leaders. 
Towards the end of 1680 or early in 1681 they attacked Kasanje, killed 
Dom Paschoal and put Kingwanga in control of the kingdom. The conquerors 
then plundered large quantities of cloth from the oombeiros and set free
1Silva e Souza to the King, 18.3.1682. A.H.U. Angola, Cx 9.
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a number of slaves who had already been bought and paid for. As the 
most important of the Portuguese staples, Kasanje had large stores of 
trade goods which were lost. Many traders in Luanda were ruined and 
others had their working capital seriously reduced by this sack of 
Kasanje. The royal exchequer also suffered a serious loss of export 
duty."**
Kingwanga was unable to maintain his command over Kasanje, even 
if he had thought of attempting to do so. He retired to Bondo, and the 
electors chose Kinguri kia ICasanje as the next king. The chief blame for 
the sack of Kasanje was laid at the door of the Jinga king, Ngola Kanini 
II. Kinguri sent an embassy to the governor, Silva e Souza, and offered 
to provide support to any punitive expedition which might be sent against 
Matamba. The governor decided to take action for two main reasons. Firstly 
because he feared that unless he punished those responsible for stealing 
goods which had been sent on credit to the slave markets of the interior, 
there might be other outbreaks of plundering. Secondly he feared that 
the tiiole Mbundu nation might rise up against the Portuguese and adopt 
Ngola Kanini as their national leader. He therefore began raising a large 
army.
The expedition against Matamba was led by Luis Lopes de Sequeira.
His prestige iras now very great having already defeated the king of Kongo 
in open battle anddestroyed the independent power of Ndongo. His force
"^Silva e Souza to the King, 18.3.1682. A.H.U. Angola, Cx 9.
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consisted of over 500 Portuguese soldiers, many of whom were probably 
brown or even black, fifty horsemen, and an auxiliary troop estimated 
at 40,000 African bowmen. They left Kbaka on 2 August 1681 and a month 
later camped at Katole, six leagues from Kanini's capital. At dawn 
on September 4 the Matamba army attacked the expeditionary force before 
it had woken. The munitions dump was fired almost at once and the Portu­
guese were nearly defeated before they were aware of what had happened. 
Sequeira belatedly organised a token resistance and was himself killed 
fighting. His deputy decided to retire with the loss of 100 Portuguese 
lives rather than attempt an advance, and the army returned to Luanda 
soundly beaten.^- When Silva o Souza reported on the battle he claimed it 
as a victory, albeit a costly one, because, he said, Ngola Kanini II had 
been killed by a lucky shot and Portuguese honour had been avenged. Luis 
Lobo da Silva, however, reported differently on the matter. He said that 
the king of Kasanje, who had suffered as much loss as the Portuguese by 
the sack of his capital, defeated and killed Kanini II after the Portuguese
had failed to do so. Kanini II was succeeded on the throne of Matamba by
2
his sister, Dona Veronica Gutterres.
The new Jinga queen, Veronica, decided to re-establish friendly re­
lations with the Portuguese. Silva e Souza negotiated a treaty with her 
laying down in some detail the manner in which future trade between the
■^ Silva e Souza. 18.3.1682. A.H.U. Angola, Cx 9.
2
Luis Lobo da Silva. 25.11.1684. A.H.U. Angola, Cx. 10.
Portuguese and I-Iatamba should be conducted. The Queen would make sure 
that neither she nor any of her subjects impeded or delayed pombeiros 
going to her kingdom. Trade negotiations would be carried out as ex­
peditiously as possible and all trade cloth would be measured in the 
Portuguese cubit of three palms and the ell of five palms and in no other 
measure. Permission must also be given, and this was perhaps one of the 
most important provisions, allowing pombeiros to travel beyond Matamba 
to trade with the kingdoms of 'Gonso, Quiacas, Puriamujinga, Sundi (or 
Cundi), Casern (or Caseu), and Lamba'. These peoples, in so far as they 
can be identified, would appear to have been peoples of the eastern and 
north-eastern parts of Kongo. The reference to trade with the 'Quiacas' 
is especially interesting as they were almost certainly the Yaka or Jaga 
of the Kwango valley. Puriamujinga and Casern cannot be identified. The 
implication of this provision of the treaty is that the Portuguese were 
opening a new route to the slave markets of north and east Kongo which 
they had previously exploited via San Salvador and which had become in­
creasingly inaccessible owing to the hostility of :.the Ndembu and the civil 
wars in Kongo. These reserves of slaves were probably beginning to be 
tapped by non-Portuguese traders through Mpinda and Loaisgo,
There were several lesser provisions in the treaty. All debts owed 
to pombeiros who had been in Matamba should be paid off at once. Pom­
beiros who committed adultery with chiefs' wives should not be fined from 
their masters' trade goods, because chiefs encouraged their wives to commit 
these offences in order to make a profit. Instead the pombeiro should be
punished by having his ears cut off, but only if the wife had her ears 
cut off first. All run-away slaves, and more especially all captives 
who were made in the battle of Katole and the sack of Kasanje, should 
be returned to their owners at once. The Queen would also have to accept 
a Christian mission in I-Iatamba. Another provision required Matamba to 
make a contribution of 200 slaves towards the cost of the expedition 
which the colonial government had been forced to mount to punish the 
queen1s brother and predecessor. These would be paid in four annual in­
stalments of fifty slaves each. Kith regard to Kasanje, the Portuguese 
stressed that it was a completely independent kingdom and that any claims 
which Matamba might have made to its territory were false and unjust.
In future peace and friendship should be maintained between the two king­
doms *
The eighth and last paragraph of the treaty revealed a new and im­
portant facet of the slave trade east of Ndongo. It said that there was
*
a general complaint among the Portuguese that a people called the Mubires 
were trading in the kilombo of the Jinga queen. They brought forbidden 
trade goods, especially fire-arms and gun-powder from non-Portuguese 
traders who visited the Loango coast. Nona Veronica was ordered to expel 
all such Mubins from her kingdom at once and never allow any of her sub­
jects to trade with them under any circumstances. This clause of the 
treaty is interesting in that it shows that by 1683 there was a nex^  outlet 
for slaves from the region of Matamba and Kasanje which went across Kongo 
and was completely independent of Portuguese control. It also meant that
*
hubins or Mubino.
fire-arms were finding their way into African hands despite the strict 
ban on their sale imposed by the Portuguese authorities. This new route 
set the pattern for the trade struggle between the northern ports and
1
Luanda which dominated the history of Angola in the eighteenth century.
By 1684 when Jo&o de Silva e Souza handed over the government of 
Angola to Luis Lobo da Silva, the Portuguese appeared to have reached 
the peak of their authority. Kongo had been reduced to a state of chaos, 
Ndongo had been crushed and a Portuguese fort had been built on the site 
of its old capital, Matamba and Kasanje were being kept content with 
lucrative trade agreements. In the future the Portuguese needed to play 
a much less active military role in Angola. They organised the final pur­
chase and shipment of slaves, but the actual capturing passed out of 
their hands for the most part. Although they had the colony well organised 
and the supply lines were determined, the trade did not develop as easily 
as they had expected after their successful campaigns of the 1660's and 
1670's. The new problem which arose to challenge them was hinted at in 
the last clause of the Matamba treaty. It was the competition cf the Eng­
lish and the Prench who joined and then superseded the ^utch as the main
'interlopers' on a coast which the Portuguese considered to be their 
national preserve. Having overcome, as they thought, most of the African 
problems involved in the slave trade, the Portuguese now had to turn round 
and keep the Europeans out of what was becoming one of the most fruitful
and well organised slave producing regions of Africa.
^This treaty, dated 6 September 1683» is published in full in Ralph Delgado: 
Historia de Angola. IV, 70-74. A copy exists in A.H.U. Angola, Cx 10 
bearing the date 24 November 1684.
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Chapter Seven
THE DECLINE OF THE MBUNDU' SLAVE TRADE
1684 - 1790
After the Matamba peace and the Kasanje succession in 1685, the 
history of Portuguese activities in the Mbundu country becomes less 
flamboyantly military. The Mbundu resistance to European advance had 
been finally crushed. Whereas during most of the seventeenth century 
governors had embarked almost every year upon some military enterprise , 
from 1684 these exploits became less frequent and some eighteenth century 
governors never organised any Kars at all. They concerned themselves with 
municipal architecture and with litigation rather than with warfare. The 
country nonetheless remained fairly turbulent as was perhaps inevitable 
in a slave-producing colony. Moreover the area of turbulence spread in 
widening circles. Among the Mbundu Portuguese military activity was 
limited to a constant pressure on chiefs to supply carriers and labourers 
and to pay taxes. There were only very occasional punitive campaigns. In 
the Caconda region behind Benguela, on the other hand, the Portuguese were 
involved in a series of important wars in the process of conquering a 
trade route to the Dt/imbundu highlands in a manner similar to that in 
which they had conquered the Kwanza route in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.^
^3ee Chapter Three.
During the course of the eighteenth century the focal point of the 
slave supply in West Central Africa gradually moved east from the Mbundu 
country to centre on Matamba and Kasanje in the first half of the century 
and on the Lunda empire in the second half. The Mbundu country and the 
Kwanza valley changed from being a generating point to being a corridor 
through which the slaves captured during the Lunda wars of expansion 
reached the sea. At first, when the Lunda trade was only beginning, 
Kasanje was probably the most important and perhaps even the only gateway 
to the coast. In time, however, competitive routes developed, by-passing 
and eventually superseding in importance the Kasanj e-Mbundu line of com­
munication. Lunda trade began to pass to Benguela through the agency of 
the Ovimbundu and to Loango through Kongo, and later possibly also through 
Teke, channels.
In 1684 when Luis Lobo da Silva arrived in Angola as governor, he 
found the colony was in serious economic decline. Foreign ships were 
openly trading at Luanda, and the settlers were demoralised by their de­
feat in the battle of Katole.^ One cause of "trouble was the new-found 
authority of the king of Kasanje. He had proved hb strength by defeating 
Matamba where the Portuguese had failed to do so, and now treated the 
Portuguese in a high handed manner. He imposed his own commercial terms 
to the disgust of the traders. He altered the rates of exchange, put 
arbitrary limits on the flow of goods and ignored the governor's reminder
1The Provedor to the King, 7.11.1684. Cx 10.
that previous rulers of Kasanje had always seen fit to do as the Portu­
guese hid them. The king of Kasanje also refused to have a Portuguese 
captain-major at his court.
When Lobo da Silva left Angola four years later he reported that
2
trade relations with Matamba and Kasanje had much improved. His suc- 
cesor, however, D. Jo£o de Lencastre, did not find this to be the case.
The king of Kasanje had discovered that trade wines were being so badly 
adulterated that he had banned the import of wine to his kingdom altogether 
end put guards on the frontier to prevent traders from bringing it in.
This was a serious blow to the traders since wine was one of the commo­
dities most widely used for buying slaves in the late seventeenth century.
In addition to this ban on wines, the king of Kasanje continued to^ /impose 
his own prices, to the general indignation of the Portuguese who assumed 
that any indigenous ruler would accept whatever they gave him for his 
slaves. They claimed that the king’s action was fraudulent and disloyal 
and felt more urgently than ever the need for a captain at his court who 
would adjudicate in their favour. The dispute seems finally to have been 
settled in mutually agreeable terms and in 1696 Manual de Oliveira de
Figueiredo was sent to the Kasanje capital where he remained captain-
4
major for seven years.
^Luis Lobo da Silva to the King, 25.11.1684• Cx. 10. Letters from the gov­
ernor are normally addressed to the King in the first part of the eighteenth 
century and to the Secretary of State in the latter part unless anothe-r re­
cipient is indicated in the foot-note. Cx means Caixa and refers to the 
Box number in the series of Angolan papers in the Arquivo Historico Uitra- 
marino, Lisbon.
(cont.)
Kasanje1s independence of action was imitated by Veronica, the 
queen of the Jingas of Matamba* In about 1688 she attacked Kahenda, an 
important ruler in the Mbaka region, and a loyal vassal of the Portuguese. 
Kith the help of disloyal Kahenda subjects she captured the chief and 
destroyed some of his villages and crops. To avenge this insult a council 
was called in Luanda which decided that a punitive war against Matamba 
would be permitted by the royal instructions given to the governor. A 
preliminary force of 140 men was sent to Mbaka late in 1688 while other 
troops were sought from the presidios and from Brazil* Adequate support 
could not be raised, however, and the campaign never materialised. By 
October 1690 peaceful co-existence had been restored between Matamba and 
the colony.^ Prom then on trade from Matamba to Luanda seems to have 
flowed without major hindrance until the 1750's when the Portuguese caused 
a major upheaval by trying to push their supply lines further east at 
the expense of Matamba.
The Matamba attack on Kahenda was followed in 1691 by a revolt against 
Portuguese authority by the Ndembu chief Mbwila. He expelled the captain 
and other Europeans from his state, burnt down the church and requisitioned 
goods valued at 20 million reis. about the equivalent of one thousand slaves.
(cont.)
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Luis Lobo da Silva, 28.8.1688. Cx 10. 
Camara to the King. 3.8.1703. Cx 13.
3
D. J0S.0 de Lencastre to the King,
11.1.1689. Cx 10.
etteisfrom Lencastre dated 11.1.1689, 23.2.1689, 28.10.1690. Cx 10.
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He barred all roads and trade came to a standstill. The new Portuguese
governor began preparations for war.^ * A column of about 800 soldiers
with fire-arms supported by an estimated 40,000 bowmen, entered Mbwila
and put the army to flight. They did considerable material damage to
villages but were continually hampered by rains and fevers and had to 
2
retire. Mbwila continued to bother the Portuguese periodically but 
the inactive Luanda governors did not begin to take serious steps to 
deal with the menace until 40 years later.
Apart from occasional campaigns in Kisama and an alarm in 1709 dur­
ing another short war between Matamba and Kahenda, there were no import­
ant colonial wars in Angola until the 1730’s. The mainirouble which 
ruffled the life of the colony round the turn of the century was the old 
trade dispute between officials who came to Angola for a tour of duty and 
settlers who were there for life. Throughout the seventeenth century it 
had been illegal, in theory at least, for white men to trade in the in­
terior either on their own account or on behalf of anyone else. Trade 
had to be conducted through the intermediary of pombeiros. It was frequently 
the case, however, that governors used officials and army officers to trade 
for them in the back-country where their forceful methods of obtaining 
slaves disnpted the system of more or less peaceful negotiation used by
1
Gosta de Kenezes to the King, 28.11.1691. Cx 11. 
Same, 25.4.1632. Cx 11.
the pombeiros.
To combat this abuse the Luanda municipal councillors took ad­
vantage of the death in 1703 of Bernardino de Tavora, a particularly 
hated governor, and sent a petition to Lisbon. They said that for years 
the governors had been entrusting goods to people whom they called captain- 
majors and whom they sent inland to buy slaves. Each of these captains 
caused havoc in the region to which he was sent* The Mbundu chiefs became 
so exasperated by their excesses that they revolted thus giving the gov­
ernor the opportunity to use more force and gain even more slaves for his 
personal enrichment. To try to stop this method of ’trading’ the council 
issued a decree ordering all white men and mulattoes to return to the coast 
and abolished the post of captain-major except in the forts. Anyone not 
obeying within four months could be punished.^ " This ruling seems even to
have applied to the captain-major at Kasanje who arrived back in Luanda
2
after seven years in that kingdom on the Kwango.
This decree by the Municipal Council in Luanda was only a temporary 
measure and did not limit the disruptive effects of the activities of 
future governors. The case had been so strongly presented to the Overseas 
Council in Lisbon, however, that by 1721 a more radical solution was intro­
duced. A law was passed forbidding all governors from participating in 
the slave trade. They were to be compensated for this loss by a five-fold
^Qrder by the Camara, 26.1.1703. Letter to the King, 22.4.1702, Cx.13. 
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Camara to the King, 3.3.1703. Cx 13.
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increase in salary to 6 million reis per annum. Antonio de Albuquerque 
de Coelho de Carvalho, the first governor to be appointed under the 
new regulations, was worried lest the new export tax on slaves should 
not prove adequate to pay this colossal salary. He was assured however 
that in that event the balance would be paid from Bahia out of taxes im­
posed on slaves from the Hina coast of Lest Africa.'*’
During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century the total 
number of slaves exported from Angola each year seems to have been very 
small compared to the volume of the traffic in the middle of the seven­
teenth century. In 1710, one of the earliest years for which the records 
provide statistics, the total number of registered exports was only 5,549* 
Over the next twenty years the volume rose fairly steadily, as the follow­
ing table shows, but never approached the exports of 10,000 and 15,000
2
slaves per annum of a century before.
1710 5,549 1721 5,578
1711 4,158 1722 5,062
1712 4,188 1725 6,744
1715 5,617 . 1724 6,108
1714 5,581 1725 6,726
1716 - 1726 8,440
1717 - 1728 8,542
1718 6,747 1729 -
1719 6,886 1750 -
1720 7,215 1751 5,808
1
Consulta of the Lisbon Overseas Council, 12.9*1721. Cx 15*
(cont.)
In the years 1711 to 1713 the Camara complained repeatedly to the 
Overseas Council about the low level of trade and said that not enough 
ships were coming to Luanda to take away even those slaves which were 
available. Freight space to Brazil was being competitively sold at in­
flated rates to the detriment of the traders.^ One reason for the decline 
in exports from Luanda would appear to have been the growing competition 
from other parts of the coast. About 1717 the governor Henrique de Figueir­
edo complained that the non-Portuguese traders on the Loango coast were
2
chiefly responsible for reducing the Luanda trade. The growth of the Ben- 
guela trade probably also had an adverse effect on Luanda.
The Portuguese had been aware since 1683 at least that slaves from 
Matamba were being taken b^traders called Mubires to the Loango coast.
These Mubires appear to have been a Kongo people living half way between 
Loango and Matamba. During the eighteenth century the Portuguese tried 
several ways of limiting this competition by physical means. Uhat they 
hardly attempted to do was to outbid their rivals by economic competition. 
The Portuguese attitude was that they alone had a right to trade in slaves 
on the coast from Gaboon to the Namib desert. Any other nation trading 
there were pirates and should, if possible, be kept out. They were well
(cont.)
2
The slave trade figures quoted in this chapter are taken from a large 
number of documents in the A.H.U.; some are annual reports on trade by 
the governor, and some are six-yearly reports on the slaves exported 
during a particular term of the slave contract.
Consulta of the Overseas Council on a Camara petition, 21.2.1716. Cx 15.
^Henrique de Figueiredo, n.d. (c. 1717). Cx 15.
aware that the success of these fpirates1 arose from the fact that 
they paid more for slaves, and especially for ivory, and that their 
trade goods were of a better quality. It would seem, however, that 
at least in the first half of the eighteenth century the Portuguese 
did nothing to raise their prices in order to attract trade back to 
Luanda.
The main trade goods used by the pombeiros who plied through the
Mbundu country to the ponbos of Matamba and ICasanje were rock salt from
the Kisama mines, cloth, and to a lesser extent china and enamel-ware,
brought from India, tobacco and gerebita. probably a coarse rum-like
spirit, brought from Brasil, and wines, brandy, knives and European cloth
from Portugal.1 Indian goods went first to Portugal where they were made
up into lots with the inferior European produce which otherwise had little
to commend it. Metal goods such as brass basins were apparently scarce
and those used seem often to have been bought from foreigners based in
Loango. In addition to legal trade goods, it would appear that illegal
fire-arms were used in growing numbers by Portuguese caravans who smuggled
2
them out of Luanda.
In Angola the Portuguese ivory trade was very depressed. royal 
monopoly precluded free trade in ivory and only the contractor could buy 
it and then only at fixed and very low rates. The result of this was that
1The Ouvldor to the King, 20.2.1731* Cx 18. Governor, 3*6.1723* Cx 16. 
2
The Provedor da Fazenda, to the King, 7*4,1727* Cx 17*
it was not worth carrying ivory to Luanda unless it was already near 
to the coast. In addition to this four different rates applied rising 
with the size of the' tusk. This meant that even the best tusks were 
abandoned if they were under the minimum weight for each grade. Foreigners, 
on the other hand, paid much higher prices for ivory and the contractor was 
allowed to sell his ivory to foreigners on condition he did so in return 
for slaves. This was a means of acquiring more slaves for Brazil and at 
the same time saving their souls from the heretics. Figueiredo suggested 
abGut 1717 that since very few foreign ships came to Luanda, permission 
be given to traders to take ivory to the 'free coast of Loango' and sell 
it there for slaves who would otherwise be lost to the Protestant nations. 
This would increase the slave trade and at the same time stimulate ivory 
production. The crown would benefit from the export duties levied on 
ivory before it went to Loango.1
The response to Figueiredo's suggestion does not appear to have been 
favourable. During the 1720*s the ivory export from Luanda continued to 
be small, always less than one thousand tusks a year paying an export duty 
equivalent to only about 2 per cent of the slave taxes. The English con­
tinued to trade through the Mubires with the Luanda hinterland and even
2
went so far as to fortify the port of Cabinda . Small English ships visited 
the Kongo coast right down to the Dande and carried off slaves who had been
figueiredo, n.d. (c. 1717) Cx 15.
2
Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho de Carvalho, 13.6.1722 and 15.6.1722. 
King of Ngoyo to Albuquerque, n.d. (? 1722) Cx 26.
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diverted there from the Mbundu route to Luanda. Figueiredo's successor, 
Antonio de Albuquerque, suggested another way of undermining this com­
petition. He said that Brazilian tobacco was an essential item in any 
trade lot used for buying slaves. The Mubires from Loango bought their 
tobacco from the Portuguese. A ban qd. the sale of tobacco to any foreigner 
would therefore be an effective way of limiting their ability to trade.^
Sound though the idea was, the authorities had so little control over even 
their own national traders that 110 such ban could ever be effectively imposed. 
It is possible for instance that Portuguese traders obtained some of their 
vitally important fire-arms from the Loanga traders in return for tobacco.
The Lnglish sale of fire-arms and gun-powder, whether direct to Afri­
can chiefs or to Portuguese dealers, was probably the most important single
2
aspect of the Loanga trade. Officially Portuguese traders were banned 
from supplying guns to the chiefs. This was because the Portuguese had 
territorial and military stakes in Angola and did not want to increase the 
resistance which they met in their campaigns. The embargo was, however, 
being undermined by traders in Loango who had no territorial interests and 
to whom increased warfare was likely to prove, beneficial rather than other­
wise by increasing the number of captives in the market. Once guns were 
available in the interior they soon reached the hands of the Kisama peoples 
who were a serious threat to the traders using the Kwanza River trade-route.^
^Antonio de Albuquerque to the King. 12.9.1722. Cx 26.
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Paulo Caetano de Albuquerque to the King, 26,9.1727. Cx 17.
3
Rodrigo Cezar de Menezes to the King, 20.12.1754. Cx 20.
To try to limit this spread of arms Paulo Caetano issued the rather 
naive order that the cap tain-major 8 . diould confiscate all fire-arms found 
in African hands
\;hile the Portuguese were losing an increasing proportion of the
Mbundu and Kongo slave trade, they were making up their exports with slaves
from the hinterland of Benguela. A reconstruction of the historyof the
Portuguese conquest of Benguela and the plateau would be as long a study
as the history of the Portuguese penetration of the Mbundu country. By
the eighteenth century however this new colony, founded in 1617, had grown
so that its sphere of influence overlapped with the trading sphere of the
Mbundu. From the latter part of the seventeenth century onwards a series
of fierce campaigns had been fought around the presidio of Kakonda which
2had been established on the plateau edge about 1682. A growing area of 
the densely populated Ovimbundu country came under the influence of the 
Portuguese slave traders. One reason why this area had not beai penetrated 
earlier from the Kwanza valley may have been the presence of Lunda-Imbangala 
armies in Kisama and Libolo. Once this source of supply had been found by 
penetrating from the south-west, the caravans went out by two routes. One 
led to the port of Benguela whence the slaves were shipped to Luanda by 
coastal vessels. The other, which probably developed later, went northwards
^Tculo Caetano de Albuquerque to the King, 26.2.1728. Cx 17* 
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DelgadO; Historia de Angola, IV, 61.
to reach the Kwanza at a new market called Dondo between Massangano
and Cambambe. In 1729 JoSo V wrote to Paulo Caetano to ask him to
open or re-open this land route. He said that a powerful chief was
blocking it to the detriment of the slave trade. It was particularly
important to increase the trade at that time because of the great
shortage of slaves being experienced on the Hina coast,^
In 1727 the inhabitants of Luanda complained that ships were sailing
direct to Brazil from Benguela instead of calling first at Luanda. The
traders said that this trade had the major drawback that it was now
possible for pombeiros to buy a chain of slaves with goods entrusted to
them by their masters in Luanda and to sell them in Benguela without hav-
2
ing to account to anyone. This dishonesty was ruining Luanda. w’hen a 
protest was made to Lisbon the Overseas Council forbade all direct sail­
ing from Benguela. They were not, however, wholly convinced of the need 
for this rule, for two years later an 800 berth slaver took on a cargo
in Benguela with instructions from the Overseas Council itself to sail
3
direct to Bahia. The shortage of shipping space in Luanda became more
4
acute than ever.
^To&o V to the Governor. 19.5*1729. Cx 18. (Copy)
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Paulo Caetano de Albuquerque, 17.4.1727. Cx 17.
Seme, 20.12.1729. Cx ?
4 /
Jose Carvalho da Costa, 8.6.1725. Cx 16.
Although the Luanda merchants complained that their slave supply 
was being diverted to Benguela, a later governor, Rodrigo Cezar de 
Kenezes, realised that the truth was rather different. In fact the 
bulk of the slaves coming to Luanda were originating in the Benguela 
hinterland rather than being diverted there from the Mbundu country.
The profits being made in Luanda were the commission on slaves which 
came there from Benguela before being shipped to Brazil. L'hat the 
Luanda traders were protesting about was that their profitable but non- 
essential role of middlemen between Benguela and Brazil was being cut 
out.'
The two lines of competition from north and south which partially 
squeezed out the Mbundu-Luanda participation in the slave trade, probably 
interacted on each other. So long as the Luanda traders were able to 
tap Benguela supplies they were not over worried at the failure of the 
supply from Matamba and Kasanje to increase in volume. It was only 
when the Luanda traders began to lose the Benguela supplies to other 
Portuguese competitors that they concentrated once more on the Mbundu 
routes after several decades of comparative neglect.
The renewed interest in the Mbundu country eventually led to war. 
After 1753 the total exports rose to over nine thousand slaves in most 
years and even reached twelve thousand in 1736. The figures given below 
probably do not include between one and two thousand slaves that were
legally exported each year direct from Benguela, Neither, of course, 
do they take any account of the unknown numbers which were illegally 
exported from both Benguela and Luanda.
1731 5,808 1740 8,484
1732 1741 8,693
1733 1742 10,130
1734 9,962 1743
1735 9,257 1744 8,849
1736 12,250 1745
1737 9,900 (?) 1746
1733 8,809 1747 10,112
1739 1748 11,592
One of the major hindrances to the Mbundu trade continued to be 
the powerful Ndembu chief Mbwila. He caused serious trouble by giving 
refuge to slaves who had escaped from Portuguese custody, and then 
allowing them to form bands which went out from his capital to rob cara­
vans. He also controlled, or at least had a hand in, the busy trade 
route which led northward through the divided territory of the old 
Kongo kingdom to Cabinda and Loango. The Portuguese accused him of hav­
ing stolen from them the majority of the slaves and ivory which he sent 
in that direction. In return he received from Loango excellent north- 
Huropean cloths and fire-arms. To combat this Cezar de Menezes proposed 
in 1734 the building of a new presidio at an easily defensible point only
five days narch from Kbwila's capital* A garrison at that point would 
be able to serve the dual function of closing the trade-route to the 
north and of making east-west trade-routes much safer* The cost of the 
enterprise would easily be off-set by not having to defend the nombeiros 
from robbers and murderers.'*' The effectiveness or .othervri.se of a re­
mote garrison in the thick bush of southern Kongo was debated with even 
less speed than was usual in the ponderous Portuguese colonial system*
It was twenty years before any action was taken onllenezes' suggestion.
As part of their policy of intensifying the trade through the Kbundu 
country in the 1730's, the Portuguese became more active in the direction 
of the upper Kwango, They attempted to penetrate further inland than 
the rulers of Matamba and Kasanje had previously permitted them to do.
Cezar de Menezes considered the 'King of the Jingas' in Matamba to be 
the most dangerous of the indigenous rulers and the one who constituted 
the gravest threat to the outlying Portuguese forts. This ruler main­
tained a very firm hold on the trade to all points east and north of 
his territory just as his southern neighbour, Kasanje, was complete 
master of trade to the east and.south-east of the Mbundu. This complete 
barrier to Portuguese penetration of the interior caused a war with Mat­
amba in the years 1739 to 1744.
The immediate cause of the war seems to have been the activities of 
a Portuguese trader called Prancisco Roque de Soutto. He had been operating
“^Rodrigo Cezar de Menezes to the King, 30.1.1734. Cx 20.
at Kasanje where his methods included the use of violence against his
rivals.^ His aim, it seems, had been to travel beyond Kasanje. He
later claimed that in so doing he had been acting on instructions from 
2
the governor. Roque failed to get through Kasanje and so tried to by­
pass it and reach the Holo people via Matamba. On the road he was 
stopped by Dom Afonso Alvares who claimed to be the 'King of Hdongo and 
Matamba' and was reputedly the son and successor of Queen Victoria 
(Veronica ) Gutterres. This king wrote and told the captain of Mbaka that 
he had arrested Roque who was trying to reach Holo to sell guns and pow­
der which were illegal goods. Pie wished to know whether Roque was a
3
criminal or had a permit to carry these goods.
Francisco Roque seems to have escaped from ^ atamba custody and 
reached the Holo country. By August 1739 he was back in Luanda with 
eleven men who claimed to be ambassadors from the king of the Holo people. 
They said that their master wished to become a vassal of Portugal and to 
trade direct with the Portuguese. Previously the Holo had been in con­
tinual conflict with Matamba and Kasanje who controlled all trade with 
the Portuguese and paid the peoples from beyond the Kwango a much smaller 
price for their slaves than they themselves received from the white men.
■^JoSo Jaques de Hagalh3.es, 24.9.1739* Cx 21.
2
Consulta of the Overseas Council in Lisbon, 4.9.1742. Cx 22.
King of Matamba to Francisco Xavier, Captain-Major of Mbaka, n.d. (? 1739) 
Captain Major of Mbaka to the Governor, 5.7*1739. Cx 21.
The Portuguese in Luanda realised that an opening with the Holo could 
be advantageous but that it might involve raising, and paying for, 
an army large enough to fight Katamba. They were also a little cauticus 
lest the embassy should not be genuine but merely a cover to hide other 
illegal activities by Francisco Roque. The matter was reported to Lisbon 
where the Overseas Council advised that trade with the Holo would be ad­
vantageous and that an attempt should be made to obtain peaceful per-
1
mission for it from Katamba and Kasanje.
An attempt to open trade with the Holo was apparently made in 1742.
A caravan of slaves guarded by 130 freemen sent by the Holo king, set 
out for the Portuguese dominions. It never got through Ilatamba, however,
but was attacked by the queen’s army, which killed the guards and cap-
/
tured the slaves. It is not clear what had happened to Lora Afonso and 
whether this was a new queen or whether the old Queen Veronica, now as 
aged as her predecessor Queen ITzinga had once been, was in fact still 
alive and in control of Katamba. Whoever she was, this queen had delivered 
a blow to Portuguese prestige which Jo2o Jaques de Magalh2.es felt it nec­
essary to avenge lest other peoples, seeing it as a sign of Portuguese 
weakness, should defy them also. At the same time he hoped to stop or
limit the active trade to the Loango coast which the Mubires were conduct-
2
ing from the whole of the region east of Ndongo.
^Report on the embassy from Holo, 16.8.1739. Letter from J.J.MagalhS.es, 
24.9.1739. Marginal comments. Order for an investigation, 25.9.1739'.
Cx 21.
2
Jo2o Jaques de Magalh2es, 13.4.1744. Cx 23. The Catalogo assumes that 
the queen of MaJ&mba was still the same one and says she was aged 60.
In fact she would, by 1744, have reigned for sixty years if she were alive.
Before the Portuguese had taken any action, the queen of Matamba 
delivered an even more serious blow to their trading system. Her army 
advanced right into the Hbundu territory, which the Portuguese had 
claimed to be theirs for generations, and on 4 February 1744 attacked 
the great fair near Cambsmbe. They carried off slaves and goods to a 
total estimated value of 500 head of slaves. This was a complete and 
final breach of the peace which had lasted somewhat uneasily since 1683. 
The governor examined the old treaty and found that in addition to taking 
hostile action, the queen had failed to comply with its provisions re­
lating to free trade beyond Matamba, and hadnever paid more than one 
third of the indemnity of 200 slaves which had been promised after the 
war of 1681. A punitive war therefore seemed essential.^
The campaign was fought during the dry season Of 1744 under the 
leadership of Bartholemeu Duarte de Sequeira. His army consisted of
some 600 ’Portuguese’ soldiers, 500 white or so-called white civilians,
2
2,000 well-armed slaves and a guerra nreta of 20,000 bowmen. Sequeira 
first of all raided the fertile islands in the Kwanza above Pungu a Ndongo 
which were believed to belong to I-latamba, From there he marched northward 
destroying and pillaging villages and driving the queen's army back until 
he entered the capital of the Kingdom. It was the first time that a 
Portuguese army, as opposed to Portuguese traders and missionaries, had
Jofio de Hagalh&es, 13.4.1744. Cx 23. 
2J. J. Hagalhfies, 15.5.1744. Cx 23.
penetrated so far inland. By the time they reached the Matamba capital,
however, the rains were beginning and the army decided to negotiate
a peace rather than march further and risk dying of fever, A treaty
was signed on 25 October 1744 with terms similar to those of 1683.
Access to Matamba and beyond it to the Yaka, and presumably also to the
Eolo, was to be given to traders and missionaries, and an indemnity for
the war was fixed at 2,949>840 reis, about the value of 100 slaves,
1
but probably less than the campaign had cost. Bequeira arrived back in 
Luanda with his army to meet widespread criticism of his conduct of the 
war. It was alleged that the campaign had not been carried far enough, 
and that the queen's escape had been due to negligence on the part of the 
commander. It was also claimed that the royal fifth of captured slaves 
had not been justly allocated and branded according to custom. Finally 
the treatment meted out to soldiers, allies, friendly chiefs and the 
guerra preta by the Portuguese officers, was reported to have been tyran­
nical.^
After the defeat of Matamba, Hagalh&es, who governed Angola from 
1738 until his death in Luanda in 1748, concentrated his attention on the 
problem of Kisama. The population of Kisama was a mixture of Mbundu who 
had fled from the Portuguese wars, slaves of varying nationalities who
Treaty signed by delegates of the Jinga Queen at the court of Matamba, 
25.10.1744. Ox 23. J. J. Magalh&es, 31.8.1745. Cx
p
^Terms of reference of commission of enquiry, 18.3*1745. Cx 24.
had escaped from Luanda or from caravans on their way there, and of 
the old sixteenth century Lunda-Imbangala invaders. The fact that it was 
such a close refuge for slaves from Luanda and that it lay along-side 
the Kwanza trade route made the Portuguese especially anxious to dominate 
it. Ilagalh&es conducted campaigns against several of the leading chiefs, 
Kimone, Katala, Mushima, and Kisua but the effect was no more lasting 
than previous efforts to control the Kisama chiefs had been.'*'
Dorn .Antonio Alvares da Cunha, who arrived in Luanda as governor in 
July 1753, described Angola as a rotten, vicious and corrupt colony. It 
was desperately short of war materials and soldiers for its defence.
The only white inhabitants in evidence were the slave traders, men with­
out consciences who feared neither God nor the law and who terrified 
the Mbundu chiefs into selling their subjects. Such scandalous behaviour, 
the governor said, amply justified the royal order prohibiting white and 
mulatto men from entering the hinterland. He issued an order to arrest 
all white men in the interior and appealed to Li±on for horses to build 
up a cavalry capable of enforcing the order and controlling illicit trade. 
To illustrate his point the governor later sent a letter from the captain
of Pungu a Mongo describing how a jealous trader had mutilated and eventu
3
ally killed a son of the chief Kabuku.
"^Letters from HagalhSes to the King, 4.12.1745, 15.3.1746, 3.8.1747 and 
others. Cx 24.
2
u. ;mtonio Alvares da Cunha to Secretary of State, 29.10.1753. Cx 25.
3
J. P. de Araujo, Pedras de Pungo a Ndongo, 16.11,1754. Cx 26.
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In an attempt to remedy the situation in which criminals went 
illegally to the fairs to trade and caused serious disturbances, the 
j Lisbon government decided to adopt an entirely new policy and one quite
r
contrary to Alvares da Cunha’s advice. On 11 January 1753 it lifted 
| the ban on white men trading direct wiih the pumbos and legalised free-
f[
| dom to trade in the hope of minimising the troubles. The next governor
| was not happy about this freedom since the majority of the white popu-
| lation of Angola were deported convicts from the Lisbon prisons who did
i not make the best free agents.'*' Three years later he wrote to say that
since by no stretch of the imagination could it be thought that a royal 
| decree would have been made with the intention of benefitting 'Jews,
! Gypsies and other depraved peoples’ the governor had excluded them from
I
2I any right to trade.
I
Sousa Coutinho, who.took over the government in 1764, approved of 
; the new regiktion and thought that traders would be more correct in their
dealings with chiefs and states where there was no Portuguese military 
establishment. If traders had to rely on themselves for their safety 
they would be less prone to committing atrocities than if they knew that 
there was a presidio garrison to protect them from reprisals. Their 
more cautious approach to African rulers and their freedom to range 
through the country would make them better able to compete with the
^Antonio de Vase one el os, 13.1.1749. Cx 28. 
Sane, 6.5.1762. Cx 29.
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traders T;.Tho came from the Aoango coast.
/mother problem which continued to exercise the minds of success­
ive governors, was the import of fire-arms. The possession of fire­
arms by African rulers made their opposition to Portuguese traders
dangerous and effective. There had.been a ’revolt1 by ICalandula, and
*
the Ndenbu chiefs had prevented Portuguese entry into Ukoje. The 
Queen of Ilatamba had attacked traders going to Holo and Kasanje and it 
had been necessary to send a troop of 300 'native recruits' to re­
open the trade and avenge the deat^of several pombeiros.^ In 1759 
the governor Vasconcelos pointed out that it was wrong to suppose that 
foreign traders were chiefly responsible for providing the peoples of 
Angola with guns. The majority of both fire-arms and gun-powder were 
in fact obtained illegally from Portuguese traders. Vasconcelos was 
not convinced, however, that the gun trade was as detrimental to Portu­
guese interests as had been supposed. Most of the Portuguese guns were 
of such poor quality that they fell to pieces at the first shot. Of
4,000 trade guns which he had examined only 200 were serviceable. To 
try to stop this trade would be both impracticable and harmful to com-
3
mercial interests.
I/hen Souza Coutinho succeeded Vasconcelos he came out in favour of 
allowing a controlled trade in arms. He said that it was an illusion to
^Souza Coutinho. 9.5.1756. Cx 30.
Antonio Alvares da Cunha, 23.5.1755. Cx 26 and 22.1.1756. Cx 27. 
Vasconcelos, 18.3.1759, Cx 28 and 19.5.1759, Cx 29.
hncoge.
suppose that Europeans could impose their terms on the trade and bully 
African merchants into disadvantageous bargains. Since marching slaves 
was a comparatively cheap form of transport, the middlemen were willing 
to send them long distances to find the highest prices and seek the goods 
currently in greatest demand. If the Portuguese did not reap the bene­
fit of selling arms, other nations would and the slaves would be permanent­
ly lost to the Portuguese while the Africans got their guns nonetheless,^
In 1759 Sousa Coutinho obtained permission to allow a limited legal trade 
in fire-arms. He announced to a gathering of merchants that he would 
authorise the sale of 1,900 guns and 200 barrels of powder each year.
The traders welcomed the prospect but asked that the goods be shared out 
so that first-comers did not take the entire quota. Souza Coutinho
thought this a reasonable request to prevent a small number of traders
2
making profits far above the normal level of 100 to 190 per cent.
The old ambition of the Portuguese to open a route across Africa to
join Angola with the Sena Puivers province on the Zambesi, was revived 
by Alvares da Cunha in the 1750's. His uncle, Dom Luis da Cunha, had 
commissioned a report on the feasability of such a project from the French 
royal cartographer, D'Anville, in 1725.  ^ The chief obstacle was the king
^Souza Coutinho, 90.16.1769. Cx 30.
2
Report on the meeting and letter from Souza Coutinho, 19.12.1767. Cx 31.
3
One version of this IIs is in the Lisbon Geographical Soc. Mss. Res. 
1-3-64.
of Kasanje who carefully prevented any European from even seeing the 
Kwango which lay one day's march beyond his capital. The Portuguese, 
however, bought slaves from beyond the Kwango who told them that the 
chiefs there would willingly trade direct with Europeans since Kasanje 
paid them only one third of what he received. Although Alvares da 
Cunha had no success in breaking through the Kasanje trade barrier, 
he did hear that beyond the Kwango there were rulers called ' Caba^o 
'Cafuxy', 'Muhetu* aid 'Haguinby' who obeyed a great king called 'Qui-
1
conba Acoassa' or 'Cabonda' living at 20 days' journey from the Kwango.
Alvares da Cunha's informants probably referred to the Mwata Yamvo,
ruler of the Lunda empire, of whose existence D'Anville had apparently
been unaware thirty years earlier. There is perhaps even an outside
chance that 'Quiconba' might be 'Tshikombe', who was probably the great-
2
grandson of the first Lunda ruler to adopt the title Mwata Yamvo.
The major factor in the history of Angola during the half-century 
before 1790 was the arrival of the Lunda empire at the peak of its trad­
ing power. A brief account has been given of the nursery of political 
institutions which existed in Katanga before the European arrival in 
Africa, and of the manner in which a Luba dynasty implanted itself on 
the Lunda peoples. The Lunda areas then threw out migrations of peoples 
escaping from the process of consolidating the new state betvreen the
*4). Antonio Alvares da Cunha, 4.12.1754. Cx 27. 
2Duysters, op.cit., 89.
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Lulua and the Lubilash.1 Once Lunda had been consolidated and had 
evolved its complex and characteristic administrative system, the new- 
state embarked on a programme of imperial expansion until it came into 
contact with overseas traders who were reaching into Africa both from 
the Indian Ocean and from the Atlantic.
An exact chronological account of the expansion of the Lunda empire 
is hard to construct. The fullest version of the oral tradition of the 
Lunda, that collected by Duysters, gives little indication of the length 
of time which elapsed between the establishment of the first Luba settlers 
in Lunda territory, and the beginning of the Lunda expansion, when the 
Mwata Yamvo started sending his relatives and officers to found new Lunda 
states in the peripheral areas of the old Lunda country. It would appear 
that the process of internal consolidation lasted from the mid-sixteenth 
century until about the mid-seventeenth century when the exploitation 
began. Kazembe, the most famous of the Lunda off-shoot states, was 
established on the Luapula in the first half of the eighteenth century.
It was not, according to Duysters' tradition, a late stage of the Lunda
bvJt e>n« ecu-ly sfc fc t
expansion, seeking to satisfy a demand for slaves from the we s1>A re suiting 
from late seventeenth century explorations. The satellite states which 
were set up as a consequence of these explorations were all bound to 
send tribute to the Mwata Yamvo.
One of the important westward probings from Lunda was led by Kuke-
'"See Chapters One and Four.
1 cnge Kutombo and I-Iai kunene who imposed their control over the Pende. 
According to Pende tradition, the Pende themselves arrived on the Kasai 
in about 1700 to 1730, and the IMnda came and conquered their new home­
land soon after they arrived there.'*' This suggests an early eighteenth 
century westward expansion by Lunda. An off-shoot of Had . Hunene's mi­
gration went westward under the leadership of Kasongo who founded a 
Lunda dynasty among the Yaka on the middle Kwango. He took the title 
of Kwene Puto ICasongo because of the trading association he formed with 
Mwene Puto, the King of Portugal. Plancquaert published an extract from 
a document in the Vatican archives, dated 1724-1730, which refers to
'Kano Pota1 and would appear to suggest that the Yaka-Lunda kingdom was
2
founded before that time.
The Pende traditions give some account of the activity on the
lengthened trade-routes into the interior. Both the Imbangala of Kasanje
and the Pongo, their southern neighbours, travelled to the Pende-Lunda
state at the confluence of the Kasai and the Tshikapa to buy slaves in
return for salt and cloth. Trade was facilitated by the similarity of 
3
their languages. Some traders settled in the Pende country and organised 
a second trade network stretching into the Bashilanje and Kuba country.
*4laveaux, 26-27. The date is established on the basis of twelve initiation 
periods of 18-20 years each before the mid-twentieth century.
p
Plancquaert, 84-87*
3
The Imbangala of Kasanje and the Pende of Tshikapa both had Mbundu 
ancestors.
Even the mulatto traders reached the Pende markets. This trade was quite 
unlike the direct Portuguese activities from which the Pende had suffered 
so severe^ in Angola. It was well organised and controlled by the chiefs 
who determined what volume of trade the country's economy could stand.l 
It seems from this evidence that large-scale Lunda participation 
in the Atlantic slave trade was not an immediate consequence of Kinguri's 
contact with the Portuguese at the end of the sixteenth century. On the 
contrary, the peoples who first left Lunda stayed in Angola to trade on 
their own account and itwas only a century or more 3a ter that Lunda emerged 
as a trading empire. The Lunda expeditions of the early eighteenth century 
seem to have brought the people of the I-iwata Yamvo into close trading 
contact with Europeans. They were thus seeking to partake in a trade which 
m s  growing more rapidly than ever and which reached its height during the 
latter part of the eighteenth century.
During the 1750's the Portuguese revived the twenty-year-old project 
to limit the loss of trade to the north by building a fort at Ilkoje in the 
Ildembu territory of I-Ibwila. Delays in executing the plan were caused by 
a shortage of men and arms, by fear of a French attack on Luanda, and by
2
a season of especially tad fevers. Action was eventually taken in 1759, 
and on 18 August the army reached Kkoje and began to fortify it at once.y
"4lavemux, 27-28.
2Leite3s to Alvares da Cunha, 24.2.1756, Cx 28, 10.3.1757, 26.5.1757, Cx 27. 
A^. de Vasconcelos, 6.5.1760. Cx 23.
Although their aim was to impose Portuguese authority over a wide
area of southern Kongo, the critics of the scheme were cynical and
said that a remote and inaccessible fort would be of very limited
benefit. It soon appeared, however, that the fort may in fact have
had considerable effect on trade.
Two years after the fort at Nkoje was established, a people called 
*
the Hungu entered Portuguese territory and attacked the Capuchin hos­
pice of Kahenda east of Mbaka. This was apparently an invasion by an 
entire people, including chiefs, soldiers, women and children. Their 
leader, called Mushinda^ said that they were fleeing from the persecu­
tion of the 'Melues' who were probably the 'Moluas' or Lunda. To repel 
the invaders a small army set out from Pungu a Ndongo and recruited 
the assistance of Kalandula. During the winter of 1761 the Hungu were 
defeated, but the Portuguese force was too small to control many cap­
tives so the surplus were kilM or maii&ed. The total Hungu loss of dead 
and captured was estimated at 15,000 of whom 803 head of slaves were 
allocated to the 'royal fifth'. Kushinda himself was killed in battle.^ 
The claim of the Hungu that they were being driven on by the 'Melues' 
might suggest that they were the spear-head of an attempt to clear the 
trade route from the upper Kwango to Loango. It is possible that the 
Ukoje fort was proving more effective than its critics had allowed for
^Vasconcelos, 12.6.1762. Cx 29.
* 1
Maungos. 'Moxinda.
and that after 1759 trade became bottled up on the Kwango leading 
to an explosion of which the Hungo invasion was the first symptom.
The check imposed on the progress of the Eungoly the Portuguese was 
only temporary. After failing to get past Kahenda, they apparently 
withdrew and tried circling the Portuguese position further to the 
north. On 7 April the Ilungo defeated some Portuguese and successfully 
blockaded Nkoje. Trade to Luanda from this area, which was rather im­
probably alleged to have amounted to 5,000 slaves, was all but stopped.
The l-Iarques of Zombo imposed his control on the route and sent the 
slaves which he received in tribute to Loango for sale. Vasconcelos 
sent detachments of cavalry in 1762 and in 1763 to try to reinforce 
Portuguese authority, but they were wiped out by fevers. During his 
first year in office Sousa Coutinho also sacrificed men trying without 
success in revive the Nkoje trade which had by then completely dried up.'*'
In 1765 the governor decided that the situation called for a major 
war. The Hungu and the Sosso, a people with whom the Hungu were ap­
parently associated, were crowding in on the peoples under Portuguese 
dominion. They were reported to have made anaLliance with the Ndembu 
chief I-lbwila (or Ilbwela) and were preparing an attack on Portuguese trade 
centres. Souza Coutinho described the Hungu as wandering landless peoples.
They built villages surrounded by three stockades of woven branches coated 
2
with clay. They were in some ways, perhaps, similar to the sixteenth
1
Lo'usa Coutinho, 4.3*1766. Cx 31*
2
Louza Coutinho, 18.12.1765. Cx 30.
*There would appear to have been two chiefs in close proximity called Nbwila 
an d Kbwela.
century Jaga and Imbangala invaders, though of a more mellowed nature. 
Their line of invasion appears to have been similar to the route fol­
lowed by the Imbangala two hundred years earlier. Unlike the Jaga, 
the Eungo were not expelled by the Portuguese and still remain an im­
portant ethnic group of about 60,000 people in southern Kongo. They 
appear to be similar to the Yaka and have preserved their language and 
customs to a degree only paralleled by the Yaka.'*'
The Portuguese army which was directed against the Hungu met its 
first resistance on the Bande River where Mbwila held the crossing with 
a force well equipped with guns. The Portuguese eventually reached 
the north bank, however, and marched on Ekoje, although suffering from 
heavy losses. Using the fort as a base, the Portuguese army destroyed
a number of Hungu kipakas or fortified encampments. At the same time
*
the Sosso were defeated with the help of the Queen of Uandu whose terri­
tory they had invaded. The chiefs Mujinga a Teka and Ilujinga Bunga were
driven north, beyond Nkoje. For the first time in 80 years the Portu-
L £ 2
guese were able to trade with Kongo chiefs called Kina^ and Nkusu .
Souza Coutinho hoped that this campaign had instilled sufficient terror 
into his enemies to ensure a durable peace. During 1766 the Sosso began
■^ Guy Atkins: nAn outline of Hungu grammar”, Garcia de Orta, Lisbon,
Vol. II, No. 2.
Souza Coutinho, 4.3.1766. Cx 31.
3
Souza Coutinho, 2.4.1766. Cx 31.
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to settle down after their migration. The Mani Sosso, Hujinga Bunga, 
and his 40,000 followers offered, as Souza Coutinho understood it, to 
become vassals of Portugal.^
The Portuguese plan to increase trade with the eastern markets by- 
blocking the route to the north would appear to have met with a limited 
degree of success after the Eungo and Sosso invasions. On 8 July 1765 
Souza Coutinho initialled a trade treaty with the Holo which was rati­
fied by the Holo king and sent back to Luanda a year later. Souza Cou­
tinho was particularly anxious to send missionaries to the Holo on the 
assumption that if Africans became Christian, they would be more apt to
apply Christian standards of honesty to their trading than if they fol-
2
lowed the example of Portuguese traders. He was also anxious that
3
Portuguese traders should learn to set a better example. To further
improve trade, Souza Coutinho also signed a treaty with the Jinga of
Katamba in 1765, and in July 1766 he could report that Angola was enjoy-
4
ing profound peace and that justice was being administered unperturbed. 
During this peace the governor kept in close touch with the peoples of 
the expanded northern frontier. In August 1767 he wrote to the captain 
of Ekoje asking him to Impose stability on the Ndembu people of ICingengu^
^Sousa Coutinho, 28.11.1766 and 5*12.1766. Cx 51*
2
Souza Coutinho to Secretary of State, 18.7.1766, and to Holo missionary,
18.7.1766. Cx 51. Same to Er.crivSo of Holo and Jinga lands, 9*9.1767. 
Luanda Archives, Officios para of interior. Vol. 85, 38v-39.
■'’Souza Coutinho, to Captain of Ekoje, 28.10.1767. Luanda Vol. 85.
4Souza Coutinho to fee. of State, Cx 31.
* * J"Dom Andre Kuginga Bunga JIane Mossoso* / Quinguengo.
who changed their ruler almost daily, and to force the subjects of
ITambu a Kgongo to elect a ruler of whom the governor could approve.
The governor also said that the chief of the Kubires, Dom Francisco,
1
had died and should be replaced.
Towards the end of 1767 the peace of which Souza Coutinho spoke 
was shattered by what appears to have been a Lunda attack on the barrier 
of trading states along the upper Kwango. Both the Portuguese and the 
Lunda seem to have been fully aware that these states which acted as 
middlemen were more of a barrier to trade than a vehicle for it. Souza 
Coutinho's first report on this attack said that the 'Quizda' (or Lunda), 
a people whose country stretched almost to the far side of Africa, had 
launched a cruel and barbarous attack on Kasanje, Holo, Jinga and Kuketu. 
The victims immediately appealed to the Portuguese for help. Souza Cou­
tinho refused them assistance on scant grounds of previous misdemeanours, 
and wrote to Lisbon tbefc he was in fact delighted to see these peoples be­
ing tamed and destroyed by their own kind. He obviously hoped that the 
Kwango barrier would be removed without the need for Portuguese military 
intervention. Colonel Duarte Sequeira was sent up-country to help to de­
fend the presidios of Mbaka and Pungu a Ndongo from the 'barbarians', but
2
received instructions not to proceed any further inland. When Souza 
Coutinho's letter was received in Lisbon his inaction was warmly approved.
1
Souza Coutinho to Captain of Wkoje, 12.8.1767. Luanda Vol. 85, 29v-30v.
2
Souza Coutinho to Sec. of State, lb.12.1767, Cx 31. To Duarte Sequeira 
25.11.1767, Luanda Vol. 85, 63.
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The council was pleased at the increased security which would result 
frcn the destruction of some of the colony's nearest neighbours. It
also anticipated that the war would result in a profitable crop of
* 1 prisoners-of-war.
Vihen the situation cleared in January 1768, it appeared that the
chief victim of the attack had been Matamba. The king of Kasanje wrote
2
that there was no longer any danger to his kingdom. In Matamba on
the other hand, the queen had been overthrown and replaced by a nephew
who killed all her sons. One d aughter escaped to the Kindongo Islands
near the Kwanza bend, Souza Coutinho wrote to offer this princess asylum
in the colony if she were to come unarmed and would agree to adopt Roman
Catholicism. He also wrote to the nephew and successor of the old queen,
*
Kaluete ka Mbande, King of Ndongo and Matamba, and welcomed his suc­
cession to his aunt’s throne. The governor later arranged for the new 
4
king's baptism. Souza Coutinho seemed to think that this Matamba re­
volution was a spontaneous rising by the Jinga but it seems more likely 
to have been associated with the Lunda attack. The fact that it was Mat­
amba, north of Kasanje, which suffered most might indicate either that 
the Lunda were more interested in the north-east trade-route than in the
^Marginal comment in S.C.'s letter, n.d. (1768).
2
Souza Coutinho to Regente of Mbaka, 22.1.1768. Luanda Vol. 85.
■7,
"'Souza Coutinho to Sec. of St. 16.12J767. Cx 51. Same to Captain of 
Pedras de Pungu a Ndongo, 7.1.1768 (?) Luanda Vol. 85, 74.
4.
■ aouza Coutinho to King of Matamba, 26.2.1768, Luanda Vol. 85. Same to 
King of Ilatamba and to mission at Koangu a Kitamba (Bango Aquitamba)
2b.11.1771.
''Dorn Calluete 0anbancle.
270 .
route to Luanda, or that Kasanje was strong enough to resist and 
Matamba was not.
The turmoil on the Kwango did not quieten down immediately. Early 
in 1768 Kasanje was again threatened. The governor seems inexplicably 
to have adopted an entirely new attitude, and instead of welcoming the 
challenge to the august ruler of Kasanje, he worried about the danger 
of losing the trade goods which were stock-piled in the Kasanje staple.
In Karch 1768 he sent out a military expedition to rescue the goods and 
thereby save the Luanda merchants from ruin. Before the troop had got 
very far, however, the invader withdrew and Souza Coutinho was able to 
call his men back.^ "
After an initial impetus this period of war seems tohave had an 
adverse effect on Luanda trade. The export figures dropped steadily 
from 1766 to 1769 to reach the lowest that they had been since the early 
1720’s. If both the Hungu invasion and the Lunda attack on Matamba were 
attempts deriving from the Mwata Yamvo’s capital to re-open a trade-route 
across Kongo which had been closed in 1759, it would appear from the ex­
port statistics that the end was achieved and by 1766 slaves again began 
to be syphoned off northwards from the Luanda route as they were before 
the establishment of Kkoje.
The official statistics for the slave exports from Luanda and Ben- 
guela in the third quarter of the eighteenth century are as follows. The
^Sousa Coutinho, 15.10.1768. Cx 51.
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figures from which the table is compiled contain minor inconsistencies 
arising from the fact that some reports do and some do not include the
Luanda Benguela
1754 8,807 2,787
1755 9,220 2,157
1756 10,151 2,541
1757 10,764 1,461
1758 10,038 2,419
1759 10,152 3,192
1760 
1761
1762 -  3,924
1763 - 3,423
1764 7,500 (?) 3,821
1765 11,064 6,183
1766 9,330 5,160
1767 8,926 (?) 6,584
1768 7,214 (?) 5,643
1769 5,651 5,531
1770 7,519 4,726
1771 7,214 5,276
1772 7,528 5,021
3-773 - 5,363
1774 7,935 4,321
1775 7,795 5,739
Souza Coutinho, who governed Angola from 1764 to 1772, put great 
energy into trying to expand and diversify the economy of Angola, His 
colonial legislation, however, was apparently no more successful than 
his wars on the Kwango front and in southern Kongo. Although he opened 
new markets in the interior, the slave export from Luanda dropped from
10,000 to 7,000 per annuo during his government and stayed at that level. 
In Eenguela, on the other hand, the figures rose from 2,000 to 5,000 so 
that the overall Portuguese exports remained fairly constant. A scheme 
for allowing ships returning from India to call at Luanda and sell Indian 
wares was tried for a time, and expensive tea-sets, dinner services, tea­
pots, enamel vases, silks and satins came into Luanda. There was fierce 
opposition to this scheme however because the high quality Indian goods 
undermined the market for the inferior Portuguese wares, and because some 
of the goods were smuggled to Erasil instead of being used in Angola.
The scheme had to be dropped. Souza Coutino persuaded the Lisbon govern­
ment to administer the slave trade direct and abolish the contract which 
took twenty per cent of the total slave taxes which amounted to about 
ICC contos (million reis). Finally the aspects of Souza Coutinho's work 
on which greatest emphasis has been laid by Portuguese historians such as 
Delagado, were his attempts to start an iron foundry, a leather factory, 
a salt monopoly, and various agricultural schemes which would have made 
Angola as desirable a colony to settle in as was Brazil. All his en­
deavours came to nothing, however, and the only effect on the I-Ibundu was
an increase in labour service, and possibly a more effective collection
of tithes.'*'
Souza Coutinho left Angola in 1772. In a summary of the history
of Angola written 70 years later, Lopes de Lima said that between Souza
Coutinho*s departure and the arrival of Manuel de Almeida Vasconcelos
in 1790, nothing important happened and Portuguese Angola sank back into
2
its lethargic routine. Although Lopes de Lima was overstating the case, 
there was a degree of truth in his assessment, especially in so far as the 
Mbundu country was concerned. Any activities which the Portuguese did 
undertake were on the Loango coast in the north and in the Ovimbundu 
country in the south, where in 1774 to 1776 they fought the important 
Bailundu '.far. The old hinterland of Luanda was comparatively quiet, al­
though important numbers of slaves continued to pass through it.
Between 1772 and 1790 the Portuguese concentrated mainly on coastal 
control to limit foreign trade. By abandom|ing their attempts to domin­
ate the inland trade routes, they may have been recognising their ulti­
mate failure in Kongo and on the upper Kwango in the 1760's. Attempting 
to control the ports which foreigners visited was not a new idea. Souza 
Coutinho had garrisoned Novo Redondo, near Old Benguela, to try to pre­
vent the English and French from buying slaves there. Similar activity 
was now concentrated on the Loango coast, and especially on the port of
'To do justice to the vigorous ideas and actions of Souza Coutinho and 
to study the Portuguese colonial policy Involved, see three articles 
by Ralph Delgado in Studia nos. 6-10. Many documents on the Portuguese 
aspects of Coutinho*s work have been published in Arquivos de Angola.
1
Lopes de Lima, III, page xxxvi.
Cabinda, which apart from its own trade, was the outlet for Sonyo, 
the most powerful of the coastal states, but one which would allow 
no direct access to Europeans.
Portugal's concern ever the Loango trade was based on her claim 
that Loango was her domain. The Portuguese also complained that slaves 
sold there often came from the Luanda hinterland, and that foreign traders 
based in Loango used small vessels to visit the Kongo coast as far south 
as the outskirts of Luanda. A more fundamental but probably unrealised 
cause for the prosperity of Loango and the decline of Luanda, may have 
been the establishment of a direct link between Loango and Hussumba, the 
capital of the Lunda empire, by-passing Angola and Kongo altogether. At 
the same time trade was being increased by supplies of slaves coming to 
the Atlantic sea-bord from as far afield as the Lunda kingdom of the 
Kazembes in the Luapula valley. L hint of these developments, which in­
creased the slave trade but cut out the Portuguese more completely than 
ever, is given in a report received by Lacerda when preparing his expedi­
tion to Kazenbe. Manuel Caetano Pereira, who had visited Kasembe, reported 
that cloth, mirrors, tea-pots, plates, glasses, beads, cowries and woollen 
goods were reaching Kazembe from 'Iluropoe', the Mwata Yamvo, who lived 60 
days to the east. In return Kazenbe sent slaves which were taken from 
the kingdom of 'Koropoe' to the sea in canoes.^ If slaves were taken from 
Lunda to the coast by canoe, they cannot have been going to the old staples
of Holo and ICasanje but only northwards along the Lulua to the Kasai 
and Stanley Fool and hence, presumably, to the Loango coast.
In the 1770's an expedition sent from Luanda to investigate foreign 
trade reported that it had not been allowed to land at the mouth of the 
Lande, a mere 25 miles from Luanda, because the people there carried on 
a very profitable business with the north and would have nothing what­
soever to do with the Portuguese. On the Loango coast itself the ex­
pedition found 17 ships, 9 French, 4 English and 4 Dutch, and heardihat 
six others had recently sailed. The report estimated the volume of the 
trade to be about 20,000 slaves a year.'*' Although this report is undated, 
it might have been prepared sifter the outbreak of the war of American 
Independence yjhich gradually reduced Anglo-French activities in the south­
ern slave trade. Another report, also undated but possibly written a few 
years earlier, described an even brisker foreign trade and said that as
many as 25 ships might be seen in Cabinda alone at any one time and that
2at least a dozen more would be found in the bays farther north.
In July 1785 an expedition of nearly 400 Europeans and 150 African 
artisans set out from Luanda to build a fort at Cabinda. The aim was to 
keep out rival Europeans and either trade there themselves directly or 
force the suppliers to revert to.the old Mbundu routes. The timing of 
the expedition was based on Jose Gonjalo da Camara's report of 1780 that 
for the past sixteen months no foreign ships had been seen and that if the
‘Report on trade in the northern ports. N.d. Cx 58.
>
'Report on trade in the northern ports. N.d. Cx 57.
fortifying of Cabinda was to be successful it must be undertaken before 
the peace was settled in Europe and the English and French returned to 
the south Atlantic trade.^ When .the Portuguese lad signed a treaty
establishing their factory at Cabinda, they discovered that trading there 
was not so easy as it had been in the almost monopoly conditions of Angola. 
In Loango if the European buyer did not offer the desired goods, trading 
was suspended. Hum for instance was preferred to brandy and gun-powder 
formed an essential item in any transaction. The factory fared very badly. 
The garrison was weakened by disease, and it was soon realised that con­
trolling one bay would have very little effect 011 the trade since rivals 
could easily go to Ilolenbo or elsewhere. In the end the experiment 
failed ignominously when in June 1784 two French frigates sailed into 
Cabinda Bay and forcibly ejected the sick and dispirited Portuguese garrison 
Boon after the Cabinda fiasco the Baron of Ilossamedes arrived to 
take over the government of Angola. He found the colony in a very run­
down condition. Before lea^ving Brazil to take up the post he had heard 
that the unprecedented number of 24 ships were queueing up .‘in Luanda for 
cargoes of slaves. The acting governors had attempted to raise revenue 
by gaining control of the Kisama salt mines but their army had had to
Boo. from Cabinda (?) 15.8.1735 (?). Cx 40.
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The a .H.U. boxes for Angola in the 1780's and beyond contain a great 
many documents with details of the Cabinda episode.
■^ossamedes, from Rio de Janeiro, 12.6.1784. Cx 40.
withdraw beaten.^ To add to their discomfiture, the trade through Bondo 
had become notoriously unsafe and traders were continually being attacked, 
robbed and even killed, Hossamedes did little to change the routine of 
government. The main functions of his administration we re to collect tithes 
and to punish highway-men on the paths to Ivasanje and Hatamba. A great 
deal of time was devoted to petty squabbles and litigation. The life of 
the colony was stirred up in particular by a feud between the bishop and 
the governor. Hossamedes' one constructive action was to investigate
the southern coast between Benguela and the Cunene River. The scheme to trade
in the north had failed completely and Hossamedes wanted to acquire any 
slaves which might be available in the south. It was reported that Eng­
lish and French slavers often picked up slaves at Cape Negro while on their 
way to Cabinda. Hossamedes' efforts did not amount to more than an ex­
ploration, however, and it was more than half a century before the settle­
ment bearing his name was established in the vicinity of Cape Negro.
At this time, when Angola was at its lowest ebb, Elias Alexandre 
da Silva Correia wrote a description of the colony attempting to explain 
the general state of ruin. The royal monopoly in ivory meant that the price 
offered would not cover the coat of transport from places as far afield as
Kasanje. The profit on beeswax, an export of growing importance, was
very slight. The insatiable greed of the slave traders meant that they 
would not spend money on erecting new buildings in Luanda nor even on re­
pairing the old ones. The trade suffered from the absence of police to
J"Asewedo e Vasconcelos, Luanda, 3.10.1784. Cx 39.
ensure the safe transit of goods to and from the interior. The life 
of a merchant was unhealthy, risky and rough whether he stayed in Luanda 
or went up-country.
In describing the appalling spectacle of a degraded colony, Correia
referred to the constant pressure of indebtedness, to the manner in which
soldiers and officers were forced to supplement their pay by trading,
and to the degenerating influence of the liquor trade. Hany traders were
convicts and the violent insults and punishments which they administered 
to the Kbundu met with reprisals which disrupted trade. Shortage of food 
supplies often meant expensive delays to ships otherwise ready to sail. 
Correia recommended that taxes, like freight rates, should only be paid 
on slaves which were delivered alive in Brazil. The ship on which Correia 
himself left Angola carried 40C slaves of whom ICO died on the voyage.
Uhen a big shipment of trade goods arrived in Luanda the traders scrambled 
to get to the pumbos first and to impede the progress of their rivals.
This competition, and the shortage of slaves, inflated prices. This in­
flation was accentuated by the excess of trade goods being sent from Lisbon. 
In particular the introduction of luxury goods spoilt the market for poorer 
quality cotton materials. Two shiploads of Lisbon goods a year would have 
sufficed, Correia said, to supplement the commodities sent from Brazil, 
but in 1786 six ship-loads arrived from Lisbon. Last of all Correia was 
opposed to the school of thought which argued that powder and guns must 
be sold, despite the risk, so as to assist the ultimate producers of 
slaves in capturing their victims in the remotest regions of Africa."^
^Cliac Alexandre da Silva Correia: I-Iistoria de Angola, c. 1792, published
Lisbon 1S57. 27-57.
The gloom which reigned over the Kbundu and their colonial masters 
in 17S0 makes a sharp contrast with the energy which drove both peoples
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forward in the sixteenth century. When the Portuguese first reconnoitred 
Angola they were guided by idealistic schemes to bring the Negro races 
into the Christian community of nations and to educate them in European 
knowledge and techniques. They drew up bold plans for colonization and 
settlement and dreamt of thriving agricultural and mining communities.
The Kbundu also embarked with zest on this new phase of their history 
in which the Europeans on the coast overshadowed their giant Kongo neighbour. 
A monarchy developed which put the Kbundu in a strong bargaining position 
vis-a-vis European traders. The Ngola became powerful enough not only to 
impose terms on the captains of slave vessels, but later even to resist 
the first waves of Portuguese military expansion in Angola. By the end 
of the sixteenth century however the profits of trading were undermining 
what idealistic zeal there was and the relationship between Portuguese and 
Mbuiidu was becoming a hostile political rivalry.
Nhile the opponents were vying with each other to gain the upper hand 
in their commercial transactions, a third force came on the scene. The 
Lunda-Imbangala invaders from the east attacked both the Mbundu and the 
Portuguese and maintained a state of almost continuous warfare. The degenera­
tion of Angola set in rapidly once the Imbangala armies were established 
there. A cordon of restlessness encircled the Portuguese-conquered terri­
tory and produced a continuous flow of slaves. The profits of slave trading
on the African side began to shift from the I-Ibundu to the Imbangala.
The latter were used by the Portuguese to hunt slaves.'*’ The optimism 
and idealism of the Kgolas and of the Portuguese drained away in the 
century-long Angolan Wars.
In the three cornered struggle for mastery of the slave trade it 
was the Kbundu who went to the wall. They were crushed as between the 
upper and the nether millstone. The followers of Kasanje undermined the 
power of the Ngola from the east until the Portuguese were able to pene- 
trade the heartland of ITdongo from the west in the 1620's. Some Kbundu 
withdrew to platamba,in the north-east, and established a new Hbundu-ruled 
kingdom which was far enough inland to be almost immune from Portuguese 
attack, and which was strong enough to resist Imbangala encroachment.
The Kbundu who remained in Kdongo came increasingly under the influence 
of the Portuguese until by the eighteenth century they were in the sorry 
state described by Silva Correia.
The Imbangala also withdrew from close proximity of the Portuguese 
and founded the trading kingdom of Kasanje in a strategic position be­
tween. the Portuguese colony and the Kasai basin. The slave trade evolved 
in several stages. In the seventeenth century the Kwango states gradually
?k>—
took over*the Kbundu kingdom of Ndongo as the last link in the chain. In 
the eighteenth century another link was added with the development of the 
Lunda. slave trade. As Lunda became the major slave producing area, the 
authority of the Hwata Yamvo spread out to a radius of four hundred miles
The analogy between hunting and the Angolan Wars was made by a Jesuit 
observer. A.R.S.I. Lus. 57. fl 194-197. 1.12.1685.
east and west of the capital. The middle links in the chain, Kasanje 
and I-Iatamba on the upper Kwango, held firm until the end of the eighteenth 
century and prevented the Portuguese and the Lunda from trading directly 
with each other.
After 1790 there was a revival of Portuguese activity in Angola.
A feiguela trader led a series of expeditions far inland to the Barotse 
plains on the Zambesi.^ A few years later, in 1808, the Mwata Yamvo man­
aged to by-pass the Kwango barrier and send an embassy to the Portuguese 
governor. The Lunda ruler at last discovered that the terrible tales about 
Europeans with which the king of Kasanje had dissuaded Lunda subjects from 
seeing white men, were political trickery. The governor sent friendly 
letters to the Ilwata Yamvo, to his wife and to the mother of the Lunda 
people. At about the same time, two pombeiros went right across the 
continent to Mozambique and returned to their master in Angola. The Portu­
guese seemed to be on the threshold of a new expansionist phase in which 
they would reach the heart of Africa both from their western base in the 
Kbundu country, and from their east coast settlements. That nothing came 
of these probings was probably due to the gradual decrease in the intensity 
of the competition for the slave trade during the first half of the nine­
teenth century.
^Report on a J0umey to Lovar, 1794. Pelner: Angola. 1940, Vol. I, 236.
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Antonio de Soldanha da Gama to the Mwata Yamvo, his wife and his mother.
22.1.1808 and 5.12.1808. Luanda Archives, Vol. 98> 60-61 and 69-70v.
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Unpublished material was taken from two major archives. The 
Arquivo Historico Ultramarino in Lisbon is the chief source of mater­
ial cn ^ngola from about 1600 onwards. The material used here was in 
the scries Locumentos Aval sos de :,ngola of which the boxes numbered 1 
to 40 cover the period 1600 to 1790. The main headings under which 
these documents can be classified are letters from the governor to the 
central government, minutes of the Overseas Council, petitions from 
individuals to governments and papers concerning litigation. Only the 
first three boxes are catalogued. The classification is an approximate 
and often badly disrupted chronological order.
The most important papers for this study in the .Irqulvo Provincial 
de Angola in Luanda are the Oficlos para of Interior of which volumes 
85 to 90 cover some of the years between 1767 and 1790. These are let­
ters and instructions from the governors in Luanda to their officers 
spread over the Portuguese-conquered section of Angola.
The three remaining important archives in Lisbon are inadequately 
organised and catalogued but most of the documents concerning Angola 
which they have yielded so far appear to have been published. The Bib- 
liteca national has three main series of documents. The Fundu Geral, the 
catalogue of which indicates nothing of importance concerning Angola, 
but wiii-oh nonetheless contains several important manuscripts* have been 
published. The Colecffio Pombalina has a published catalogue containing
a few minor references to Angola. The Colec^ S-o de Alcobaya contains 
some published Jesuit letters from Angola. (See next section.) The 
Torre do Tombo contains many of the documents relating to the Portuguese 
empire before the seventeenth century. Brasio's collection of published 
documents has been relied upon for these. The Bibliteca da A.juda suf­
fers from utterly inadequate staffing and cataloguing but it would seem 
that Brasio was able to publish the most important documents relating 
to Angola which have so far been discovered there.
Several other archives from which one or more documents have been 
consulted either published or in manuscript are listed below:
Biblloteca National of Rio de Janeiro.
British Museum in London.
Blblioteca da Academia de Ciencias in Lisbon.
Biblioteca da Sociedade de Geografia in Lisbon.
Archivo Romano of the Society of Jesus in Rome.
Academia da Eistoria in Madrid.
Blbllotheca Vaticana in Rone.
Bibliotheca hacional in liladrid.
Archivo da Propaganda Fide in Rome.
PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS. CONTEMPORARY WORKS 
AND ORAL TRADITIONS
Abreu e Brito, Domingos de: Um Inquerito a Vida Adminstratlva de
Angola e do Brazil. 1592. Published by Alfredo de 
Albuquerque Felner, Coimbra 1951.
Arquivos de Angola. Review of the Angolan Archives. First Series
in 20 parts 1933-1939. Second Series from 1945 continuing.
Barros, JoSo de: Asia. Prlmeira Becada. Edition of Coimbra 1932.
Battcll, Andrew: see Ravenstein (eel.)
Bole tin da Sociede.de de GeogTafUr. do Lisboa. Volume for 1883 contains 
several Jesuit letters from Angola in the sixteenth century. 
Later reprinted by Ga^t&o de Souza Lias: Relay ties de Angola,
Coimbra 1934.
Boxer, C. R.6tf)!>Uma relay£o ined.ita. e contempor&nea da Batalha de Ambuila 
1665”, in I-luseu de Angola No. 2, Luanda IS60.
Brasio, Antonio: Konumenta hissionarta Africans. Africa Occidental.
First Series. Lisbon 1952 continuing. 9 Volumes to date.
Cadornega, Antonio de Oliveira de: Historia Geral das Guerras Angolanas.
Nritten 1680-1681. Edited by Matias Delgado and Alves da Cunha, 
Lisbon 1940-1942.
Carvalho, Henrique Lias de: Sxpedly&o Portugueza ao Muatifinvua. Volume
entitled: Ethnographia e historia tradicional dos Povos da
Lunda. Lisbon 1890.*
—- 0 Jagado de Cassange. Lisbon 1890 or 1898.(?)*
* Post contemporary works containing oral tradition have been treated as 
primary sources and have been marked in the bibliography with an asterisk.
Cavazzi de Kontecuccolo, Giovanni Antonio; Istorica Descrizione de* 
tre regni Congo, Hatamba et Angola situati nell Etiopia 
Jnferiore Occidentale. Written c. 1670* Published Eologna 
1587.
- Historische Beschreibung der in dem untern occidentalischen
Ilohrenland liegenden drei iFonigrelche Congo, Matemba und 
Angola. Munchen 1694. Abridged German translation of the 
above work.
Relation Ilistorique de l’Ethiopie Occidentale. Paris 1752.
5 Volumes. French adaptation of Cavazzi by Father J. B. Labat, 
Cordeiro, Luciano; Questftes Historico-Colonlaes. Lisbon 1955-1936.
3 Volumes. (Collected Documents). Contains six essays by 
early Angolan colonisers previously published separately as 
Hemorlan do Ultramar. Lisbon 1881*
D’Anville, J. B.: Description Geographique de l'Afrique sltu.ee au Sud
de la lip;ne equinociale. 1725* Unpublished Manuscript in 
the library of the Lisbon Geographical Society. Mss Res. I-B-64 
Dapper, 0.; Beschreihung von Afrlka. (German edition.) Amsterdam 1670. 
Duysters, Leon: "Ilistoire des Aluunda.” Problernes de lfAfrique Cuntrale,
Bruxelles, 1938, No. II, (Also available separately.)
Felner, Alfredo de Albuquerque; Angola. Apontamentos sQbre a ocupay&o 
e inicio do estabelecimento dos Portugeses no Congo, Angola 
e Benguela, extraidos de documentos historicos. Coimbra 1933. 
Angola. Apontamentos sdbre a colonizayao dos planaltos e 
litoral do sul de Angola. (Documents.) Lisbon 1940. 3 Volumes
Felner, Alfredo de Albuquerque; (editor) see Abreu e Brito above.
Guerreiro, Fem&o S. J.: Relac£o annual das cousas que fizeram os
Padres da Com'anhia de Jesus nas partes da India Oriental 
das cartas dos memos padres que de la vierSo. 1600-1608. 
(Extracts cited in Brasio.) 2nd Edition of complete work 
Coimbra 1931. 2 Volumes.
Eaveaux, G. L.: La tradition historique des Bapende orientaux. Bruxelles
1954.*
Jadin, L. and J. Cuvelier: LfAncien Congo d'apres les archives Romaines.
(l518-l640) (Documents.) Bruxelles 1954*
Jfi-din, L.: Le Congo et la secte des Antoniens. Restaurantion du royaume
sous Pedro IV et la "Saint Antoine1 congolaise. Monograph 
published from the Bulletin de l'Instltut Historique Beige 
de PLpme. Bruxelles and Rome 1961. (Documents.)
Labat, J. B.: see Cavazzi above.
Lacerda e Almeida, F, J. de; Travessia da Africa. Lisbon 1936.
Lopez, Duarte and Filippo Pigafetta: Description du Royaume de Congo
et des Contrees environantes. 1591. Translated and edited 
by Willy Bal. Louvain 1963.
Neves, A. R.; Memoria da Bxpediy&o a Cassange commandada pelo Ma.jor
Graduado Francisco de Salles Ferreira em I860. Lisbon 1854.*
Newes, A little Porraine. (Pamphlet) London 1641.
Pacheco Pereira, Duarte: Esneraldo de Situ Orbis. 1505. Hakluyt Society 
edition by George Kimble, London 1937.
Paiva Manso, Visconde de; Historia do Congo. (Documents.) Lisbon 1877.
Pigafetta, Filippo: soo Lopes, Duarte above.
Rodrigues, Pero (work edited or commissioned by): Hidnria da R.esid§ncia 
dos Padres da Companhla de Jesus em Angola, e cousas tocantes 
ao reioo e conqulsta. 1.5.1594. Off-print from Arquivo 
Historlco do Portugal, 1936, reprinted in Brasio, Edited 
by Francisco Rodrigues C.J. from Roman Jesuit Archives.
Ravenetein, E. G. (editor): The Strange / dventures of Andrew Battell of
Lelrh in Angola and the ad .joining regions. Reprinted from 
Samuel Purehas: Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas, his Pilgrims,
containing a history of the world, in sea voyages and land 
travels by Englishmen, London 1625» and from Samuel Purchas:
His Pilgrimage London 1613, third edition 1617. Hakluyt Society 
edition, London 1901.
Ruela Pombo: Angola Kenina (1560-1565) (Documents.) Lisbon 1944.
Severim de Faria, Manuel: Historia Portuguesa e de outras provincias
do occidente desde o anno de 1610 ate 0 de 1640. Manuscript 
in the B.H.L. from which extracts have been published by 
Matias Delgado (editor) in Cadornega: Historia Geral das
Guerras, Angolanas* (The original was not consulted.)
Silva Correia, Elias Alexandre da: Historia de Angola, Written circa
1792. Lisbon 1937.
Turner, V. W.: "A Lunda love story and its consequences: selected texts
from traditions collected by Henrique Dias de Carvalho at the
Verhulpen,
court of the Muatianvua in 1887•" Rhodes-Llvingstone Journal 
No. 19. 1955.*
E.: Baluba et BalubaTses. Antwerp 1936.*
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Atkins, Guy: "An outline of Hungu grammar" in Garcia de Orta, Vol II,
No. 2.
BaiHo, A.yH. Cidade and M. Murias: Historia da expans&o portuguesa
no mundo. Lisbon 1937-1940. 3 Volumes.
Bal, If illy: annotations to Lopez-Pigafetta (see above.)
Boxer, C, R.: Salvador de Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola
1602-1686. London 1952.
Catalogo dos Governadores do Reino de Angola. First published by the 
Academia Real das Sciencias in Noticias para a Historia e 
Oeografta das NayPes Ultrar.arlnas, Volume III Part 1. Lisbon 
1825. Reprinted in the review Arquivos de Angola. Luanda 
December 1937.
Cuvelier, J.: LVAnclen Royaume de Congo. Bruxelles 1946.
- IConingin Nzinga van Katamba (1582-1663.) Bruges 1957.
Davidson, Basil: Black Mother. London 1961.
Delgado, Ilatias: annotations to Cadornega (see above.).
Delgado, Ralph: Historia de Angola. Lobito 1948-1955, 4 Volumes to date.
Volume I, second edition, 1961.
- "0 Governo de Souza Coutinho em Angola", in Studia nos. 6 to 
10. Lisbon 1960-1962.
Guthrie, M.: "Some developments in the prehistory of the Bantu languages.
Journal of African History. Volume III, 1962, no. 2.
Leakey, L. S. B.: Tentative Study of the Pleistocene Climatic
Changes and Stone-ige Culture Sequence in North-Eastern 
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Lopes de Lima, Jose Joaquim: Ensaios s8bre a Statistica das Possessfies
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